Vulnerabilities

Emails sent by pretix can utilize placeholders that will be filled with customer data. For example, when {name}<br /> is used in an email template, it will be replaced with the buyer&amp;#39;s <br /> name for the final email. This mechanism contained a security-relevant bug:<br /> <br /> It was possible to exfiltrate information about the pretix system through specially crafted placeholder names such as {{event.__init__.__code__.co_filename}}.<br /> This way, an attacker with the ability to control email templates <br /> (usually every user of the pretix backend) could retrieve sensitive <br /> information from the system configuration, including even database <br /> passwords or API keys. pretix does include mechanisms to prevent the usage of such <br /> malicious placeholders, however due to a mistake in the code, they were <br /> not fully effective for this plugin.<br /> <br /> Out of caution, we recommend that you rotate all passwords and API keys contained in your pretix.cfg https://docs.pretix.eu/self-hosting/config/  file.

Emails sent by pretix can utilize placeholders that will be filled with customer data. For example, when {name}<br /> is used in an email template, it will be replaced with the buyer&amp;#39;s <br /> name for the final email. This mechanism contained a security-relevant bug:<br /> <br /> It was possible to exfiltrate information about the pretix system through specially crafted placeholder names such as {{event.__init__.__code__.co_filename}}.<br /> This way, an attacker with the ability to control email templates <br /> (usually every user of the pretix backend) could retrieve sensitive <br /> information from the system configuration, including even database <br /> passwords or API keys. pretix does include mechanisms to prevent the usage of such <br /> malicious placeholders, however due to a mistake in the code, they were <br /> not fully effective for this plugin.<br /> <br /> Out of caution, we recommend that you rotate all passwords and API keys contained in your pretix.cfg file.

Emails sent by pretix can utilize placeholders that will be filled with customer data. For example, when {name}<br /> is used in an email template, it will be replaced with the buyer&amp;#39;s <br /> name for the final email. This mechanism contained two security-relevant<br /> bugs:<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> * <br /> It was possible to exfiltrate information about the pretix system through specially crafted placeholder names such as {{event.__init__.__code__.co_filename}}.<br /> This way, an attacker with the ability to control email templates <br /> (usually every user of the pretix backend) could retrieve sensitive <br /> information from the system configuration, including even database <br /> passwords or API keys. pretix does include mechanisms to prevent the usage of such <br /> malicious placeholders, however due to a mistake in the code, they were <br /> not fully effective for the email subject.<br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> * <br /> Placeholders in subjects and plain text bodies of emails were <br /> wrongfully evaluated twice. Therefore, if the first evaluation of a <br /> placeholder again contains a placeholder, this second placeholder was <br /> rendered. This allows the rendering of placeholders controlled by the <br /> ticket buyer, and therefore the exploitation of the first issue as a <br /> ticket buyer. Luckily, the only buyer-controlled placeholder available <br /> in pretix by default (that is not validated in a way that prevents the <br /> issue) is {invoice_company}, which is very unusual (but not<br /> impossible) to be contained in an email subject template. In addition <br /> to broadening the attack surface of the first issue, this could <br /> theoretically also leak information about an order to one of the <br /> attendees within that order. However, we also consider this scenario <br /> very unlikely under typical conditions.<br /> <br /> <br /> Out of caution, we recommend that you rotate all passwords and API keys contained in your pretix.cfg https://docs.pretix.eu/self-hosting/config/  file.

Mattermost versions 11.1.x

A vulnerability has been found in zhanghuanhao LibrarySystem 图书馆管理系统 up to 1.1.1. This impacts an unknown function of the file BookController.java. The manipulation leads to improper access controls. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The project was informed of the problem early through an issue report but has not responded yet.

A vulnerability was found in EFM iptime A6004MX 14.18.2. Affected is the function commit_vpncli_file_upload of the file /cgi/timepro.cgi. The manipulation results in unrestricted upload. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

The WhatsApp bridge component in Nanobot binds the WebSocket server to all network interfaces (0.0.0.0) on port 3001 by default and does not require authentication for incoming connections. An unauthenticated remote attacker with network access to the bridge can connect to the WebSocket server to hijack the WhatsApp session. This allows the attacker to send messages on behalf of the user, intercept all incoming messages and media in real-time, and capture authentication QR codes.

Mattermost versions 11.1.x

Mattermost versions 11.1.x

Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Kubysoft, which is triggered through multiple parameters in the &amp;#39;/kForms/app&amp;#39; endpoint. This issue allows malicious scripts to be injected and executed persistently in the context of users accessing the affected resource.

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability reflected in Kubysoft, which occurs through multiple parameters within the endpoint ‘/node/kudaby/nodeFN/procedure’. This flaw allows the injection of arbitrary client-side scripts, which are immediately reflected in the HTTP response and executed in the victim&amp;#39;s browser.

Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Kubysoft, where uploaded SVG images are not properly sanitized. This allows attackers to embed malicious scripts within SVG files as visual content, which are then stored on the server and executed in the context of any user accessing the compromised resource.