Vulnerabilities

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> mptcp: pm: only set fullmesh for subflow endp<br /> <br /> With the in-kernel path-manager, it is possible to change the &amp;#39;fullmesh&amp;#39;<br /> flag. The code in mptcp_pm_nl_fullmesh() expects to change it only on<br /> &amp;#39;subflow&amp;#39; endpoints, to recreate more or less subflows using the linked<br /> address.<br /> <br /> Unfortunately, the set_flags() hook was a bit more permissive, and<br /> allowed &amp;#39;implicit&amp;#39; endpoints to get the &amp;#39;fullmesh&amp;#39; flag while it is not<br /> allowed before.<br /> <br /> That&amp;#39;s what syzbot found, triggering the following warning:<br /> <br /> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6499 at net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1496 __mark_subflow_endp_available net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1496 [inline]<br /> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6499 at net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1496 mptcp_pm_nl_fullmesh net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1980 [inline]<br /> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6499 at net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1496 mptcp_nl_set_flags net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:2003 [inline]<br /> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6499 at net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1496 mptcp_pm_nl_set_flags+0x974/0xdc0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:2064<br /> Modules linked in:<br /> CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 6499 Comm: syz.1.413 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00172-gd1bf27c4e176 #0<br /> Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024<br /> RIP: 0010:__mark_subflow_endp_available net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1496 [inline]<br /> RIP: 0010:mptcp_pm_nl_fullmesh net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:1980 [inline]<br /> RIP: 0010:mptcp_nl_set_flags net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:2003 [inline]<br /> RIP: 0010:mptcp_pm_nl_set_flags+0x974/0xdc0 net/mptcp/pm_netlink.c:2064<br /> Code: 01 00 00 49 89 c5 e8 fb 45 e8 f5 e9 b8 fc ff ff e8 f1 45 e8 f5 4c 89 f7 be 03 00 00 00 e8 44 1d 0b f9 eb a0 e8 dd 45 e8 f5 90 0b 90 e9 17 ff ff ff 89 d9 80 e1 07 38 c1 0f 8c c9 fc ff ff 48<br /> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000d307240 EFLAGS: 00010293<br /> RAX: ffffffff8bb72e03 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff88807da88000<br /> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000<br /> RBP: ffffc9000d307430 R08: ffffffff8bb72cf0 R09: 1ffff1100b842a5e<br /> R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100b842a5f R12: ffff88801e2e5ac0<br /> R13: ffff88805c214800 R14: ffff88805c2152e8 R15: 1ffff1100b842a5d<br /> FS: 00005555619f6500(0000) GS:ffff8880b8600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000<br /> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033<br /> CR2: 0000000020002840 CR3: 00000000247e6000 CR4: 00000000003526f0<br /> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000<br /> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:1115 [inline]<br /> genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:1195 [inline]<br /> genl_rcv_msg+0xb14/0xec0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1210<br /> netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2542<br /> genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:1219<br /> netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1321 [inline]<br /> netlink_unicast+0x7f6/0x990 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1347<br /> netlink_sendmsg+0x8e4/0xcb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1891<br /> sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]<br /> __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:726<br /> ____sys_sendmsg+0x52a/0x7e0 net/socket.c:2583<br /> ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2637 [inline]<br /> __sys_sendmsg+0x269/0x350 net/socket.c:2669<br /> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]<br /> do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83<br /> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f<br /> RIP: 0033:0x7f5fe8785d29<br /> Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48<br /> RSP: 002b:00007fff571f5558 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e<br /> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f5fe8975fa0 RCX: 00007f5fe8785d29<br /> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000480 RDI: 0000000000000007<br /> RBP: 00007f5fe8801b08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000<br /> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000<br /> R13: 00007f5fe8975fa0 R14: 00007f5fe8975fa0 R15: 000000<br /> ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> kernel: be more careful about dup_mmap() failures and uprobe registering<br /> <br /> If a memory allocation fails during dup_mmap(), the maple tree can be left<br /> in an unsafe state for other iterators besides the exit path. All the<br /> locks are dropped before the exit_mmap() call (in mm/mmap.c), but the<br /> incomplete mm_struct can be reached through (at least) the rmap finding<br /> the vmas which have a pointer back to the mm_struct.<br /> <br /> Up to this point, there have been no issues with being able to find an<br /> mm_struct that was only partially initialised. Syzbot was able to make<br /> the incomplete mm_struct fail with recent forking changes, so it has been<br /> proven unsafe to use the mm_struct that hasn&amp;#39;t been initialised, as<br /> referenced in the link below.<br /> <br /> Although 8ac662f5da19f ("fork: avoid inappropriate uprobe access to<br /> invalid mm") fixed the uprobe access, it does not completely remove the<br /> race.<br /> <br /> This patch sets the MMF_OOM_SKIP to avoid the iteration of the vmas on the<br /> oom side (even though this is extremely unlikely to be selected as an oom<br /> victim in the race window), and sets MMF_UNSTABLE to avoid other potential<br /> users from using a partially initialised mm_struct.<br /> <br /> When registering vmas for uprobe, skip the vmas in an mm that is marked<br /> unstable. Modifying a vma in an unstable mm may cause issues if the mm<br /> isn&amp;#39;t fully initialised.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> tcp: correct handling of extreme memory squeeze<br /> <br /> Testing with iperf3 using the "pasta" protocol splicer has revealed<br /> a problem in the way tcp handles window advertising in extreme memory<br /> squeeze situations.<br /> <br /> Under memory pressure, a socket endpoint may temporarily advertise<br /> a zero-sized window, but this is not stored as part of the socket data.<br /> The reasoning behind this is that it is considered a temporary setting<br /> which shouldn&amp;#39;t influence any further calculations.<br /> <br /> However, if we happen to stall at an unfortunate value of the current<br /> window size, the algorithm selecting a new value will consistently fail<br /> to advertise a non-zero window once we have freed up enough memory.<br /> This means that this side&amp;#39;s notion of the current window size is<br /> different from the one last advertised to the peer, causing the latter<br /> to not send any data to resolve the sitution.<br /> <br /> The problem occurs on the iperf3 server side, and the socket in question<br /> is a completely regular socket with the default settings for the<br /> fedora40 kernel. We do not use SO_PEEK or SO_RCVBUF on the socket.<br /> <br /> The following excerpt of a logging session, with own comments added,<br /> shows more in detail what is happening:<br /> <br /> // tcp_v4_rcv(-&gt;)<br /> // tcp_rcv_established(-&gt;)<br /> [520139222]: ==== Activating log @ net/ipv4/tcp_input.c/tcp_data_queue()/5257 ====<br /> [520139222]: tcp_data_queue(-&gt;)<br /> [520139222]: DROPPING skb [265600160..265665640], reason: SKB_DROP_REASON_PROTO_MEM<br /> [rcv_nxt 265600160, rcv_wnd 262144, snt_ack 265469200, win_now 131184]<br /> [copied_seq 259909392-&gt;260034360 (124968), unread 5565800, qlen 85, ofoq 0]<br /> [OFO queue: gap: 65480, len: 0]<br /> [520139222]: tcp_data_queue()<br /> [tp-&gt;rcv_wup: 265469200, tp-&gt;rcv_wnd: 262144, tp-&gt;rcv_nxt 265600160]<br /> [520139222]: tcp_select_window(-&gt;)<br /> [520139222]: (inet_csk(sk)-&gt;icsk_ack.pending &amp; ICSK_ACK_NOMEM) ? --&gt; TRUE<br /> [tp-&gt;rcv_wup: 265469200, tp-&gt;rcv_wnd: 262144, tp-&gt;rcv_nxt 265600160]<br /> returning 0<br /> [520139222]: tcp_select_window() tp-&gt;rcv_wup: 265469200, tp-&gt;rcv_wnd: 262144, tp-&gt;rcv_nxt 265600160<br /> [520139222]: [new_win = 0, win_now = 131184, 2 * win_now = 262368]<br /> [520139222]: [new_win &gt;= (2 * win_now) ? --&gt; time_to_ack = 0]<br /> [520139222]: NOT calling tcp_send_ack()<br /> [tp-&gt;rcv_wup: 265469200, tp-&gt;rcv_wnd: 262144, tp-&gt;rcv_nxt 265600160]<br /> [520139222]: __tcp_cleanup_rbuf(260040464 (0), unread 5559696, qlen 85, ofoq 0]<br /> returning 6104 bytes<br /> [520139222]: tcp_recvmsg_locked(rcv_wnd.<br /> // Meanwhile, the peer thinks the window is zero, and will not send<br /> // any more data to trigger an update from the interrupt mode side.<br /> <br /> [520139222]: tcp_recvmsg_locked(-&gt;)<br /> [520139222]: __tcp_cleanup_rbuf(-&gt;) tp-&gt;rcv_wup: 265469200, tp-&gt;rcv_wnd: 262144, tp-&gt;rcv_nxt 265600160<br /> [520139222]: [new_win = 262144, win_now = 131184, 2 * win_n<br /> ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> md/md-bitmap: Synchronize bitmap_get_stats() with bitmap lifetime<br /> <br /> After commit ec6bb299c7c3 ("md/md-bitmap: add &amp;#39;sync_size&amp;#39; into struct<br /> md_bitmap_stats"), following panic is reported:<br /> <br /> Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address<br /> RIP: 0010:bitmap_get_stats+0x2b/0xa0<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> md_seq_show+0x2d2/0x5b0<br /> seq_read_iter+0x2b9/0x470<br /> seq_read+0x12f/0x180<br /> proc_reg_read+0x57/0xb0<br /> vfs_read+0xf6/0x380<br /> ksys_read+0x6c/0xf0<br /> do_syscall_64+0x82/0x170<br /> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e<br /> <br /> Root cause is that bitmap_get_stats() can be called at anytime if mddev<br /> is still there, even if bitmap is destroyed, or not fully initialized.<br /> Deferenceing bitmap in this case can crash the kernel. Meanwhile, the<br /> above commit start to deferencing bitmap-&gt;storage, make the problem<br /> easier to trigger.<br /> <br /> Fix the problem by protecting bitmap_get_stats() with bitmap_info.mutex.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> powerpc/pseries/iommu: Don&amp;#39;t unset window if it was never set<br /> <br /> On pSeries, when user attempts to use the same vfio container used by<br /> different iommu group, the spapr_tce_set_window() returns -EPERM<br /> and the subsequent cleanup leads to the below crash.<br /> <br /> Kernel attempted to read user page (308) - exploit attempt?<br /> BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000308<br /> Faulting instruction address: 0xc0000000001ce358<br /> Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]<br /> NIP: c0000000001ce358 LR: c0000000001ce05c CTR: c00000000005add0<br /> <br /> NIP [c0000000001ce358] spapr_tce_unset_window+0x3b8/0x510<br /> LR [c0000000001ce05c] spapr_tce_unset_window+0xbc/0x510<br /> Call Trace:<br /> spapr_tce_unset_window+0xbc/0x510 (unreliable)<br /> tce_iommu_attach_group+0x24c/0x340 [vfio_iommu_spapr_tce]<br /> vfio_container_attach_group+0xec/0x240 [vfio]<br /> vfio_group_fops_unl_ioctl+0x548/0xb00 [vfio]<br /> sys_ioctl+0x754/0x1580<br /> system_call_exception+0x13c/0x330<br /> system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec<br /> <br /> --- interrupt: 3000<br /> <br /> Fix this by having null check for the tbl passed to the<br /> spapr_tce_unset_window().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> wifi: wilc1000: unregister wiphy only if it has been registered<br /> <br /> There is a specific error path in probe functions in wilc drivers (both<br /> sdio and spi) which can lead to kernel panic, as this one for example<br /> when using SPI:<br /> <br /> Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 9f000000 when read<br /> [9f000000] *pgd=00000000<br /> Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] ARM<br /> Modules linked in: wilc1000_spi(+) crc_itu_t crc7 wilc1000 cfg80211 bluetooth ecdh_generic ecc<br /> CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 106 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.13.0-rc3+ #22<br /> Hardware name: Atmel SAMA5<br /> PC is at wiphy_unregister+0x244/0xc40 [cfg80211]<br /> LR is at wiphy_unregister+0x1c0/0xc40 [cfg80211]<br /> [...]<br /> wiphy_unregister [cfg80211] from wilc_netdev_cleanup+0x380/0x494 [wilc1000]<br /> wilc_netdev_cleanup [wilc1000] from wilc_bus_probe+0x360/0x834 [wilc1000_spi]<br /> wilc_bus_probe [wilc1000_spi] from spi_probe+0x15c/0x1d4<br /> spi_probe from really_probe+0x270/0xb2c<br /> really_probe from __driver_probe_device+0x1dc/0x4e8<br /> __driver_probe_device from driver_probe_device+0x5c/0x140<br /> driver_probe_device from __driver_attach+0x220/0x540<br /> __driver_attach from bus_for_each_dev+0x13c/0x1a8<br /> bus_for_each_dev from bus_add_driver+0x2a0/0x6a4<br /> bus_add_driver from driver_register+0x27c/0x51c<br /> driver_register from do_one_initcall+0xf8/0x564<br /> do_one_initcall from do_init_module+0x2e4/0x82c<br /> do_init_module from load_module+0x59a0/0x70c4<br /> load_module from init_module_from_file+0x100/0x148<br /> init_module_from_file from sys_finit_module+0x2fc/0x924<br /> sys_finit_module from ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x1c<br /> <br /> The issue can easily be reproduced, for example by not wiring correctly<br /> a wilc device through SPI (and so, make it unresponsive to early SPI<br /> commands). It is due to a recent change decoupling wiphy allocation from<br /> wiphy registration, however wilc_netdev_cleanup has not been updated<br /> accordingly, letting it possibly call wiphy unregister on a wiphy which<br /> has never been registered.<br /> <br /> Fix this crash by moving wiphy_unregister/wiphy_free out of<br /> wilc_netdev_cleanup, and by adjusting error paths in both drivers

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> HID: hid-thrustmaster: Fix warning in thrustmaster_probe by adding endpoint check<br /> <br /> syzbot has found a type mismatch between a USB pipe and the transfer<br /> endpoint, which is triggered by the hid-thrustmaster driver[1].<br /> There is a number of similar, already fixed issues [2].<br /> In this case as in others, implementing check for endpoint type fixes the issue.<br /> <br /> [1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=040e8b3db6a96908d470<br /> [2] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=348331f63b034f89b622

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ptr_ring: do not block hard interrupts in ptr_ring_resize_multiple()<br /> <br /> Jakub added a lockdep_assert_no_hardirq() check in __page_pool_put_page()<br /> to increase test coverage.<br /> <br /> syzbot found a splat caused by hard irq blocking in<br /> ptr_ring_resize_multiple() [1]<br /> <br /> As current users of ptr_ring_resize_multiple() do not require<br /> hard irqs being masked, replace it to only block BH.<br /> <br /> Rename helpers to better reflect they are safe against BH only.<br /> <br /> - ptr_ring_resize_multiple() to ptr_ring_resize_multiple_bh()<br /> - skb_array_resize_multiple() to skb_array_resize_multiple_bh()<br /> <br /> [1]<br /> <br /> WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9150 at net/core/page_pool.c:709 __page_pool_put_page net/core/page_pool.c:709 [inline]<br /> WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9150 at net/core/page_pool.c:709 page_pool_put_unrefed_netmem+0x157/0xa40 net/core/page_pool.c:780<br /> Modules linked in:<br /> CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9150 Comm: syz.1.1052 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc3-syzkaller-00202-gf8669d7b5f5d #0<br /> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024<br /> RIP: 0010:__page_pool_put_page net/core/page_pool.c:709 [inline]<br /> RIP: 0010:page_pool_put_unrefed_netmem+0x157/0xa40 net/core/page_pool.c:780<br /> Code: 74 0e e8 7c aa fb f7 eb 43 e8 75 aa fb f7 eb 3c 65 8b 1d 38 a8 6a 76 31 ff 89 de e8 a3 ae fb f7 85 db 74 0b e8 5a aa fb f7 90 0b 90 eb 1d 65 8b 1d 15 a8 6a 76 31 ff 89 de e8 84 ae fb f7 85<br /> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000bda6b58 EFLAGS: 00010083<br /> RAX: ffffffff8997e523 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000040000<br /> RDX: ffffc9000fbd0000 RSI: 0000000000001842 RDI: 0000000000001843<br /> RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff8997df2c R09: 1ffffd40003a000d<br /> R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff940003a000e R12: ffffea0001d00040<br /> R13: ffff88802e8a4000 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff<br /> FS: 00007fb7aaf716c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000<br /> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033<br /> CR2: 00007fa15a0d4b72 CR3: 00000000561b0000 CR4: 00000000003506f0<br /> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000<br /> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> tun_ptr_free drivers/net/tun.c:617 [inline]<br /> __ptr_ring_swap_queue include/linux/ptr_ring.h:571 [inline]<br /> ptr_ring_resize_multiple_noprof include/linux/ptr_ring.h:643 [inline]<br /> tun_queue_resize drivers/net/tun.c:3694 [inline]<br /> tun_device_event+0xaaf/0x1080 drivers/net/tun.c:3714<br /> notifier_call_chain+0x19f/0x3e0 kernel/notifier.c:93<br /> call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2032 [inline]<br /> call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2046 [inline]<br /> dev_change_tx_queue_len+0x158/0x2a0 net/core/dev.c:9024<br /> do_setlink+0xff6/0x41f0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2923<br /> rtnl_setlink+0x40d/0x5a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3201<br /> rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x73f/0xcf0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6647<br /> netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> OPP: add index check to assert to avoid buffer overflow in _read_freq()<br /> <br /> Pass the freq index to the assert function to make sure<br /> we do not read a freq out of the opp-&gt;rates[] table when called<br /> from the indexed variants:<br /> dev_pm_opp_find_freq_exact_indexed() or<br /> dev_pm_opp_find_freq_ceil/floor_indexed().<br /> <br /> Add a secondary parameter to the assert function, unused<br /> for assert_single_clk() then add assert_clk_index() which<br /> will check for the clock index when called from the _indexed()<br /> find functions.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> powerpc/pseries/iommu: IOMMU incorrectly marks MMIO range in DDW<br /> <br /> Power Hypervisor can possibily allocate MMIO window intersecting with<br /> Dynamic DMA Window (DDW) range, which is over 32-bit addressing.<br /> <br /> These MMIO pages needs to be marked as reserved so that IOMMU doesn&amp;#39;t map<br /> DMA buffers in this range.<br /> <br /> The current code is not marking these pages correctly which is resulting<br /> in LPAR to OOPS while booting. The stack is at below<br /> <br /> BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on read at 0xc00800005cd40000<br /> Faulting instruction address: 0xc00000000005cdac<br /> Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]<br /> LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries<br /> Modules linked in: af_packet rfkill ibmveth(X) lpfc(+) nvmet_fc nvmet nvme_keyring crct10dif_vpmsum nvme_fc nvme_fabrics nvme_core be2net(+) nvme_auth rtc_generic nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc fuse configfs ip_tables x_tables xfs libcrc32c dm_service_time ibmvfc(X) scsi_transport_fc vmx_crypto gf128mul crc32c_vpmsum dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_multipath dm_mod sd_mod scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_alua t10_pi crc64_rocksoft_generic crc64_rocksoft sg crc64 scsi_mod<br /> Supported: Yes, External<br /> CPU: 8 PID: 241 Comm: kworker/8:1 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.4.0-150600.23.14-default #1 SLE15-SP6 b44ee71c81261b9e4bab5e0cde1f2ed891d5359b<br /> Hardware name: IBM,9080-M9S POWER9 (raw) 0x4e2103 0xf000005 of:IBM,FW950.B0 (VH950_149) hv:phyp pSeries<br /> Workqueue: events work_for_cpu_fn<br /> NIP: c00000000005cdac LR: c00000000005e830 CTR: 0000000000000000<br /> REGS: c00001400c9ff770 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.4.0-150600.23.14-default)<br /> MSR: 800000000280b033 CR: 24228448 XER: 00000001<br /> CFAR: c00000000005cdd4 DAR: c00800005cd40000 DSISR: 40000000 IRQMASK: 0<br /> GPR00: c00000000005e830 c00001400c9ffa10 c000000001987d00 c00001400c4fe800<br /> GPR04: 0000080000000000 0000000000000001 0000000004000000 0000000000800000<br /> GPR08: 0000000004000000 0000000000000001 c00800005cd40000 ffffffffffffffff<br /> GPR12: 0000000084228882 c00000000a4c4f00 0000000000000010 0000080000000000<br /> GPR16: c00001400c4fe800 0000000004000000 0800000000000000 c00000006088b800<br /> GPR20: c00001401a7be980 c00001400eff3800 c000000002a2da68 000000000000002b<br /> GPR24: c0000000026793a8 c000000002679368 000000000000002a c0000000026793c8<br /> GPR28: 000008007effffff 0000080000000000 0000000000800000 c00001400c4fe800<br /> NIP [c00000000005cdac] iommu_table_reserve_pages+0xac/0x100<br /> LR [c00000000005e830] iommu_init_table+0x80/0x1e0<br /> Call Trace:<br /> [c00001400c9ffa10] [c00000000005e810] iommu_init_table+0x60/0x1e0 (unreliable)<br /> [c00001400c9ffa90] [c00000000010356c] iommu_bypass_supported_pSeriesLP+0x9cc/0xe40<br /> [c00001400c9ffc30] [c00000000005c300] dma_iommu_dma_supported+0xf0/0x230<br /> [c00001400c9ffcb0] [c00000000024b0c4] dma_supported+0x44/0x90<br /> [c00001400c9ffcd0] [c00000000024b14c] dma_set_mask+0x3c/0x80<br /> [c00001400c9ffd00] [c0080000555b715c] be_probe+0xc4/0xb90 [be2net]<br /> [c00001400c9ffdc0] [c000000000986f3c] local_pci_probe+0x6c/0x110<br /> [c00001400c9ffe40] [c000000000188f28] work_for_cpu_fn+0x38/0x60<br /> [c00001400c9ffe70] [c00000000018e454] process_one_work+0x314/0x620<br /> [c00001400c9fff10] [c00000000018f280] worker_thread+0x2b0/0x620<br /> [c00001400c9fff90] [c00000000019bb18] kthread+0x148/0x150<br /> [c00001400c9fffe0] [c00000000000ded8] start_kernel_thread+0x14/0x18<br /> <br /> There are 2 issues in the code<br /> <br /> 1. The index is "int" while the address is "unsigned long". This results in<br /> negative value when setting the bitmap.<br /> <br /> 2. The DMA offset is page shifted but the MMIO range is used as-is (64-bit<br /> address). MMIO address needs to be page shifted as well.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> wifi: mt76: mt7925: fix off by one in mt7925_load_clc()<br /> <br /> This comparison should be &gt;= instead of &gt; to prevent an out of bounds<br /> read and write.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> wifi: rtw89: chan: fix soft lockup in rtw89_entity_recalc_mgnt_roles()<br /> <br /> During rtw89_entity_recalc_mgnt_roles(), there is a normalizing process<br /> which will re-order the list if an entry with target pattern is found.<br /> And once one is found, should have aborted the list_for_each_entry. But,<br /> `break` just aborted the inner for-loop. The outer list_for_each_entry<br /> still continues. Normally, only the first entry will match the target<br /> pattern, and the re-ordering will change nothing, so there won&amp;#39;t be<br /> soft lockup. However, in some special cases, soft lockup would happen.<br /> <br /> Fix it by `goto fill` to break from the list_for_each_entry.<br /> <br /> The following is a sample of kernel log for this problem.<br /> <br /> watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 26s! [wpa_supplicant:2055]<br /> [...]<br /> RIP: 0010:rtw89_entity_recalc ([...] chan.c:392 chan.c:479) rtw89_core<br /> [...]