Vulnerabilities

Artha ~ The Open Thesaurus 1.0.3.0 has a Buffer Overflow.

An issue was discovered on Phoenix Contact AXC F 2152 (No.2404267) before 2019.0 LTS and AXC F 2152 STARTERKIT (No.1046568) before 2019.0 LTS devices. Unlimited physical access to the PLC may lead to a manipulation of SD cards data. SD card manipulation may lead to an authentication bypass opportunity.

An XSS issue was discovered in i-doit Open 1.12 via the src/tools/php/qr/qr.php url parameter.

In UrBackup 2.2.6, an attacker can send a malformed request to the client over the network, and trigger a fileservplugin/CClientThread.cpp CClientThread::ProcessPacket metadata_id!=0 assertion, leading to shutting down the client application.

OX App Suite 7.10.1 and earlier allows Information Exposure.

Craft CMS before 3.1.31 does not properly filter XML feeds and thus allowing XSS.

app/Model/Server.php in MISP 2.4.109 allows remote command execution by a super administrator because the PHP file_exists function is used with user-controlled entries, and phar:// URLs trigger deserialization.

In radare2 through 3.5.1, cmd_mount in libr/core/cmd_mount.c has a double free for the ms command.

Recently it was discovered as a part of the research on IoT devices in the most recent firmware for Shekar Endoscope that an attacker connected to the device Wi-Fi SSID can exploit a memory corruption issue and execute remote code on the device. This device acts as an Endoscope camera that allows its users to use it in various industrial systems and settings, car garages, and also in some cases in the medical clinics to get access to areas that are difficult for a human being to reach. Any breach of this system can allow an attacker to get access to video feed and pictures viewed by that user and might allow them to get a foot hold in air gapped networks especially in case of nation critical infrastructure/industries. The firmware contains binary uvc_stream that is the UDP daemon which is responsible for handling all the UDP requests that the device receives. The client application sends a UDP request to change the Wi-Fi name which contains the following format: "SETCMD0001+0002+[2 byte length of wifipassword]+[Wifipassword]. This request is handled by "control_Dev_thread" function which at address "0x00409AE4" compares the incoming request and determines if the 10th byte is 02 and if it is then it redirects to 0x0040A7D8, which calls the function "setwifipassword". The function "setwifipassword" uses a memcpy function but uses the length of the payload obtained by using strlen function as the third parameter which is the number of bytes to copy and this allows an attacker to overflow the function and control the $PC value.

Recently it was discovered as a part of the research on IoT devices in the most recent firmware for Shekar Endoscope that the desktop application used to connect to the device suffers from a stack overflow if more than 26 characters are passed to it as the Wi-Fi name. This application is installed on the device and an attacker who can provide the right payload can execute code on the user's system directly. Any breach of this system can allow an attacker to get access to all the data that the user has access too. The application uses a dynamic link library(DLL) called "avilib.dll" which is used by the application to send binary packets to the device that allow to control the device. One such action that the DLL provides is change password in the function "sendchangename" which allows a user to change the Wi-Fi name on the device. This function calls a sub function "sub_75876EA0" at address 0x758784F8. The function determines which action to execute based on the parameters sent to it. The "sendchangename" passes the datastring as the second argument which is the name we enter in the textbox and integer 1 as first argument. The rest of the 3 arguments are set to 0. The function "sub_75876EA0" at address 0x75876F19 uses the first argument received and to determine which block to jump to. Since the argument passed is 1, it jumps to 0x75876F20 and proceeds from there to address 0x75876F56 which calculates the length of the data string passed as the first parameter. This length and the first argument are then passed to the address 0x75877001 which calls the memmove function which uses a stack address as the destination where the password typed by us is passed as the source and length calculated above is passed as the number of bytes to copy which leads to a stack overflow.

Recently it was discovered as a part of the research on IoT devices in the most recent firmware for Shekar Endoscope that the desktop application used to connect to the device suffers from a stack overflow if more than 26 characters are passed to it as the Wi-Fi password. This application is installed on the device and an attacker who can provide the right payload can execute code on the user's system directly. Any breach of this system can allow an attacker to get access to all the data that the user has access too. The application uses a dynamic link library(DLL) called "avilib.dll" which is used by the application to send binary packets to the device that allow to control the device. One such action that the DLL provides is change password in the function "sendchangepass" which allows a user to change the Wi-Fi password on the device. This function calls a sub function "sub_75876EA0" at address 0x7587857C. The function determines which action to execute based on the parameters sent to it. The "sendchangepass" passes the datastring as the second argument which is the password we enter in the textbox and integer 2 as first argument. The rest of the 3 arguments are set to 0. The function "sub_75876EA0" at address 0x75876F19 uses the first argument received and to determine which block to jump to. Since the argument passed is 2, it jumps to 0x7587718C and proceeds from there to address 0x758771C2 which calculates the length of the data string passed as the first parameter.This length and the first argument are then passed to the address 0x7587726F which calls a memmove function which uses a stack address as the destination where the password typed by us is passed as the source and length calculated above is passed as the number of bytes to copy which leads to a stack overflow.

Recently it was discovered as a part of the research on IoT devices in the most recent firmware for Shekar Endoscope that an attacker connected to the device Wi-Fi SSID can exploit a memory corruption issue and execute remote code on the device. This device acts as an Endoscope camera that allows its users to use it in various industrial systems and settings, car garages, and also in some cases in the medical clinics to get access to areas that are difficult for a human being to reach. Any breach of this system can allow an attacker to get access to video feed and pictures viewed by that user and might allow them to get a foot hold in air gapped networks especially in case of nation critical infrastructure/industries. The firmware contains binary uvc_stream that is the UDP daemon which is responsible for handling all the UDP requests that the device receives. The client application sends a UDP request to change the Wi-Fi name which contains the following format: "SETCMD0001+0001+[2 byte length of wifiname]+[Wifiname]. This request is handled by "control_Dev_thread" function which at address "0x00409AE0" compares the incoming request and determines if the 10th byte is 01 and if it is then it redirects to 0x0040A74C which calls the function "setwifiname". The function "setwifiname" uses a memcpy function but uses the length of the payload obtained by using strlen function as the third parameter which is the number of bytes to copy and this allows an attacker to overflow the function and control the $PC value.