Vulnerabilities

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> scsi: iscsi: Fix iscsi_task use after free<br /> <br /> Commit d39df158518c ("scsi: iscsi: Have abort handler get ref to conn")<br /> added iscsi_get_conn()/iscsi_put_conn() calls during abort handling but<br /> then also changed the handling of the case where we detect an already<br /> completed task where we now end up doing a goto to the common put/cleanup<br /> code. This results in a iscsi_task use after free, because the common<br /> cleanup code will do a put on the iscsi_task.<br /> <br /> This reverts the goto and moves the iscsi_get_conn() to after we&amp;#39;ve checked<br /> if the iscsi_task is valid.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> powerpc/64s: fix program check interrupt emergency stack path<br /> <br /> Emergency stack path was jumping into a 3: label inside the<br /> __GEN_COMMON_BODY macro for the normal path after it had finished,<br /> rather than jumping over it. By a small miracle this is the correct<br /> place to build up a new interrupt frame with the existing stack<br /> pointer, so things basically worked okay with an added weird looking<br /> 700 trap frame on top (which had the wrong -&gt;nip so it didn&amp;#39;t decode<br /> bug messages either).<br /> <br /> Fix this by avoiding using numeric labels when jumping over non-trivial<br /> macros.<br /> <br /> Before:<br /> <br /> LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV<br /> Modules linked in:<br /> CPU: 0 PID: 88 Comm: sh Not tainted 5.15.0-rc2-00034-ge057cdade6e5 #2637<br /> NIP: 7265677368657265 LR: c00000000006c0c8 CTR: c0000000000097f0<br /> REGS: c0000000fffb3a50 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted<br /> MSR: 9000000000021031 CR: 00000700 XER: 20040000<br /> CFAR: c0000000000098b0 IRQMASK: 0<br /> GPR00: c00000000006c964 c0000000fffb3cf0 c000000001513800 0000000000000000<br /> GPR04: 0000000048ab0778 0000000042000000 0000000000000000 0000000000001299<br /> GPR08: 000001e447c718ec 0000000022424282 0000000000002710 c00000000006bee8<br /> GPR12: 9000000000009033 c0000000016b0000 00000000000000b0 0000000000000001<br /> GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 0000000000000ff8<br /> GPR20: 0000000000001fff 0000000000000007 0000000000000080 00007fff89d90158<br /> GPR24: 0000000002000000 0000000002000000 0000000000000255 0000000000000300<br /> GPR28: c000000001270000 0000000042000000 0000000048ab0778 c000000080647e80<br /> NIP [7265677368657265] 0x7265677368657265<br /> LR [c00000000006c0c8] ___do_page_fault+0x3f8/0xb10<br /> Call Trace:<br /> [c0000000fffb3cf0] [c00000000000bdac] soft_nmi_common+0x13c/0x1d0 (unreliable)<br /> --- interrupt: 700 at decrementer_common_virt+0xb8/0x230<br /> NIP: c0000000000098b8 LR: c00000000006c0c8 CTR: c0000000000097f0<br /> REGS: c0000000fffb3d60 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted<br /> MSR: 9000000000021031 CR: 22424282 XER: 20040000<br /> CFAR: c0000000000098b0 IRQMASK: 0<br /> GPR00: c00000000006c964 0000000000002400 c000000001513800 0000000000000000<br /> GPR04: 0000000048ab0778 0000000042000000 0000000000000000 0000000000001299<br /> GPR08: 000001e447c718ec 0000000022424282 0000000000002710 c00000000006bee8<br /> GPR12: 9000000000009033 c0000000016b0000 00000000000000b0 0000000000000001<br /> GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 0000000000000ff8<br /> GPR20: 0000000000001fff 0000000000000007 0000000000000080 00007fff89d90158<br /> GPR24: 0000000002000000 0000000002000000 0000000000000255 0000000000000300<br /> GPR28: c000000001270000 0000000042000000 0000000048ab0778 c000000080647e80<br /> NIP [c0000000000098b8] decrementer_common_virt+0xb8/0x230<br /> LR [c00000000006c0c8] ___do_page_fault+0x3f8/0xb10<br /> --- interrupt: 700<br /> Instruction dump:<br /> XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX<br /> XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX<br /> ---[ end trace 6d28218e0cc3c949 ]---<br /> <br /> After:<br /> <br /> ------------[ cut here ]------------<br /> kernel BUG at arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S:491!<br /> Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]<br /> LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA PowerNV<br /> Modules linked in:<br /> CPU: 0 PID: 88 Comm: login Not tainted 5.15.0-rc2-00034-ge057cdade6e5-dirty #2638<br /> NIP: c0000000000098b8 LR: c00000000006bf04 CTR: c0000000000097f0<br /> REGS: c0000000fffb3d60 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted<br /> MSR: 9000000000021031 CR: 24482227 XER: 00040000<br /> CFAR: c0000000000098b0 IRQMASK: 0<br /> GPR00: c00000000006bf04 0000000000002400 c000000001513800 c000000001271868<br /> GPR04: 00000000100f0d29 0000000042000000 0000000000000007 0000000000000009<br /> GPR08: 00000000100f0d29 0000000024482227 0000000000002710 c000000000181b3c<br /> GPR12: 9000000000009033 c0000000016b0000 00000000100f0d29 c000000005b22f00<br /> GPR16: 00000000ffff0000 0000000000000001 0000000000000009 00000000100eed90<br /> GPR20: 00000000100eed90 00000<br /> ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> powerpc/64s: Fix unrecoverable MCE calling async handler from NMI<br /> <br /> The machine check handler is not considered NMI on 64s. The early<br /> handler is the true NMI handler, and then it schedules the<br /> machine_check_exception handler to run when interrupts are enabled.<br /> <br /> This works fine except the case of an unrecoverable MCE, where the true<br /> NMI is taken when MSR[RI] is clear, it can not recover, so it calls<br /> machine_check_exception directly so something might be done about it.<br /> <br /> Calling an async handler from NMI context can result in irq state and<br /> other things getting corrupted. This can also trigger the BUG at<br /> arch/powerpc/include/asm/interrupt.h:168<br /> BUG_ON(!arch_irq_disabled_regs(regs) &amp;&amp; !(regs-&gt;msr &amp; MSR_EE));<br /> <br /> Fix this by making an _async version of the handler which is called<br /> in the normal case, and a NMI version that is called for unrecoverable<br /> interrupts.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> x86/entry: Clear X86_FEATURE_SMAP when CONFIG_X86_SMAP=n<br /> <br /> Commit<br /> <br /> 3c73b81a9164 ("x86/entry, selftests: Further improve user entry sanity checks")<br /> <br /> added a warning if AC is set when in the kernel.<br /> <br /> Commit<br /> <br /> 662a0221893a3d ("x86/entry: Fix AC assertion")<br /> <br /> changed the warning to only fire if the CPU supports SMAP.<br /> <br /> However, the warning can still trigger on a machine that supports SMAP<br /> but where it&amp;#39;s disabled in the kernel config and when running the<br /> syscall_nt selftest, for example:<br /> <br /> ------------[ cut here ]------------<br /> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 49 at irqentry_enter_from_user_mode<br /> CPU: 0 PID: 49 Comm: init Tainted: G T 5.15.0-rc4+ #98 e6202628ee053b4f310759978284bd8bb0ce6905<br /> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014<br /> RIP: 0010:irqentry_enter_from_user_mode<br /> ...<br /> Call Trace:<br /> ? irqentry_enter<br /> ? exc_general_protection<br /> ? asm_exc_general_protection<br /> ? asm_exc_general_protectio<br /> <br /> IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SMAP) could be added to the warning condition, but<br /> even this would not be enough in case SMAP is disabled at boot time with<br /> the "nosmap" parameter.<br /> <br /> To be consistent with "nosmap" behaviour, clear X86_FEATURE_SMAP when<br /> !CONFIG_X86_SMAP.<br /> <br /> Found using entry-fuzz + satrandconfig.<br /> <br /> [ bp: Massage commit message. ]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> drm/amdgpu: fix gart.bo pin_count leak<br /> <br /> gmc_v{9,10}_0_gart_disable() isn&amp;#39;t called matched with<br /> correspoding gart_enbale function in SRIOV case. This will<br /> lead to gart.bo pin_count leak on driver unload.

A Stored Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the "Import of user role and title of user role" feature in ILIAS 7 before 7.30 and ILIAS 8 before 8.11 allows remote authenticated attackers with administrative privileges to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via XML file upload.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> phy: mdio: fix memory leak<br /> <br /> Syzbot reported memory leak in MDIO bus interface, the problem was in<br /> wrong state logic.<br /> <br /> MDIOBUS_ALLOCATED indicates 2 states:<br /> 1. Bus is only allocated<br /> 2. Bus allocated and __mdiobus_register() fails, but<br /> device_register() was called<br /> <br /> In case of device_register() has been called we should call put_device()<br /> to correctly free the memory allocated for this device, but mdiobus_free()<br /> calls just kfree(dev) in case of MDIOBUS_ALLOCATED state<br /> <br /> To avoid this behaviour we need to set bus-&gt;state to MDIOBUS_UNREGISTERED<br /> _before_ calling device_register(), because put_device() should be<br /> called even in case of device_register() failure.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> libbpf: Fix memory leak in strset<br /> <br /> Free struct strset itself, not just its internal parts.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net_sched: fix NULL deref in fifo_set_limit()<br /> <br /> syzbot reported another NULL deref in fifo_set_limit() [1]<br /> <br /> I could repro the issue with :<br /> <br /> unshare -n<br /> tc qd add dev lo root handle 1:0 tbf limit 200000 burst 70000 rate 100Mbit<br /> tc qd replace dev lo parent 1:0 pfifo_fast<br /> tc qd change dev lo root handle 1:0 tbf limit 300000 burst 70000 rate 100Mbit<br /> <br /> pfifo_fast does not have a change() operation.<br /> Make fifo_set_limit() more robust about this.<br /> <br /> [1]<br /> BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000<br /> PGD 1cf99067 P4D 1cf99067 PUD 7ca49067 PMD 0<br /> Oops: 0010 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN<br /> CPU: 1 PID: 14443 Comm: syz-executor959 Not tainted 5.15.0-rc3-syzkaller #0<br /> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011<br /> RIP: 0010:0x0<br /> Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0xffffffffffffffd6.<br /> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000e2f7310 EFLAGS: 00010246<br /> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffff8d6ecc00 RCX: 0000000000000000<br /> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff888024c27910 RDI: ffff888071e34000<br /> RBP: ffff888071e34000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffff8fcfb947<br /> R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888024c27910<br /> R13: ffff888071e34018 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff88801ef74800<br /> FS: 00007f321d897700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000<br /> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033<br /> CR2: ffffffffffffffd6 CR3: 00000000722c3000 CR4: 00000000003506e0<br /> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000<br /> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400<br /> Call Trace:<br /> fifo_set_limit net/sched/sch_fifo.c:242 [inline]<br /> fifo_set_limit+0x198/0x210 net/sched/sch_fifo.c:227<br /> tbf_change+0x6ec/0x16d0 net/sched/sch_tbf.c:418<br /> qdisc_change net/sched/sch_api.c:1332 [inline]<br /> tc_modify_qdisc+0xd9a/0x1a60 net/sched/sch_api.c:1634<br /> rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5572<br /> netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504<br /> netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline]<br /> netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340<br /> netlink_sendmsg+0x86d/0xdb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929<br /> sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline]<br /> sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:724<br /> ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2409<br /> ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2463<br /> __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2492<br /> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]<br /> do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80<br /> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net/sched: sch_taprio: properly cancel timer from taprio_destroy()<br /> <br /> There is a comment in qdisc_create() about us not calling ops-&gt;reset()<br /> in some cases.<br /> <br /> err_out4:<br /> /*<br /> * Any broken qdiscs that would require a ops-&gt;reset() here?<br /> * The qdisc was never in action so it shouldn&amp;#39;t be necessary.<br /> */<br /> <br /> As taprio sets a timer before actually receiving a packet, we need<br /> to cancel it from ops-&gt;destroy, just in case ops-&gt;reset has not<br /> been called.<br /> <br /> syzbot reported:<br /> <br /> ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: hrtimer hint: advance_sched+0x0/0x9a0 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:22<br /> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8441 at lib/debugobjects.c:505 debug_print_object+0x16e/0x250 lib/debugobjects.c:505<br /> Modules linked in:<br /> CPU: 0 PID: 8441 Comm: syz-executor813 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc6-syzkaller #0<br /> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011<br /> RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x16e/0x250 lib/debugobjects.c:505<br /> Code: ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 af 00 00 00 48 8b 14 dd e0 d3 e3 89 4c 89 ee 48 c7 c7 e0 c7 e3 89 e8 5b 86 11 05 0b 83 05 85 03 92 09 01 48 83 c4 18 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e c3<br /> RSP: 0018:ffffc9000130f330 EFLAGS: 00010282<br /> RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000000000<br /> RDX: ffff88802baeb880 RSI: ffffffff815d87b5 RDI: fffff52000261e58<br /> RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000<br /> R10: ffffffff815d25ee R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff898dd020<br /> R13: ffffffff89e3ce20 R14: ffffffff81653630 R15: dffffc0000000000<br /> FS: 0000000000f0d300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000<br /> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033<br /> CR2: 00007ffb64b3e000 CR3: 0000000036557000 CR4: 00000000001506e0<br /> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000<br /> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400<br /> Call Trace:<br /> __debug_check_no_obj_freed lib/debugobjects.c:987 [inline]<br /> debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x301/0x420 lib/debugobjects.c:1018<br /> slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1603 [inline]<br /> slab_free_freelist_hook+0x171/0x240 mm/slub.c:1653<br /> slab_free mm/slub.c:3213 [inline]<br /> kfree+0xe4/0x540 mm/slub.c:4267<br /> qdisc_create+0xbcf/0x1320 net/sched/sch_api.c:1299<br /> tc_modify_qdisc+0x4c8/0x1a60 net/sched/sch_api.c:1663<br /> rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x413/0xb80 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5571<br /> netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504<br /> netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline]<br /> netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340<br /> netlink_sendmsg+0x86d/0xdb0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929<br /> sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:704 [inline]<br /> sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:724<br /> ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2403<br /> ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2457<br /> __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2486<br /> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]<br /> do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> drm/amdkfd: fix a potential ttm-&gt;sg memory leak<br /> <br /> Memory is allocated for ttm-&gt;sg by kmalloc in kfd_mem_dmamap_userptr,<br /> but isn&amp;#39;t freed by kfree in kfd_mem_dmaunmap_userptr. Free it!

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> drm/nouveau/kms/nv50-: fix file release memory leak<br /> <br /> When using single_open() for opening, single_release() should be<br /> called, otherwise the &amp;#39;op&amp;#39; allocated in single_open() will be leaked.