CVE-2026-10657

Zephyr&amp;#39;s DNS resolver detects mDNS (.local) queries in dns_resolve_name_internal() (subsys/net/lib/dns/resolve.c) with memcmp(strrchr(query, &amp;#39;.&amp;#39;), ".local", 7), which always reads a fixed 7 bytes from the suffix pointer. When the resolved hostname&amp;#39;s final label is shorter than 7 bytes (e.g. names ending in .org, .com, .net, .io, or a trailing dot), the comparison reads 1-2 bytes past the string&amp;#39;s NUL terminator.<br /> <br /> The hostname (query) is the caller-supplied name passed through the standard getaddrinfo()/dns_get_addr_info()/dns_resolve_name() path and is influenceable by operators or remote inputs (server names from configuration, parsed URLs, or app-facing interfaces).<br /> <br /> On a tightly-sized buffer with no slack (for example a userspace getaddrinfo call where the hostname is copied with k_usermode_string_alloc_copy to exactly strlen+1 bytes), the over-read crosses the allocation boundary; if that boundary is unmapped (guard page, memory-domain boundary under MPU, or an address sanitizer) the over-read faults, causing a denial of service. The over-read bytes are never returned, so there is no information disclosure.<br /> <br /> The flaw is compiled only when CONFIG_MDNS_RESOLVER is enabled, exists since v1.10.0, and is fixed by replacing the fixed-length memcmp with a NUL-safe strcmp(ptr, ".local").