Vulnerabilities

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> gpio: graniterapids: Fix vGPIO driver crash<br /> <br /> Move setting irq_chip.name from probe() function to the initialization<br /> of "irq_chip" struct in order to fix vGPIO driver crash during bootup.<br /> <br /> Crash was caused by unauthorized modification of irq_chip.name field<br /> where irq_chip struct was initialized as const.<br /> <br /> This behavior is a consequence of suboptimal implementation of<br /> gpio_irq_chip_set_chip(), which should be changed to avoid<br /> casting away const qualifier.<br /> <br /> Crash log:<br /> BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc0ba81c0<br /> /#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode<br /> /#PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation<br /> CPU: 33 UID: 0 PID: 1075 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-00077-g2e1b3cc9d7f7 #1<br /> Hardware name: Intel Corporation Kaseyville RP/Kaseyville RP, BIOS KVLDCRB1.PGS.0026.D73.2410081258 10/08/2024<br /> RIP: 0010:gnr_gpio_probe+0x171/0x220 [gpio_graniterapids]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> acpi: nfit: vmalloc-out-of-bounds Read in acpi_nfit_ctl<br /> <br /> Fix an issue detected by syzbot with KASAN:<br /> <br /> BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in cmd_to_func drivers/acpi/nfit/<br /> core.c:416 [inline]<br /> BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in acpi_nfit_ctl+0x20e8/0x24a0<br /> drivers/acpi/nfit/core.c:459<br /> <br /> The issue occurs in cmd_to_func when the call_pkg-&gt;nd_reserved2<br /> array is accessed without verifying that call_pkg points to a buffer<br /> that is appropriately sized as a struct nd_cmd_pkg. This can lead<br /> to out-of-bounds access and undefined behavior if the buffer does not<br /> have sufficient space.<br /> <br /> To address this, a check was added in acpi_nfit_ctl() to ensure that<br /> buf is not NULL and that buf_len is less than sizeof(*call_pkg)<br /> before accessing it. This ensures safe access to the members of<br /> call_pkg, including the nd_reserved2 array.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> wifi: nl80211: fix NL80211_ATTR_MLO_LINK_ID off-by-one<br /> <br /> Since the netlink attribute range validation provides inclusive<br /> checking, the *max* of attribute NL80211_ATTR_MLO_LINK_ID should be<br /> IEEE80211_MLD_MAX_NUM_LINKS - 1 otherwise causing an off-by-one.<br /> <br /> One crash stack for demonstration:<br /> ==================================================================<br /> BUG: KASAN: wild-memory-access in ieee80211_tx_control_port+0x3b6/0xca0 net/mac80211/tx.c:5939<br /> Read of size 6 at addr 001102080000000c by task fuzzer.386/9508<br /> <br /> CPU: 1 PID: 9508 Comm: syz.1.386 Not tainted 6.1.70 #2<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]<br /> dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106<br /> print_report+0xe0/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:398<br /> kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495<br /> kasan_check_range+0x287/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189<br /> memcpy+0x25/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:65<br /> ieee80211_tx_control_port+0x3b6/0xca0 net/mac80211/tx.c:5939<br /> rdev_tx_control_port net/wireless/rdev-ops.h:761 [inline]<br /> nl80211_tx_control_port+0x7b3/0xc40 net/wireless/nl80211.c:15453<br /> genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x22e/0x320 net/netlink/genetlink.c:756<br /> genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:833 [inline]<br /> genl_rcv_msg+0x539/0x740 net/netlink/genetlink.c:850<br /> netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508<br /> genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:861<br /> netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline]<br /> netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352<br /> netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874<br /> sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline]<br /> __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline]<br /> ____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499<br /> ___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553<br /> __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]<br /> __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline]<br /> __se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589<br /> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]<br /> do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81<br /> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd<br /> <br /> Update the policy to ensure correct validation.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> bpf, sockmap: Fix race between element replace and close()<br /> <br /> Element replace (with a socket different from the one stored) may race<br /> with socket&amp;#39;s close() link popping &amp; unlinking. __sock_map_delete()<br /> unconditionally unrefs the (wrong) element:<br /> <br /> // set map[0] = s0<br /> map_update_elem(map, 0, s0)<br /> <br /> // drop fd of s0<br /> close(s0)<br /> sock_map_close()<br /> lock_sock(sk) (s0!)<br /> sock_map_remove_links(sk)<br /> link = sk_psock_link_pop()<br /> sock_map_unlink(sk, link)<br /> sock_map_delete_from_link<br /> // replace map[0] with s1<br /> map_update_elem(map, 0, s1)<br /> sock_map_update_elem<br /> (s1!) lock_sock(sk)<br /> sock_map_update_common<br /> psock = sk_psock(sk)<br /> spin_lock(&amp;stab-&gt;lock)<br /> osk = stab-&gt;sks[idx]<br /> sock_map_add_link(..., &amp;stab-&gt;sks[idx])<br /> sock_map_unref(osk, &amp;stab-&gt;sks[idx])<br /> psock = sk_psock(osk)<br /> sk_psock_put(sk, psock)<br /> if (refcount_dec_and_test(&amp;psock))<br /> sk_psock_drop(sk, psock)<br /> spin_unlock(&amp;stab-&gt;lock)<br /> unlock_sock(sk)<br /> __sock_map_delete<br /> spin_lock(&amp;stab-&gt;lock)<br /> sk = *psk // s1 replaced s0; sk == s1<br /> if (!sk_test || sk_test == sk) // sk_test (s0) != sk (s1); no branch<br /> sk = xchg(psk, NULL)<br /> if (sk)<br /> sock_map_unref(sk, psk) // unref s1; sks[idx] will dangle<br /> psock = sk_psock(sk)<br /> sk_psock_put(sk, psock)<br /> if (refcount_dec_and_test())<br /> sk_psock_drop(sk, psock)<br /> spin_unlock(&amp;stab-&gt;lock)<br /> release_sock(sk)<br /> <br /> Then close(map) enqueues bpf_map_free_deferred, which finally calls<br /> sock_map_free(). This results in some refcount_t warnings along with<br /> a KASAN splat [1].<br /> <br /> Fix __sock_map_delete(), do not allow sock_map_unref() on elements that<br /> may have been replaced.<br /> <br /> [1]:<br /> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sock_map_free+0x10e/0x330<br /> Write of size 4 at addr ffff88811f5b9100 by task kworker/u64:12/1063<br /> <br /> CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 1063 Comm: kworker/u64:12 Not tainted 6.12.0+ #125<br /> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Arch Linux 1.16.3-1-1 04/01/2014<br /> Workqueue: events_unbound bpf_map_free_deferred<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x90<br /> print_report+0x174/0x4f6<br /> kasan_report+0xb9/0x190<br /> kasan_check_range+0x10f/0x1e0<br /> sock_map_free+0x10e/0x330<br /> bpf_map_free_deferred+0x173/0x320<br /> process_one_work+0x846/0x1420<br /> worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80<br /> kthread+0x29e/0x360<br /> ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70<br /> ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30<br /> <br /> <br /> Allocated by task 1202:<br /> kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40<br /> kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30<br /> __kasan_slab_alloc+0x85/0x90<br /> kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x131/0x450<br /> sk_prot_alloc+0x5b/0x220<br /> sk_alloc+0x2c/0x870<br /> unix_create1+0x88/0x8a0<br /> unix_create+0xc5/0x180<br /> __sock_create+0x241/0x650<br /> __sys_socketpair+0x1ce/0x420<br /> __x64_sys_socketpair+0x92/0x100<br /> do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180<br /> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e<br /> <br /> Freed by task 46:<br /> kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40<br /> kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30<br /> kasan_save_free_info+0x37/0x60<br /> __kasan_slab_free+0x4b/0x70<br /> kmem_cache_free+0x1a1/0x590<br /> __sk_destruct+0x388/0x5a0<br /> sk_psock_destroy+0x73e/0xa50<br /> process_one_work+0x846/0x1420<br /> worker_thread+0x5b3/0xf80<br /> kthread+0x29e/0x360<br /> ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x70<br /> ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30<br /> <br /> The bu<br /> ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> bpf,perf: Fix invalid prog_array access in perf_event_detach_bpf_prog<br /> <br /> Syzbot reported [1] crash that happens for following tracing scenario:<br /> <br /> - create tracepoint perf event with attr.inherit=1, attach it to the<br /> process and set bpf program to it<br /> - attached process forks -&gt; chid creates inherited event<br /> <br /> the new child event shares the parent&amp;#39;s bpf program and tp_event<br /> (hence prog_array) which is global for tracepoint<br /> <br /> - exit both process and its child -&gt; release both events<br /> - first perf_event_detach_bpf_prog call will release tp_event-&gt;prog_array<br /> and second perf_event_detach_bpf_prog will crash, because<br /> tp_event-&gt;prog_array is NULL<br /> <br /> The fix makes sure the perf_event_detach_bpf_prog checks prog_array<br /> is valid before it tries to remove the bpf program from it.<br /> <br /> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/Z1MR6dCIKajNS6nU@krava/T/#m91dbf0688221ec7a7fc95e896a7ef9ff93b0b8ad

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> usb: gadget: u_serial: Fix the issue that gs_start_io crashed due to accessing null pointer<br /> <br /> Considering that in some extreme cases,<br /> when u_serial driver is accessed by multiple threads,<br /> Thread A is executing the open operation and calling the gs_open,<br /> Thread B is executing the disconnect operation and calling the<br /> gserial_disconnect function,The port-&gt;port_usb pointer will be set to NULL.<br /> <br /> E.g.<br /> Thread A Thread B<br /> gs_open() gadget_unbind_driver()<br /> gs_start_io() composite_disconnect()<br /> gs_start_rx() gserial_disconnect()<br /> ... ...<br /> spin_unlock(&amp;port-&gt;port_lock)<br /> status = usb_ep_queue() spin_lock(&amp;port-&gt;port_lock)<br /> spin_lock(&amp;port-&gt;port_lock) port-&gt;port_usb = NULL<br /> gs_free_requests(port-&gt;port_usb-&gt;in) spin_unlock(&amp;port-&gt;port_lock)<br /> Crash<br /> <br /> This causes thread A to access a null pointer (port-&gt;port_usb is null)<br /> when calling the gs_free_requests function, causing a crash.<br /> <br /> If port_usb is NULL, the release request will be skipped as it<br /> will be done by gserial_disconnect.<br /> <br /> So add a null pointer check to gs_start_io before attempting<br /> to access the value of the pointer port-&gt;port_usb.<br /> <br /> Call trace:<br /> gs_start_io+0x164/0x25c<br /> gs_open+0x108/0x13c<br /> tty_open+0x314/0x638<br /> chrdev_open+0x1b8/0x258<br /> do_dentry_open+0x2c4/0x700<br /> vfs_open+0x2c/0x3c<br /> path_openat+0xa64/0xc60<br /> do_filp_open+0xb8/0x164<br /> do_sys_openat2+0x84/0xf0<br /> __arm64_sys_openat+0x70/0x9c<br /> invoke_syscall+0x58/0x114<br /> el0_svc_common+0x80/0xe0<br /> do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28<br /> el0_svc+0x38/0x68

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> drm/xe/reg_sr: Remove register pool<br /> <br /> That pool implementation doesn&amp;#39;t really work: if the krealloc happens to<br /> move the memory and return another address, the entries in the xarray<br /> become invalid, leading to use-after-free later:<br /> <br /> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in xe_reg_sr_apply_mmio+0x570/0x760 [xe]<br /> Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881244b2590 by task modprobe/2753<br /> <br /> Allocated by task 2753:<br /> kasan_save_stack+0x39/0x70<br /> kasan_save_track+0x14/0x40<br /> kasan_save_alloc_info+0x37/0x60<br /> __kasan_kmalloc+0xc3/0xd0<br /> __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x200/0x6d0<br /> krealloc_noprof+0x229/0x380<br /> <br /> Simplify the code to fix the bug. A better pooling strategy may be added<br /> back later if needed.<br /> <br /> (cherry picked from commit e5283bd4dfecbd3335f43b62a68e24dae23f59e4)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> Bluetooth: btmtk: avoid UAF in btmtk_process_coredump<br /> <br /> hci_devcd_append may lead to the release of the skb, so it cannot be<br /> accessed once it is called.<br /> <br /> ==================================================================<br /> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in btmtk_process_coredump+0x2a7/0x2d0 [btmtk]<br /> Read of size 4 at addr ffff888033cfabb0 by task kworker/0:3/82<br /> <br /> CPU: 0 PID: 82 Comm: kworker/0:3 Tainted: G U 6.6.40-lockdep-03464-g1d8b4eb3060e #1 b0b3c1cc0c842735643fb411799d97921d1f688c<br /> Hardware name: Google Yaviks_Ufs/Yaviks_Ufs, BIOS Google_Yaviks_Ufs.15217.552.0 05/07/2024<br /> Workqueue: events btusb_rx_work [btusb]<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> dump_stack_lvl+0xfd/0x150<br /> print_report+0x131/0x780<br /> kasan_report+0x177/0x1c0<br /> btmtk_process_coredump+0x2a7/0x2d0 [btmtk 03edd567dd71a65958807c95a65db31d433e1d01]<br /> btusb_recv_acl_mtk+0x11c/0x1a0 [btusb 675430d1e87c4f24d0c1f80efe600757a0f32bec]<br /> btusb_rx_work+0x9e/0xe0 [btusb 675430d1e87c4f24d0c1f80efe600757a0f32bec]<br /> worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0<br /> kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0<br /> ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80<br /> ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30<br /> <br /> <br /> Allocated by task 82:<br /> stack_trace_save+0xdc/0x190<br /> kasan_set_track+0x4e/0x80<br /> __kasan_slab_alloc+0x4e/0x60<br /> kmem_cache_alloc+0x19f/0x360<br /> skb_clone+0x132/0xf70<br /> btusb_recv_acl_mtk+0x104/0x1a0 [btusb]<br /> btusb_rx_work+0x9e/0xe0 [btusb]<br /> worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0<br /> kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0<br /> ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80<br /> ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30<br /> <br /> Freed by task 1733:<br /> stack_trace_save+0xdc/0x190<br /> kasan_set_track+0x4e/0x80<br /> kasan_save_free_info+0x28/0xb0<br /> ____kasan_slab_free+0xfd/0x170<br /> kmem_cache_free+0x183/0x3f0<br /> hci_devcd_rx+0x91a/0x2060 [bluetooth]<br /> worker_thread+0xe44/0x2cc0<br /> kthread+0x2ff/0x3a0<br /> ret_from_fork+0x51/0x80<br /> ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30<br /> <br /> The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888033cfab40<br /> which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 232<br /> The buggy address is located 112 bytes inside of<br /> freed 232-byte region [ffff888033cfab40, ffff888033cfac28)<br /> <br /> The buggy address belongs to the physical page:<br /> page:00000000a174ba93 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x33cfa<br /> head:00000000a174ba93 order:1 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0<br /> anon flags: 0x4000000000000840(slab|head|zone=1)<br /> page_type: 0xffffffff()<br /> raw: 4000000000000840 ffff888100848a00 0000000000000000 0000000000000001<br /> raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080190019 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000<br /> page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected<br /> <br /> Memory state around the buggy address:<br /> ffff888033cfaa80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc<br /> ffff888033cfab00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb<br /> &gt;ffff888033cfab80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb<br /> ^<br /> ffff888033cfac00: fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc<br /> ffff888033cfac80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb<br /> ==================================================================<br /> <br /> Check if we need to call hci_devcd_complete before calling<br /> hci_devcd_append. That requires that we check data-&gt;cd_info.cnt &gt;=<br /> MTK_COREDUMP_NUM instead of data-&gt;cd_info.cnt &gt; MTK_COREDUMP_NUM, as we<br /> increment data-&gt;cd_info.cnt only once the call to hci_devcd_append<br /> succeeds.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> Bluetooth: hci_event: Fix using rcu_read_(un)lock while iterating<br /> <br /> The usage of rcu_read_(un)lock while inside list_for_each_entry_rcu is<br /> not safe since for the most part entries fetched this way shall be<br /> treated as rcu_dereference:<br /> <br /> Note that the value returned by rcu_dereference() is valid<br /> only within the enclosing RCU read-side critical section [1]_.<br /> For example, the following is **not** legal::<br /> <br /> rcu_read_lock();<br /> p = rcu_dereference(head.next);<br /> rcu_read_unlock();<br /> x = p-&gt;address; /* BUG!!! */<br /> rcu_read_lock();<br /> y = p-&gt;data; /* BUG!!! */<br /> rcu_read_unlock();

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> netfilter: nf_tables: do not defer rule destruction via call_rcu<br /> <br /> nf_tables_chain_destroy can sleep, it can&amp;#39;t be used from call_rcu<br /> callbacks.<br /> <br /> Moreover, nf_tables_rule_release() is only safe for error unwinding,<br /> while transaction mutex is held and the to-be-desroyed rule was not<br /> exposed to either dataplane or dumps, as it deactives+frees without<br /> the required synchronize_rcu() in-between.<br /> <br /> nft_rule_expr_deactivate() callbacks will change -&gt;use counters<br /> of other chains/sets, see e.g. nft_lookup .deactivate callback, these<br /> must be serialized via transaction mutex.<br /> <br /> Also add a few lockdep asserts to make this more explicit.<br /> <br /> Calling synchronize_rcu() isn&amp;#39;t ideal, but fixing this without is hard<br /> and way more intrusive. As-is, we can get:<br /> <br /> WARNING: .. net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:5515 nft_set_destroy+0x..<br /> Workqueue: events nf_tables_trans_destroy_work<br /> RIP: 0010:nft_set_destroy+0x3fe/0x5c0<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x6b7/0xad0<br /> process_one_work+0x64a/0xce0<br /> worker_thread+0x613/0x10d0<br /> <br /> In case the synchronize_rcu becomes an issue, we can explore alternatives.<br /> <br /> One way would be to allocate nft_trans_rule objects + one nft_trans_chain<br /> object, deactivate the rules + the chain and then defer the freeing to the<br /> nft destroy workqueue. We&amp;#39;d still need to keep the synchronize_rcu path as<br /> a fallback to handle -ENOMEM corner cases though.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> bnxt_en: Fix aggregation ID mask to prevent oops on 5760X chips<br /> <br /> The 5760X (P7) chip&amp;#39;s HW GRO/LRO interface is very similar to that of<br /> the previous generation (5750X or P5). However, the aggregation ID<br /> fields in the completion structures on P7 have been redefined from<br /> 16 bits to 12 bits. The freed up 4 bits are redefined for part of the<br /> metadata such as the VLAN ID. The aggregation ID mask was not modified<br /> when adding support for P7 chips. Including the extra 4 bits for the<br /> aggregation ID can potentially cause the driver to store or fetch the<br /> packet header of GRO/LRO packets in the wrong TPA buffer. It may hit<br /> the BUG() condition in __skb_pull() because the SKB contains no valid<br /> packet header:<br /> <br /> kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:2766!<br /> Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 1 PREEMPT SMP NOPTI<br /> CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.12.0-rc2+ #7<br /> Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE<br /> Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R760/0VRV9X, BIOS 1.0.1 12/27/2022<br /> RIP: 0010:eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140<br /> Code: 80 00 00 00 eb c1 8b 47 70 2b 47 74 48 8b 97 d0 00 00 00 83 f8 01 7e 1b 48 85 d2 74 06 66 83 3a ff 74 09 b8 00 04 00 00 eb a5 0b b8 00 01 00 00 eb 9c 48 85 ff 74 eb 31 f6 b9 02 00 00 00 48<br /> RSP: 0018:ff615003803fcc28 EFLAGS: 00010283<br /> RAX: 00000000000022d2 RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: ff2e8c25da334040<br /> RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: ff2e8c25c1ce8000 RDI: ff2e8c25869f9000<br /> RBP: ff2e8c258c31c000 R08: ff2e8c25da334000 R09: 0000000000000001<br /> R10: ff2e8c25da3342c0 R11: ff2e8c25c1ce89c0 R12: ff2e8c258e0990b0<br /> R13: ff2e8c25bb120000 R14: ff2e8c25c1ce89c0 R15: ff2e8c25869f9000<br /> FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff2e8c34be300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000<br /> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033<br /> CR2: 000055f05317e4c8 CR3: 000000108bac6006 CR4: 0000000000773ef0<br /> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000<br /> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400<br /> PKRU: 55555554<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> ? die+0x33/0x90<br /> ? do_trap+0xd9/0x100<br /> ? eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140<br /> ? do_error_trap+0x65/0x80<br /> ? eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140<br /> ? exc_invalid_op+0x4e/0x70<br /> ? eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140<br /> ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20<br /> ? eth_type_trans+0xda/0x140<br /> bnxt_tpa_end+0x10b/0x6b0 [bnxt_en]<br /> ? bnxt_tpa_start+0x195/0x320 [bnxt_en]<br /> bnxt_rx_pkt+0x902/0xd90 [bnxt_en]<br /> ? __bnxt_tx_int.constprop.0+0x89/0x300 [bnxt_en]<br /> ? kmem_cache_free+0x343/0x440<br /> ? __bnxt_tx_int.constprop.0+0x24f/0x300 [bnxt_en]<br /> __bnxt_poll_work+0x193/0x370 [bnxt_en]<br /> bnxt_poll_p5+0x9a/0x300 [bnxt_en]<br /> ? try_to_wake_up+0x209/0x670<br /> __napi_poll+0x29/0x1b0<br /> <br /> Fix it by redefining the aggregation ID mask for P5_PLUS chips to be<br /> 12 bits. This will work because the maximum aggregation ID is less<br /> than 4096 on all P5_PLUS chips.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ALSA: control: Avoid WARN() for symlink errors<br /> <br /> Using WARN() for showing the error of symlink creations don&amp;#39;t give<br /> more information than telling that something goes wrong, since the<br /> usual code path is a lregister callback from each control element<br /> creation. More badly, the use of WARN() rather confuses fuzzer as if<br /> it were serious issues.<br /> <br /> This patch downgrades the warning messages to use the normal dev_err()<br /> instead of WARN(). For making it clearer, add the function name to<br /> the prefix, too.