Vulnerabilities

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> mm/page_table_check: fix crash on ZONE_DEVICE<br /> <br /> Not all pages may apply to pgtable check. One example is ZONE_DEVICE<br /> pages: they map PFNs directly, and they don&amp;#39;t allocate page_ext at all<br /> even if there&amp;#39;s struct page around. One may reference<br /> devm_memremap_pages().<br /> <br /> When both ZONE_DEVICE and page-table-check enabled, then try to map some<br /> dax memories, one can trigger kernel bug constantly now when the kernel<br /> was trying to inject some pfn maps on the dax device:<br /> <br /> kernel BUG at mm/page_table_check.c:55!<br /> <br /> While it&amp;#39;s pretty legal to use set_pxx_at() for ZONE_DEVICE pages for page<br /> fault resolutions, skip all the checks if page_ext doesn&amp;#39;t even exist in<br /> pgtable checker, which applies to ZONE_DEVICE but maybe more.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> KVM: Fix a data race on last_boosted_vcpu in kvm_vcpu_on_spin()<br /> <br /> Use {READ,WRITE}_ONCE() to access kvm-&gt;last_boosted_vcpu to ensure the<br /> loads and stores are atomic. In the extremely unlikely scenario the<br /> compiler tears the stores, it&amp;#39;s theoretically possible for KVM to attempt<br /> to get a vCPU using an out-of-bounds index, e.g. if the write is split<br /> into multiple 8-bit stores, and is paired with a 32-bit load on a VM with<br /> 257 vCPUs:<br /> <br /> CPU0 CPU1<br /> last_boosted_vcpu = 0xff;<br /> <br /> (last_boosted_vcpu = 0x100)<br /> last_boosted_vcpu[15:8] = 0x01;<br /> i = (last_boosted_vcpu = 0x1ff)<br /> last_boosted_vcpu[7:0] = 0x00;<br /> <br /> vcpu = kvm-&gt;vcpu_array[0x1ff];<br /> <br /> As detected by KCSAN:<br /> <br /> BUG: KCSAN: data-race in kvm_vcpu_on_spin [kvm] / kvm_vcpu_on_spin [kvm]<br /> <br /> write to 0xffffc90025a92344 of 4 bytes by task 4340 on cpu 16:<br /> kvm_vcpu_on_spin (arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4112) kvm<br /> handle_pause (arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5929) kvm_intel<br /> vmx_handle_exit (arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:?<br /> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6606) kvm_intel<br /> vcpu_run (arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11107 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11211) kvm<br /> kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run (arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:?) kvm<br /> kvm_vcpu_ioctl (arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:?) kvm<br /> __se_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:52 fs/ioctl.c:904 fs/ioctl.c:890)<br /> __x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:890)<br /> x64_sys_call (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:33)<br /> do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:?)<br /> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)<br /> <br /> read to 0xffffc90025a92344 of 4 bytes by task 4342 on cpu 4:<br /> kvm_vcpu_on_spin (arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:4069) kvm<br /> handle_pause (arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5929) kvm_intel<br /> vmx_handle_exit (arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:?<br /> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6606) kvm_intel<br /> vcpu_run (arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11107 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11211) kvm<br /> kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run (arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:?) kvm<br /> kvm_vcpu_ioctl (arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:?) kvm<br /> __se_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:52 fs/ioctl.c:904 fs/ioctl.c:890)<br /> __x64_sys_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:890)<br /> x64_sys_call (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:33)<br /> do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:?)<br /> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)<br /> <br /> value changed: 0x00000012 -&gt; 0x00000000

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net: do not leave a dangling sk pointer, when socket creation fails<br /> <br /> It is possible to trigger a use-after-free by:<br /> * attaching an fentry probe to __sock_release() and the probe calling the<br /> bpf_get_socket_cookie() helper<br /> * running traceroute -I 1.1.1.1 on a freshly booted VM<br /> <br /> A KASAN enabled kernel will log something like below (decoded and stripped):<br /> ==================================================================<br /> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29)<br /> Read of size 8 at addr ffff888007110dd8 by task traceroute/299<br /> <br /> CPU: 2 PID: 299 Comm: traceroute Tainted: G E 6.10.0-rc2+ #2<br /> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:117 (discriminator 1))<br /> print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:488)<br /> ? __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29)<br /> kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:603)<br /> ? __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29)<br /> kasan_check_range (mm/kasan/generic.c:183 mm/kasan/generic.c:189)<br /> __sock_gen_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_64.h:15 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:2583 ./include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:1611 net/core/sock_diag.c:29)<br /> bpf_get_socket_ptr_cookie (./arch/x86/include/asm/preempt.h:94 ./include/linux/sock_diag.h:42 net/core/filter.c:5094 net/core/filter.c:5092)<br /> bpf_prog_875642cf11f1d139___sock_release+0x6e/0x8e<br /> bpf_trampoline_6442506592+0x47/0xaf<br /> __sock_release (net/socket.c:652)<br /> __sock_create (net/socket.c:1601)<br /> ...<br /> Allocated by task 299 on cpu 2 at 78.328492s:<br /> kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)<br /> kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:68)<br /> __kasan_slab_alloc (mm/kasan/common.c:312 mm/kasan/common.c:338)<br /> kmem_cache_alloc_noprof (mm/slub.c:3941 mm/slub.c:4000 mm/slub.c:4007)<br /> sk_prot_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2075)<br /> sk_alloc (net/core/sock.c:2134)<br /> inet_create (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:327 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:252)<br /> __sock_create (net/socket.c:1572)<br /> __sys_socket (net/socket.c:1660 net/socket.c:1644 net/socket.c:1706)<br /> __x64_sys_socket (net/socket.c:1718)<br /> do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)<br /> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)<br /> <br /> Freed by task 299 on cpu 2 at 78.328502s:<br /> kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:48)<br /> kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:68)<br /> kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:582)<br /> poison_slab_object (mm/kasan/common.c:242)<br /> __kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:256)<br /> kmem_cache_free (mm/slub.c:4437 mm/slub.c:4511)<br /> __sk_destruct (net/core/sock.c:2117 net/core/sock.c:2208)<br /> inet_create (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:397 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:252)<br /> __sock_create (net/socket.c:1572)<br /> __sys_socket (net/socket.c:1660 net/socket.c:1644 net/socket.c:1706)<br /> __x64_sys_socket (net/socket.c:1718)<br /> do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)<br /> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)<br /> <br /> Fix this by clearing the struct socket reference in sk_common_release() to cover<br /> all protocol families create functions, which may already attached the<br /> reference to the sk object with sock_init_data().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> dmaengine: idxd: Fix possible Use-After-Free in irq_process_work_list<br /> <br /> Use list_for_each_entry_safe() to allow iterating through the list and<br /> deleting the entry in the iteration process. The descriptor is freed via<br /> idxd_desc_complete() and there&amp;#39;s a slight chance may cause issue for<br /> the list iterator when the descriptor is reused by another thread<br /> without it being deleted from the list.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> seg6: fix parameter passing when calling NF_HOOK() in End.DX4 and End.DX6 behaviors<br /> <br /> input_action_end_dx4() and input_action_end_dx6() are called NF_HOOK() for<br /> PREROUTING hook, in PREROUTING hook, we should passing a valid indev,<br /> and a NULL outdev to NF_HOOK(), otherwise may trigger a NULL pointer<br /> dereference, as below:<br /> <br /> [74830.647293] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000090<br /> [74830.655633] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode<br /> [74830.657888] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page<br /> [74830.659500] PGD 0 P4D 0<br /> [74830.660450] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI<br /> ...<br /> [74830.664953] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011<br /> [74830.666569] RIP: 0010:rpfilter_mt+0x44/0x15e [ipt_rpfilter]<br /> ...<br /> [74830.689725] Call Trace:<br /> [74830.690402] <br /> [74830.690953] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df<br /> [74830.692020] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df<br /> [74830.693095] ? ipt_do_table+0x286/0x710 [ip_tables]<br /> [74830.694275] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd<br /> [74830.695205] ? page_fault_oops+0xac/0x140<br /> [74830.696244] ? exc_page_fault+0x62/0x150<br /> [74830.697225] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30<br /> [74830.698344] ? rpfilter_mt+0x44/0x15e [ipt_rpfilter]<br /> [74830.699540] ipt_do_table+0x286/0x710 [ip_tables]<br /> [74830.700758] ? ip6_route_input+0x19d/0x240<br /> [74830.701752] nf_hook_slow+0x3f/0xb0<br /> [74830.702678] input_action_end_dx4+0x19b/0x1e0<br /> [74830.703735] ? input_action_end_t+0xe0/0xe0<br /> [74830.704734] seg6_local_input_core+0x2d/0x60<br /> [74830.705782] lwtunnel_input+0x5b/0xb0<br /> [74830.706690] __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x63/0xa0<br /> [74830.707825] process_backlog+0x99/0x140<br /> [74830.709538] __napi_poll+0x2c/0x160<br /> [74830.710673] net_rx_action+0x296/0x350<br /> [74830.711860] __do_softirq+0xcb/0x2ac<br /> [74830.713049] do_softirq+0x63/0x90<br /> <br /> input_action_end_dx4() passing a NULL indev to NF_HOOK(), and finally<br /> trigger a NULL dereference in rpfilter_mt()-&gt;rpfilter_is_loopback():<br /> <br /> static bool<br /> rpfilter_is_loopback(const struct sk_buff *skb,<br /> const struct net_device *in)<br /> {<br /> // in is NULL<br /> return skb-&gt;pkt_type == PACKET_LOOPBACK ||<br /> in-&gt;flags &amp; IFF_LOOPBACK;<br /> }

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> netns: Make get_net_ns() handle zero refcount net<br /> <br /> Syzkaller hit a warning:<br /> refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.<br /> WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 7890 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0<br /> Modules linked in:<br /> CPU: 3 PID: 7890 Comm: tun Not tainted 6.10.0-rc3-00100-gcaa4f9578aba-dirty #310<br /> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014<br /> RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0<br /> Code: 41 49 04 31 ff 89 de e8 9f 1e cd fe 84 db 75 9c e8 76 26 cd fe c6 05 b6 41 49 04 01 90 48 c7 c7 b8 8e 25 86 e8 d2 05 b5 fe 90 0b 90 90 e9 79 ff ff ff e8 53 26 cd fe 0f b6 1<br /> RSP: 0018:ffff8881067b7da0 EFLAGS: 00010286<br /> RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff811c72ac<br /> RDX: ffff8881026a2140 RSI: ffffffff811c72b5 RDI: 0000000000000001<br /> RBP: ffff8881067b7db0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 205b5d3730353139<br /> R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 205d303938375420 R12: ffff8881086500c4<br /> R13: ffff8881086500c4 R14: ffff8881086500b0 R15: ffff888108650040<br /> FS: 00007f5b2961a4c0(0000) GS:ffff88823bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000<br /> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033<br /> CR2: 000055d7ed36fd18 CR3: 00000001482f6000 CR4: 00000000000006f0<br /> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000<br /> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> ? show_regs+0xa3/0xc0<br /> ? __warn+0xa5/0x1c0<br /> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0<br /> ? report_bug+0x1fc/0x2d0<br /> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0<br /> ? handle_bug+0xa1/0x110<br /> ? exc_invalid_op+0x3c/0xb0<br /> ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30<br /> ? __warn_printk+0xcc/0x140<br /> ? __warn_printk+0xd5/0x140<br /> ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xdf/0x1d0<br /> get_net_ns+0xa4/0xc0<br /> ? __pfx_get_net_ns+0x10/0x10<br /> open_related_ns+0x5a/0x130<br /> __tun_chr_ioctl+0x1616/0x2370<br /> ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch+0x58/0xa0<br /> ? __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp2+0x1c/0x30<br /> ? __pfx_tun_chr_ioctl+0x10/0x10<br /> tun_chr_ioctl+0x2f/0x40<br /> __x64_sys_ioctl+0x11b/0x160<br /> x64_sys_call+0x1211/0x20d0<br /> do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x1d0<br /> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f<br /> RIP: 0033:0x7f5b28f165d7<br /> Code: b3 66 90 48 8b 05 b1 48 2d 00 64 c7 00 26 00 00 00 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 81 48 2d 00 8<br /> RSP: 002b:00007ffc2b59c5e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010<br /> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f5b28f165d7<br /> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000000054e3 RDI: 0000000000000003<br /> RBP: 00007ffc2b59c650 R08: 00007f5b291ed8c0 R09: 00007f5b2961a4c0<br /> R10: 0000000029690010 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000400730<br /> R13: 00007ffc2b59cf40 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000<br /> <br /> Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel: panic_on_warn set ...<br /> <br /> This is trigger as below:<br /> ns0 ns1<br /> tun_set_iff() //dev is tun0<br /> tun-&gt;dev = dev<br /> //ip link set tun0 netns ns1<br /> put_net() //ref is 0<br /> __tun_chr_ioctl() //TUNGETDEVNETNS<br /> net = dev_net(tun-&gt;dev);<br /> open_related_ns(&amp;net-&gt;ns, get_net_ns); //ns1<br /> get_net_ns()<br /> get_net() //addition on 0<br /> <br /> Use maybe_get_net() in get_net_ns in case net&amp;#39;s ref is zero to fix this

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> xfrm6: check ip6_dst_idev() return value in xfrm6_get_saddr()<br /> <br /> ip6_dst_idev() can return NULL, xfrm6_get_saddr() must act accordingly.<br /> <br /> syzbot reported:<br /> <br /> Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI<br /> KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]<br /> CPU: 1 PID: 12 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00383-gb8481381d4e2 #0<br /> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/02/2024<br /> Workqueue: wg-kex-wg1 wg_packet_handshake_send_worker<br /> RIP: 0010:xfrm6_get_saddr+0x93/0x130 net/ipv6/xfrm6_policy.c:64<br /> Code: df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 97 00 00 00 4c 8b ab d8 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 ea 48 c1 ea 03 3c 02 00 0f 85 86 00 00 00 4d 8b 6d 00 e8 ca 13 47 01 48 b8 00<br /> RSP: 0018:ffffc90000117378 EFLAGS: 00010246<br /> RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88807b079dc0 RCX: ffffffff89a0d6d7<br /> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff89a0d6e9 RDI: ffff88807b079e98<br /> RBP: ffff88807ad73248 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: fffffffffffff000<br /> R10: ffff88807b079dc0 R11: 0000000000000007 R12: ffffc90000117480<br /> R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000<br /> FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000<br /> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033<br /> CR2: 00007f4586d00440 CR3: 0000000079042000 CR4: 00000000003506f0<br /> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000<br /> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> xfrm_get_saddr net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2452 [inline]<br /> xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2481 [inline]<br /> xfrm_tmpl_resolve+0xa26/0xf10 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2541<br /> xfrm_resolve_and_create_bundle+0x140/0x2570 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2835<br /> xfrm_bundle_lookup net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3070 [inline]<br /> xfrm_lookup_with_ifid+0x4d1/0x1e60 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3201<br /> xfrm_lookup net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3298 [inline]<br /> xfrm_lookup_route+0x3b/0x200 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3309<br /> ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x15c/0x1d0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1256<br /> send6+0x611/0xd20 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:139<br /> wg_socket_send_skb_to_peer+0xf9/0x220 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:178<br /> wg_socket_send_buffer_to_peer+0x12b/0x190 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:200<br /> wg_packet_send_handshake_initiation+0x227/0x360 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:40<br /> wg_packet_handshake_send_worker+0x1c/0x30 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:51<br /> process_one_work+0x9fb/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3231<br /> process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3312 [inline]<br /> worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf70 kernel/workqueue.c:3393<br /> kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389<br /> ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147<br /> ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> cxl/region: Fix memregion leaks in devm_cxl_add_region()<br /> <br /> Move the mode verification to __create_region() before allocating the<br /> memregion to avoid the memregion leaks.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> x86/kexec: Fix bug with call depth tracking<br /> <br /> The call to cc_platform_has() triggers a fault and system crash if call depth<br /> tracking is active because the GS segment has been reset by load_segments() and<br /> GS_BASE is now 0 but call depth tracking uses per-CPU variables to operate.<br /> <br /> Call cc_platform_has() earlier in the function when GS is still valid.<br /> <br /> [ bp: Massage. ]

Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> iommu: Return right value in iommu_sva_bind_device()<br /> <br /> iommu_sva_bind_device() should return either a sva bond handle or an<br /> ERR_PTR value in error cases. Existing drivers (idxd and uacce) only<br /> check the return value with IS_ERR(). This could potentially lead to<br /> a kernel NULL pointer dereference issue if the function returns NULL<br /> instead of an error pointer.<br /> <br /> In reality, this doesn&amp;#39;t cause any problems because iommu_sva_bind_device()<br /> only returns NULL when the kernel is not configured with CONFIG_IOMMU_SVA.<br /> In this case, iommu_dev_enable_feature(dev, IOMMU_DEV_FEAT_SVA) will<br /> return an error, and the device drivers won&amp;#39;t call iommu_sva_bind_device()<br /> at all.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> cachefiles: flush all requests after setting CACHEFILES_DEAD<br /> <br /> In ondemand mode, when the daemon is processing an open request, if the<br /> kernel flags the cache as CACHEFILES_DEAD, the cachefiles_daemon_write()<br /> will always return -EIO, so the daemon can&amp;#39;t pass the copen to the kernel.<br /> Then the kernel process that is waiting for the copen triggers a hung_task.<br /> <br /> Since the DEAD state is irreversible, it can only be exited by closing<br /> /dev/cachefiles. Therefore, after calling cachefiles_io_error() to mark<br /> the cache as CACHEFILES_DEAD, if in ondemand mode, flush all requests to<br /> avoid the above hungtask. We may still be able to read some of the cached<br /> data before closing the fd of /dev/cachefiles.<br /> <br /> Note that this relies on the patch that adds reference counting to the req,<br /> otherwise it may UAF.