Vulnerabilities

An issue in gray-matter All versions (verified on 4.0.3) allows the JavaScript engine in lib/engines.js using eval() to parse front matter when language is js/javascript.This allows arbitrary code execution.

Chartbrew is an open-source web application that can connect directly to databases and APIs and use the data to create charts. Prior to 5.2.3, Chartbrew's ClickHouse protocol in server/sources/plugins/clickhouse/clickhouse.protocol.js calls applySqlVariables() from server/sources/shared/sql/sql.variables.js without enabling the escapeBackslash option. For a ClickHouse-backed chart with variable binding, an attacker can supply a backslash before a quote so quote doubling does not keep the value within its intended SQL string literal. Public dashboards can expose this path without authentication, and successful exploitation can execute arbitrary ClickHouse SQL to disclose data or, when the database configuration permits, access files or internal network resources. This issue is fixed in version 5.2.3.

Zapros, a Python HTTP client, prior to version 0.14.0 is vulnerable to denial of service via memory exhaustion. The issue affects all callers who streamed compressed responses relying on the chunk size — explicit (`iter_bytes(chunk_size=...)`) or the default — to bound memory. The decoder ignored that bound, so a chunk could be far larger than requested and a single compressed response could overflow memory. Version 0.14.0 contains a patch. Some workarounds are available. Read the still-compressed body with `Response.iter_raw()` / `Response.async_iter_raw()`, which bypass the built-in decoders, and decompress it yourself with an explicit output-size bound (e.g. `zlib`'s `max_length`), aborting once a configured limit is exceeded. Where feasible, send `Accept-Encoding: identity` to disable response compression so bodies are not decompressed client-side. Avoid decoding response bodies from untrusted servers.

Chartbrew is an open-source web application that can connect directly to databases and APIs and use the data to create charts. Prior to 5.2.2, Chartbrew's server/modules/safeRequest.js calls validateOutboundUrl() to resolve and validate a target hostname, but request-promise performs a separate DNS resolution for the actual connection. An authenticated user who can create or test API connections and controls the target DNS name can return a public address during validation and a private address during the request, bypassing the protections implemented by server/modules/outboundTargetPolicy.js. This DNS rebinding condition can expose internal services, localhost resources, or cloud metadata endpoints. This issue is fixed in version 5.2.2.

Joplin is an open source note-taking and to-do application that organises notes and lists into notebooks. Prior to 3.7.7, Joplin Server's ItemModel.checkIfAllowed() authorizes writes to items with a share ID when any share_users row exists for the caller, without requiring ShareUserStatus.Accepted. A low-privileged authenticated user with a pending folder-share invitation can create an item under the share ID, and ShareModel.updateSharedItems3() propagates the injected content to the owner and accepted participants before the attacker accepts the invitation. This issue is fixed in version 3.7.7.

Discourse is an open-source discussion platform. Prior to 2026.7.0, the post action component failed to escape user-controlled display names before interpolating them into an HTML string passed to trustHTML. A user who could choose a crafted display name could persist markup in post action descriptions. Viewing the affected user activity streams could execute attacker-controlled script in another user's browser. This issue is fixed in version 2026.7.0.

Joplin is an open source note-taking and to-do application that organises notes and lists into notebooks. Prior to 3.7.7, Joplin Server's GET /shares/:id?resource_id= route serves a resource with the attacker-controlled mime value and omits Content-Disposition when the resource title is empty. A low-privileged user can publish an empty-title image/svg+xml attachment whose script executes when a victim opens the public share. By default, user content shares the Joplin Server application origin, allowing the script to access same-origin data and, when the victim is authenticated, perform actions with the victim's session, including reading administrative data and anti-CSRF tokens. Installations that configure USER_CONTENT_BASE_URL to a separate origin still execute the script, but on that separate user-content origin rather than the application origin. This issue is fixed in version 3.7.7.

Zapros, a Python HTTP client, prior to version 0.14.0 is vulnerable to denial of service when an application requests content from an untrusted server, or follows a redirect to one, because a malicious response containing an excessive number of chained `Content-Encoding` values causes Zapros to construct a deeply nested decompression chain that consumes excessive resources. Version 0.14.0 patches the vulnerability by limiting responses to five content-encoding layers and raising `DecodingError` when that limit is exceeded. As a workaround, applications can add response middleware that inspects the `Content-Encoding` header and rejects responses containing more than a safe number of encoding layers.

The default AEAD nonce provider for the PSA Internal Trusted Storage transform module, secure_storage_its_transform_aead_get_nonce() in subsys/secure_storage/src/its/transform/aead_get.c, stores its nonce counter in unsynchronized function-local static variables (s_nonce and s_nonce_initialized). Every ITS write obtains its AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 nonce here via secure_storage_its_transform_to_store().<br /> <br /> Because the function held no lock, two threads calling it concurrently race on the shared statics: the initialization path (psa_generate_random() followed by memcpy()) and the non-atomic increment-then-copy path can each hand the same nonce value to two distinct encryption operations, and can lose increments so the counter repeats values it was designed never to repeat. The ITS layer (secure_storage_its_set() in subsys/secure_storage/src/its/implementation.c) performs no serialization of its own, so concurrent same-UID writes reach the racy provider directly.<br /> <br /> Reusing a nonce with the same key under AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305 is a catastrophic AEAD failure: it leaks the XOR of the two plaintexts (ITS routinely stores secrets, including PSA persistent keys) and, for GCM, exposes the authentication key, enabling forgery of stored entries. Because the AEAD key is derived per entry UID, the security-relevant collision is two concurrent writes to the same UID both receiving the same nonce; an adversary able to read the raw backing storage can then exploit the reuse.<br /> <br /> Both ITS store back-ends shipped with Zephyr, zms.c and the settings/NVS back-end in settings.c, are log-structured flash stores with deferred garbage collection, so an entry superseded by a rewrite remains physically present in the partition until its sector is reclaimed. Two same-UID writes that race therefore leave both ciphertexts readable in the raw image at once, which is the condition the nonce reuse needs to be exploitable. The trigger remains narrow: both built-in key providers (DEVICE_ID_HASH and ENTRY_UID_HASH) salt the derived key with the entry UID, so reuse across different UIDs is harmless, and the exposure requires an application that writes the same UID concurrently from two threads.<br /> <br /> The fix serializes the provider with a K_MUTEX_DEFINE(s_nonce_mutex) held for the duration of nonce generation.

The Espressif ESP-hosted Wi-Fi driver (drivers/wifi/esp_hosted/) parses frames received over SPI from the ESP co-processor in esp_hosted_event_task(). For control frames it took the 16-bit TLV field data_length straight off the wire and passed it to pb_istream_from_buffer(frame.data_value, frame.data_length) without checking it against the frame length or the receive buffer. frame.data_value sits 26 bytes into a 3188-byte stack object, so a data_length of up to 0xFFFF makes pb_decode() read up to roughly 62 KB past the end of that object.<br /> <br /> Only the first fragment of a fragmented control response carries a TLV header; the pre-fix driver performed half-duplex SPI transactions and silently discarded any frame the co-processor queued while the host was transmitting (esp_hosted_hal_spi_transfer() aliased the RX buffer onto the TX buffer). When the discarded frame is the first fragment of a fragmented response, the driver treats the next fragment as a new frame — its per-fragment header and checksum are genuine, so both validation steps pass — and reads the TLV header out of raw protobuf continuation bytes. Those bytes come from control responses whose size and content an adjacent, unauthenticated attacker can influence, notably the AP scan list, which grows with the number and SSID length of access points in radio range.<br /> <br /> The impact is denial of service rather than disclosure. Reading past the end of the RAM region faults the device, and CONFIG_NANOPB_ENABLE_MALLOC is selected by the driver, so garbage length prefixes read out of bounds also drive heap allocations. The out-of-bounds bytes themselves do not reach the application: pb_decode() is started mid-stream on raw protobuf continuation bytes and so almost always fails outright, and anything that did decode would still have to pass esp_hosted_response(), which requires an exact msg_id match against the pending request, and then esp_hosted_ctrl_response(), which requires a success resp — an attacker influences the size and content of legitimate control responses, not the structure decoded out of misaligned bytes. Two related defects in the same receive path make the denial of service permanent: the fragment reassembly guard was sized with ESP_FRAME_SIZE instead of ESP_FRAME_MAX_PAYLOAD and, when tripped, returned from the sole RX thread instead of dropping the frame, and unhandled control events were queued with k_msgq_put(..., K_FOREVER) on an eight-entry queue that nothing drains, blocking that same thread. The driver has no watchdog or restart path, so either condition ends all Wi-Fi reception until the device is rebooted.

Joplin is an open source note-taking and to-do application that organises notes and lists into notebooks. Prior to 3.7.2, Joplin Server&amp;#39;s UserModel.ssoLogin() returns an existing account matched by an IdP-asserted email without checking the account&amp;#39;s is_external flag. In deployments using mixed local and SAML authentication, an attacker whose IdP session can assert a local user&amp;#39;s email can pass POST /api/saml, receive a session for that local account, and access or modify the victim&amp;#39;s notes, files, and settings without knowing the local password. This issue is fixed in version 3.7.2.

Joplin is an open source note-taking and to-do application that organises notes and lists into notebooks. Prior to 3.7.2, isAcceptedUrl() in packages/renderer/htmlUtils.ts uses an unanchored regular expression for internal resource URLs, allowing a javascript: URL containing a matching 32-character path fragment to pass validation and be emitted into an HTML note&amp;#39;s link. A low-privileged Joplin Server user can publish the crafted HTML note as a public share. In the current build, ordinary left-click is blocked; demonstrated execution requires middle-click or Open in new tab in an older or non-hardened browser because current Chrome and Firefox block javascript: new-tab navigation. When execution succeeds, the script runs in the Joplin Server origin, can read page-visible content, and can make authenticated same-origin requests when the victim is signed in. This issue is fixed in version 3.7.2.