Vulnerabilities

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> soc: ti: k3-socinfo: Fix regmap leak on probe failure<br /> <br /> The mmio regmap allocated during probe is never freed.<br /> <br /> Switch to using the device managed allocator so that the regmap is<br /> released on probe failures (e.g. probe deferral) and on driver unbind.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> drm/amd/display: Add signal type check for dcn401 get_phyd32clk_src<br /> <br /> Trying to access link enc on a dpia link will cause a crash otherwise

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> kcm: fix zero-frag skb in frag_list on partial sendmsg error<br /> <br /> Syzkaller reported a warning in kcm_write_msgs() when processing a<br /> message with a zero-fragment skb in the frag_list.<br /> <br /> When kcm_sendmsg() fills MAX_SKB_FRAGS fragments in the current skb,<br /> it allocates a new skb (tskb) and links it into the frag_list before<br /> copying data. If the copy subsequently fails (e.g. -EFAULT from<br /> user memory), tskb remains in the frag_list with zero fragments:<br /> <br /> head skb (msg being assembled, NOT yet in sk_write_queue)<br /> +-----------+<br /> | frags[17] | (MAX_SKB_FRAGS, all filled with data)<br /> | frag_list-+--&gt; tskb<br /> +-----------+ +----------+<br /> | frags[0] | (empty! copy failed before filling)<br /> +----------+<br /> <br /> For SOCK_SEQPACKET with partial data already copied, the error path<br /> saves this message via partial_message for later completion. For<br /> SOCK_SEQPACKET, sock_write_iter() automatically sets MSG_EOR, so a<br /> subsequent zero-length write(fd, NULL, 0) completes the message and<br /> queues it to sk_write_queue. kcm_write_msgs() then walks the<br /> frag_list and hits:<br /> <br /> WARN_ON(!skb_shinfo(skb)-&gt;nr_frags)<br /> <br /> TCP has a similar pattern where skbs are enqueued before data copy<br /> and cleaned up on failure via tcp_remove_empty_skb(). KCM was<br /> missing the equivalent cleanup.<br /> <br /> Fix this by tracking the predecessor skb (frag_prev) when allocating<br /> a new frag_list entry. On error, if the tail skb has zero frags,<br /> use frag_prev to unlink and free it in O(1) without walking the<br /> singly-linked frag_list. frag_prev is safe to dereference because<br /> the entire message chain is only held locally (or in kcm-&gt;seq_skb)<br /> and is not added to sk_write_queue until MSG_EOR, so the send path<br /> cannot free it underneath us.<br /> <br /> Also change the WARN_ON to WARN_ON_ONCE to avoid flooding the log<br /> if the condition is somehow hit repeatedly.<br /> <br /> There are currently no KCM selftests in the kernel tree; a simple<br /> reproducer is available at [1].<br /> <br /> [1] https://gist.github.com/mrpre/a94d431c757e8d6f168f4dd1a3749daa

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> smb: client: prevent races in -&gt;query_interfaces()<br /> <br /> It was possible for two query interface works to be concurrently trying<br /> to update the interfaces.<br /> <br /> Prevent this by checking and updating iface_last_update under<br /> iface_lock.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ntfs: -&gt;d_compare() must not block<br /> <br /> ... so don&amp;#39;t use __getname() there. Switch it (and ntfs_d_hash(), while<br /> we are at it) to kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_NOWAIT). Yes, ntfs_d_hash()<br /> almost certainly can do with smaller allocations, but let ntfs folks<br /> deal with that - keep the allocation size as-is for now.<br /> <br /> Stop abusing names_cachep in ntfs, period - various uses of that thing<br /> in there have nothing to do with pathnames; just use k[mz]alloc() and<br /> be done with that. For now let&amp;#39;s keep sizes as-in, but AFAICS none of<br /> the users actually want PATH_MAX.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> team: avoid NETDEV_CHANGEMTU event when unregistering slave<br /> <br /> syzbot is reporting<br /> <br /> unregister_netdevice: waiting for netdevsim0 to become free. Usage count = 3<br /> ref_tracker: netdev@ffff88807dcf8618 has 1/2 users at<br /> __netdev_tracker_alloc include/linux/netdevice.h:4400 [inline]<br /> netdev_hold include/linux/netdevice.h:4429 [inline]<br /> inetdev_init+0x201/0x4e0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:286<br /> inetdev_event+0x251/0x1610 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1600<br /> notifier_call_chain+0x19d/0x3a0 kernel/notifier.c:85<br /> call_netdevice_notifiers_mtu net/core/dev.c:2318 [inline]<br /> netif_set_mtu_ext+0x5aa/0x800 net/core/dev.c:9886<br /> netif_set_mtu+0xd7/0x1b0 net/core/dev.c:9907<br /> dev_set_mtu+0x126/0x260 net/core/dev_api.c:248<br /> team_port_del+0xb07/0xcb0 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1333<br /> team_del_slave drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1936 [inline]<br /> team_device_event+0x207/0x5b0 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:2929<br /> notifier_call_chain+0x19d/0x3a0 kernel/notifier.c:85<br /> call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2281 [inline]<br /> call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2295 [inline]<br /> __dev_change_net_namespace+0xcb7/0x2050 net/core/dev.c:12592<br /> do_setlink+0x2ce/0x4590 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3060<br /> rtnl_changelink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3776 [inline]<br /> __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3935 [inline]<br /> rtnl_newlink+0x15a9/0x1be0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4072<br /> rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7d5/0xbe0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6958<br /> netlink_rcv_skb+0x232/0x4b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2550<br /> netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1318 [inline]<br /> netlink_unicast+0x80f/0x9b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1344<br /> netlink_sendmsg+0x813/0xb40 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1894<br /> <br /> problem. Ido Schimmel found steps to reproduce<br /> <br /> ip link add name team1 type team<br /> ip link add name dummy1 mtu 1499 master team1 type dummy<br /> ip netns add ns1<br /> ip link set dev dummy1 netns ns1<br /> ip -n ns1 link del dev dummy1<br /> <br /> and also found that the same issue was fixed in the bond driver in<br /> commit f51048c3e07b ("bonding: avoid NETDEV_CHANGEMTU event when<br /> unregistering slave").<br /> <br /> Let&amp;#39;s do similar thing for the team driver, with commit ad7c7b2172c3 ("net:<br /> hold netdev instance lock during sysfs operations") and commit 303a8487a657<br /> ("net: s/__dev_set_mtu/__netif_set_mtu/") also applied.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> media: iris: Add missing platform data entries for SM8750<br /> <br /> Two platform-data fields for SM8750 were missed:<br /> <br /> - get_vpu_buffer_size = iris_vpu33_buf_size<br /> Without this, the driver fails to allocate the required internal<br /> buffers, leading to basic decode/encode failures during session<br /> bring-up.<br /> <br /> - max_core_mbps = ((7680 * 4320) / 256) * 60<br /> Without this capability exposed, capability checks are incomplete and<br /> v4l2-compliance for encoder fails.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net: wan: farsync: Fix use-after-free bugs caused by unfinished tasklets<br /> <br /> When the FarSync T-series card is being detached, the fst_card_info is<br /> deallocated in fst_remove_one(). However, the fst_tx_task or fst_int_task<br /> may still be running or pending, leading to use-after-free bugs when the<br /> already freed fst_card_info is accessed in fst_process_tx_work_q() or<br /> fst_process_int_work_q().<br /> <br /> A typical race condition is depicted below:<br /> <br /> CPU 0 (cleanup) | CPU 1 (tasklet)<br /> | fst_start_xmit()<br /> fst_remove_one() | tasklet_schedule()<br /> unregister_hdlc_device()|<br /> | fst_process_tx_work_q() //handler<br /> kfree(card) //free | do_bottom_half_tx()<br /> | card-&gt; //use<br /> <br /> The following KASAN trace was captured:<br /> <br /> ==================================================================<br /> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in do_bottom_half_tx+0xb88/0xd00<br /> Read of size 4 at addr ffff88800aad101c by task ksoftirqd/3/32<br /> ...<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> dump_stack_lvl+0x55/0x70<br /> print_report+0xcb/0x5d0<br /> ? do_bottom_half_tx+0xb88/0xd00<br /> kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0<br /> ? do_bottom_half_tx+0xb88/0xd00<br /> do_bottom_half_tx+0xb88/0xd00<br /> ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x85/0xe0<br /> ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10<br /> ? __pfx___hrtimer_run_queues+0x10/0x10<br /> fst_process_tx_work_q+0x67/0x90<br /> tasklet_action_common+0x1fa/0x720<br /> ? hrtimer_interrupt+0x31f/0x780<br /> handle_softirqs+0x176/0x530<br /> __irq_exit_rcu+0xab/0xe0<br /> sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x70/0x80<br /> ...<br /> <br /> Allocated by task 41 on cpu 3 at 72.330843s:<br /> kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50<br /> kasan_save_track+0x17/0x60<br /> __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90<br /> fst_add_one+0x1a5/0x1cd0<br /> local_pci_probe+0xdd/0x190<br /> pci_device_probe+0x341/0x480<br /> really_probe+0x1c6/0x6a0<br /> __driver_probe_device+0x248/0x310<br /> driver_probe_device+0x48/0x210<br /> __device_attach_driver+0x160/0x320<br /> bus_for_each_drv+0x101/0x190<br /> __device_attach+0x198/0x3a0<br /> device_initial_probe+0x78/0xa0<br /> pci_bus_add_device+0x81/0xc0<br /> pci_bus_add_devices+0x7e/0x190<br /> enable_slot+0x9b9/0x1130<br /> acpiphp_check_bridge.part.0+0x2e1/0x460<br /> acpiphp_hotplug_notify+0x36c/0x3c0<br /> acpi_device_hotplug+0x203/0xb10<br /> acpi_hotplug_work_fn+0x59/0x80<br /> ...<br /> <br /> Freed by task 41 on cpu 1 at 75.138639s:<br /> kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50<br /> kasan_save_track+0x17/0x60<br /> kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60<br /> __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70<br /> kfree+0x135/0x410<br /> fst_remove_one+0x2ca/0x540<br /> pci_device_remove+0xa6/0x1d0<br /> device_release_driver_internal+0x364/0x530<br /> pci_stop_bus_device+0x105/0x150<br /> pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device+0xd/0x20<br /> disable_slot+0x116/0x260<br /> acpiphp_disable_and_eject_slot+0x4b/0x190<br /> acpiphp_hotplug_notify+0x230/0x3c0<br /> acpi_device_hotplug+0x203/0xb10<br /> acpi_hotplug_work_fn+0x59/0x80<br /> ...<br /> <br /> The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800aad1000<br /> which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024<br /> The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of<br /> freed 1024-byte region<br /> The buggy address belongs to the physical page:<br /> page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xaad0<br /> head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0<br /> flags: 0x100000000000040(head|node=0|zone=1)<br /> page_type: f5(slab)<br /> raw: 0100000000000040 ffff888007042dc0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000<br /> raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000<br /> head: 0100000000000040 ffff888007042dc0 dead000000000122 0000000000000000<br /> head: 0000000000000000 0000000080100010 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000<br /> head: 0100000000000003 ffffea00002ab401 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff<br /> head: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000<br /> page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected<br /> <br /> Memory state around the buggy address:<br /> ffff88800aad0f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc<br /> ffff88800aad0f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc<br /> &gt;ffff88800aad1000: fa fb<br /> ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> netfilter: nf_conntrack_h323: fix OOB read in decode_choice()<br /> <br /> In decode_choice(), the boundary check before get_len() uses the<br /> variable `len`, which is still 0 from its initialization at the top of<br /> the function:<br /> <br /> unsigned int type, ext, len = 0;<br /> ...<br /> if (ext || (son-&gt;attr &amp; OPEN)) {<br /> BYTE_ALIGN(bs);<br /> if (nf_h323_error_boundary(bs, len, 0)) /* len is 0 here */<br /> return H323_ERROR_BOUND;<br /> len = get_len(bs); /* OOB read */<br /> <br /> When the bitstream is exactly consumed (bs-&gt;cur == bs-&gt;end), the check<br /> nf_h323_error_boundary(bs, 0, 0) evaluates to (bs-&gt;cur + 0 &gt; bs-&gt;end),<br /> which is false. The subsequent get_len() call then dereferences<br /> *bs-&gt;cur++, reading 1 byte past the end of the buffer. If that byte<br /> has bit 7 set, get_len() reads a second byte as well.<br /> <br /> This can be triggered remotely by sending a crafted Q.931 SETUP message<br /> with a User-User Information Element containing exactly 2 bytes of<br /> PER-encoded data ({0x08, 0x00}) to port 1720 through a firewall with<br /> the nf_conntrack_h323 helper active. The decoder fully consumes the<br /> PER buffer before reaching this code path, resulting in a 1-2 byte<br /> heap-buffer-overflow read confirmed by AddressSanitizer.<br /> <br /> Fix this by checking for 2 bytes (the maximum that get_len() may read)<br /> instead of the uninitialized `len`. This matches the pattern used at<br /> every other get_len() call site in the same file, where the caller<br /> checks for 2 bytes of available data before calling get_len().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> drm/atmel-hlcdc: fix use-after-free of drm_crtc_commit after release<br /> <br /> The atmel_hlcdc_plane_atomic_duplicate_state() callback was copying<br /> the atmel_hlcdc_plane state structure without properly duplicating the<br /> drm_plane_state. In particular, state-&gt;commit remained set to the old<br /> state commit, which can lead to a use-after-free in the next<br /> drm_atomic_commit() call.<br /> <br /> Fix this by calling<br /> __drm_atomic_helper_duplicate_plane_state(), which correctly clones<br /> the base drm_plane_state (including the -&gt;commit pointer).<br /> <br /> It has been seen when closing and re-opening the device node while<br /> another DRM client (e.g. fbdev) is still attached:<br /> <br /> =============================================================================<br /> BUG kmalloc-64 (Not tainted): Poison overwritten<br /> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------<br /> <br /> 0xc611b344-0xc611b344 @offset=836. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b<br /> FIX kmalloc-64: Restoring Poison 0xc611b344-0xc611b344=0x6b<br /> Allocated in drm_atomic_helper_setup_commit+0x1e8/0x7bc age=178 cpu=0<br /> pid=29<br /> drm_atomic_helper_setup_commit+0x1e8/0x7bc<br /> drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x3c/0x15c<br /> drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xf4<br /> drm_framebuffer_remove+0x4cc/0x5a8<br /> drm_mode_rmfb_work_fn+0x6c/0x80<br /> process_one_work+0x12c/0x2cc<br /> worker_thread+0x2a8/0x400<br /> kthread+0xc0/0xdc<br /> ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28<br /> Freed in drm_atomic_helper_commit_hw_done+0x100/0x150 age=8 cpu=0<br /> pid=169<br /> drm_atomic_helper_commit_hw_done+0x100/0x150<br /> drm_atomic_helper_commit_tail+0x64/0x8c<br /> commit_tail+0x168/0x18c<br /> drm_atomic_helper_commit+0x138/0x15c<br /> drm_atomic_commit+0xc0/0xf4<br /> drm_atomic_helper_set_config+0x84/0xb8<br /> drm_mode_setcrtc+0x32c/0x810<br /> drm_ioctl+0x20c/0x488<br /> sys_ioctl+0x14c/0xc20<br /> ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x54<br /> Slab 0xef8bc360 objects=21 used=16 fp=0xc611b7c0<br /> flags=0x200(workingset|zone=0)<br /> Object 0xc611b340 @offset=832 fp=0xc611b7c0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> drm/amdgpu: Refactor amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl for Handling Last Fence Update and Timeline Management v4<br /> <br /> This commit simplifies the amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl function, key updates<br /> include:<br /> - Moved the logic for managing the last update fence directly into<br /> amdgpu_gem_va_update_vm.<br /> - Introduced checks for the timeline point to enable conditional<br /> replacement or addition of fences.<br /> <br /> v2: Addressed review comments from Christian.<br /> v3: Updated comments (Christian).<br /> v4: The previous version selected the fence too early and did not manage its<br /> reference correctly, which could lead to stale or freed fences being used.<br /> This resulted in refcount underflows and could crash when updating GPU<br /> timelines.<br /> The fence is now chosen only after the VA mapping work is completed, and its<br /> reference is taken safely. After exporting it to the VM timeline syncobj, the<br /> driver always drops its local fence reference, ensuring balanced refcounting<br /> and avoiding use-after-free on dma_fence.<br /> <br /> Crash signature:<br /> [ 205.828135] refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.<br /> [ 205.832963] WARNING: CPU: 30 PID: 7274 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xbe/0x110<br /> ...<br /> [ 206.074014] Call Trace:<br /> [ 206.076488] <br /> [ 206.078608] amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl+0x6ea/0x740 [amdgpu]<br /> [ 206.084040] ? __pfx_amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]<br /> [ 206.089994] drm_ioctl_kernel+0x86/0xe0 [drm]<br /> [ 206.094415] drm_ioctl+0x26e/0x520 [drm]<br /> [ 206.098424] ? __pfx_amdgpu_gem_va_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [amdgpu]<br /> [ 206.104402] amdgpu_drm_ioctl+0x4b/0x80 [amdgpu]<br /> [ 206.109387] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x96/0xe0<br /> [ 206.113156] do_syscall_64+0x66/0x2d0<br /> ...<br /> [ 206.553351] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc0dfde90<br /> ...<br /> [ 206.553378] RIP: 0010:dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked+0x39/0xe0<br /> ...<br /> [ 206.553405] Call Trace:<br /> [ 206.553409] <br /> [ 206.553415] ? __pfx_drm_sched_fence_free_rcu+0x10/0x10 [gpu_sched]<br /> [ 206.553424] dma_fence_signal+0x30/0x60<br /> [ 206.553427] drm_sched_job_done.isra.0+0x123/0x150 [gpu_sched]<br /> [ 206.553434] dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked+0x6e/0xe0<br /> [ 206.553437] dma_fence_signal+0x30/0x60<br /> [ 206.553441] amdgpu_fence_process+0xd8/0x150 [amdgpu]<br /> [ 206.553854] sdma_v4_0_process_trap_irq+0x97/0xb0 [amdgpu]<br /> [ 206.554353] edac_mce_amd(E) ee1004(E)<br /> [ 206.554270] amdgpu_irq_dispatch+0x150/0x230 [amdgpu]<br /> [ 206.554702] amdgpu_ih_process+0x6a/0x180 [amdgpu]<br /> [ 206.555101] amdgpu_irq_handler+0x23/0x60 [amdgpu]<br /> [ 206.555500] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x4a/0x1c0<br /> [ 206.555506] handle_irq_event+0x38/0x80<br /> [ 206.555509] handle_edge_irq+0x92/0x1e0<br /> [ 206.555513] __common_interrupt+0x3e/0xb0<br /> [ 206.555519] common_interrupt+0x80/0xa0<br /> [ 206.555525] <br /> [ 206.555527] <br /> ...<br /> [ 206.555650] RIP: 0010:dma_fence_signal_timestamp_locked+0x39/0xe0<br /> ...<br /> [ 206.555667] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> media: radio-keene: fix memory leak in error path<br /> <br /> Fix a memory leak in usb_keene_probe(). The v4l2 control handler is<br /> initialized and controls are added, but if v4l2_device_register() or<br /> video_register_device() fails afterward, the handler was never freed,<br /> leaking memory.<br /> <br /> Add v4l2_ctrl_handler_free() call in the err_v4l2 error path to ensure<br /> the control handler is properly freed for all error paths after it is<br /> initialized.