Vulnerabilities

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ext4: fix BUG in ext4_mb_new_inode_pa() due to overflow<br /> <br /> When we calculate the end position of ext4_free_extent, this position may<br /> be exactly where ext4_lblk_t (i.e. uint) overflows. For example, if<br /> ac_g_ex.fe_logical is 4294965248 and ac_orig_goal_len is 2048, then the<br /> computed end is 0x100000000, which is 0. If ac-&gt;ac_o_ex.fe_logical is not<br /> the first case of adjusting the best extent, that is, new_bex_end &gt; 0, the<br /> following BUG_ON will be triggered:<br /> <br /> =========================================================<br /> kernel BUG at fs/ext4/mballoc.c:5116!<br /> invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI<br /> CPU: 3 PID: 673 Comm: xfs_io Tainted: G E 6.5.0-rc1+ #279<br /> RIP: 0010:ext4_mb_new_inode_pa+0xc5/0x430<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> ext4_mb_use_best_found+0x203/0x2f0<br /> ext4_mb_try_best_found+0x163/0x240<br /> ext4_mb_regular_allocator+0x158/0x1550<br /> ext4_mb_new_blocks+0x86a/0xe10<br /> ext4_ext_map_blocks+0xb0c/0x13a0<br /> ext4_map_blocks+0x2cd/0x8f0<br /> ext4_iomap_begin+0x27b/0x400<br /> iomap_iter+0x222/0x3d0<br /> __iomap_dio_rw+0x243/0xcb0<br /> iomap_dio_rw+0x16/0x80<br /> =========================================================<br /> <br /> A simple reproducer demonstrating the problem:<br /> <br /> mkfs.ext4 -F /dev/sda -b 4096 100M<br /> mount /dev/sda /tmp/test<br /> fallocate -l1M /tmp/test/tmp<br /> fallocate -l10M /tmp/test/file<br /> fallocate -i -o 1M -l16777203M /tmp/test/file<br /> fsstress -d /tmp/test -l 0 -n 100000 -p 8 &amp;<br /> sleep 10 &amp;&amp; killall -9 fsstress<br /> rm -f /tmp/test/tmp<br /> xfs_io -c "open -ad /tmp/test/file" -c "pwrite -S 0xff 0 8192"<br /> <br /> We simply refactor the logic for adjusting the best extent by adding<br /> a temporary ext4_free_extent ex and use extent_logical_end() to avoid<br /> overflow, which also simplifies the code.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> igb: clean up in all error paths when enabling SR-IOV<br /> <br /> After commit 50f303496d92 ("igb: Enable SR-IOV after reinit"), removing<br /> the igb module could hang or crash (depending on the machine) when the<br /> module has been loaded with the max_vfs parameter set to some value != 0.<br /> <br /> In case of one test machine with a dual port 82580, this hang occurred:<br /> <br /> [ 232.480687] igb 0000:41:00.1: removed PHC on enp65s0f1<br /> [ 233.093257] igb 0000:41:00.1: IOV Disabled<br /> [ 233.329969] pcieport 0000:40:01.0: AER: Multiple Uncorrected (Non-Fatal) err0<br /> [ 233.340302] igb 0000:41:00.0: PCIe Bus Error: severity=Uncorrected (Non-Fata)<br /> [ 233.352248] igb 0000:41:00.0: device [8086:1516] error status/mask=00100000<br /> [ 233.361088] igb 0000:41:00.0: [20] UnsupReq (First)<br /> [ 233.368183] igb 0000:41:00.0: AER: TLP Header: 40000001 0000040f cdbfc00c c<br /> [ 233.376846] igb 0000:41:00.1: PCIe Bus Error: severity=Uncorrected (Non-Fata)<br /> [ 233.388779] igb 0000:41:00.1: device [8086:1516] error status/mask=00100000<br /> [ 233.397629] igb 0000:41:00.1: [20] UnsupReq (First)<br /> [ 233.404736] igb 0000:41:00.1: AER: TLP Header: 40000001 0000040f cdbfc00c c<br /> [ 233.538214] pci 0000:41:00.1: AER: can&amp;#39;t recover (no error_detected callback)<br /> [ 233.538401] igb 0000:41:00.0: removed PHC on enp65s0f0<br /> [ 233.546197] pcieport 0000:40:01.0: AER: device recovery failed<br /> [ 234.157244] igb 0000:41:00.0: IOV Disabled<br /> [ 371.619705] INFO: task irq/35-aerdrv:257 blocked for more than 122 seconds.<br /> [ 371.627489] Not tainted 6.4.0-dirty #2<br /> [ 371.632257] "echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this.<br /> [ 371.641000] task:irq/35-aerdrv state:D stack:0 pid:257 ppid:2 f0<br /> [ 371.650330] Call Trace:<br /> [ 371.653061] <br /> [ 371.655407] __schedule+0x20e/0x660<br /> [ 371.659313] schedule+0x5a/0xd0<br /> [ 371.662824] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x11/0x20<br /> [ 371.667983] __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x372/0x6c0<br /> [ 371.673237] ? __pfx_aer_root_reset+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 371.678105] report_error_detected+0x25/0x1c0<br /> [ 371.682974] ? __pfx_report_normal_detected+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 371.688618] pci_walk_bus+0x72/0x90<br /> [ 371.692519] pcie_do_recovery+0xb2/0x330<br /> [ 371.696899] aer_process_err_devices+0x117/0x170<br /> [ 371.702055] aer_isr+0x1c0/0x1e0<br /> [ 371.705661] ? __set_cpus_allowed_ptr+0x54/0xa0<br /> [ 371.710723] ? __pfx_irq_thread_fn+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 371.715496] irq_thread_fn+0x20/0x60<br /> [ 371.719491] irq_thread+0xe6/0x1b0<br /> [ 371.723291] ? __pfx_irq_thread_dtor+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 371.728255] ? __pfx_irq_thread+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 371.732731] kthread+0xe2/0x110<br /> [ 371.736243] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 371.740430] ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50<br /> [ 371.744428] <br /> <br /> The reproducer was a simple script:<br /> <br /> #!/bin/sh<br /> for i in `seq 1 5`; do<br /> modprobe -rv igb<br /> modprobe -v igb max_vfs=1<br /> sleep 1<br /> modprobe -rv igb<br /> done<br /> <br /> It turned out that this could only be reproduce on 82580 (quad and<br /> dual-port), but not on 82576, i350 and i210. Further debugging showed<br /> that igb_enable_sriov()&amp;#39;s call to pci_enable_sriov() is failing, because<br /> dev-&gt;is_physfn is 0 on 82580.<br /> <br /> Prior to commit 50f303496d92 ("igb: Enable SR-IOV after reinit"),<br /> igb_enable_sriov() jumped into the "err_out" cleanup branch. After this<br /> commit it only returned the error code.<br /> <br /> So the cleanup didn&amp;#39;t take place, and the incorrect VF setup in the<br /> igb_adapter structure fooled the igb driver into assuming that VFs have<br /> been set up where no VF actually existed.<br /> <br /> Fix this problem by cleaning up again if pci_enable_sriov() fails.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> wifi: rtw88: use work to update rate to avoid RCU warning<br /> <br /> The ieee80211_ops::sta_rc_update must be atomic, because<br /> ieee80211_chan_bw_change() holds rcu_read lock while calling<br /> drv_sta_rc_update(), so create a work to do original things.<br /> <br /> Voluntary context switch within RCU read-side critical section!<br /> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 4621 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:318<br /> rcu_note_context_switch+0x571/0x5d0<br /> CPU: 0 PID: 4621 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Tainted: G W OE<br /> Workqueue: phy3 ieee80211_chswitch_work [mac80211]<br /> RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0x571/0x5d0<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> __schedule+0xb0/0x1460<br /> ? __mod_timer+0x116/0x360<br /> schedule+0x5a/0xc0<br /> schedule_timeout+0x87/0x150<br /> ? trace_raw_output_tick_stop+0x60/0x60<br /> wait_for_completion_timeout+0x7b/0x140<br /> usb_start_wait_urb+0x82/0x160 [usbcore<br /> usb_control_msg+0xe3/0x140 [usbcore<br /> rtw_usb_read+0x88/0xe0 [rtw_usb<br /> rtw_usb_read8+0xf/0x10 [rtw_usb<br /> rtw_fw_send_h2c_command+0xa0/0x170 [rtw_core<br /> rtw_fw_send_ra_info+0xc9/0xf0 [rtw_core<br /> drv_sta_rc_update+0x7c/0x160 [mac80211<br /> ieee80211_chan_bw_change+0xfb/0x110 [mac80211<br /> ieee80211_change_chanctx+0x38/0x130 [mac80211<br /> ieee80211_vif_use_reserved_switch+0x34e/0x900 [mac80211<br /> ieee80211_link_use_reserved_context+0x88/0xe0 [mac80211<br /> ieee80211_chswitch_work+0x95/0x170 [mac80211<br /> process_one_work+0x201/0x410<br /> worker_thread+0x4a/0x3b0<br /> ? process_one_work+0x410/0x410<br /> kthread+0xe1/0x110<br /> ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20<br /> ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30<br />

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> scsi: qla2xxx: Fix buffer overrun<br /> <br /> Klocwork warning: Buffer Overflow - Array Index Out of Bounds<br /> <br /> Driver uses fc_els_flogi to calculate size of buffer. The actual buffer is<br /> nested inside of fc_els_flogi which is smaller.<br /> <br /> Replace structure name to allow proper size calculation.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> RDMA/irdma: Fix memory leak of PBLE objects<br /> <br /> On rmmod of irdma, the PBLE object memory is not being freed. PBLE object<br /> memory are not statically pre-allocated at function initialization time<br /> unlike other HMC objects. PBLEs objects and the Segment Descriptors (SD)<br /> for it can be dynamically allocated during scale up and SD&amp;#39;s remain<br /> allocated till function deinitialization.<br /> <br /> Fix this leak by adding IRDMA_HMC_IW_PBLE to the iw_hmc_obj_types[] table<br /> and skip pbles in irdma_create_hmc_obj but not in irdma_del_hmc_objects().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> kheaders: Use array declaration instead of char<br /> <br /> Under CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE, memcpy() will check the size of destination<br /> and source buffers. Defining kernel_headers_data as "char" would trip<br /> this check. Since these addresses are treated as byte arrays, define<br /> them as arrays (as done everywhere else).<br /> <br /> This was seen with:<br /> <br /> $ cat /sys/kernel/kheaders.tar.xz &gt;&gt; /dev/null<br /> <br /> detected buffer overflow in memcpy<br /> kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1027!<br /> ...<br /> RIP: 0010:fortify_panic+0xf/0x20<br /> [...]<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> ikheaders_read+0x45/0x50 [kheaders]<br /> kernfs_fop_read_iter+0x1a4/0x2f0<br /> ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> iommu/amd: Add a length limitation for the ivrs_acpihid command-line parameter<br /> <br /> The &amp;#39;acpiid&amp;#39; buffer in the parse_ivrs_acpihid function may overflow,<br /> because the string specifier in the format string sscanf()<br /> has no width limitation.<br /> <br /> Found by InfoTeCS on behalf of Linux Verification Center<br /> (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> firmware: arm_ffa: Check if ffa_driver remove is present before executing<br /> <br /> Currently ffa_drv-&gt;remove() is called unconditionally from<br /> ffa_device_remove(). Since the driver registration doesn&amp;#39;t check for it<br /> and allows it to be registered without .remove callback, we need to check<br /> for the presence of it before executing it from ffa_device_remove() to<br /> above a NULL pointer dereference like the one below:<br /> <br /> | Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000<br /> | Mem abort info:<br /> | ESR = 0x0000000086000004<br /> | EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits<br /> | SET = 0, FnV = 0<br /> | EA = 0, S1PTW = 0<br /> | FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault<br /> | user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000881cc8000<br /> | [0000000000000000] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000<br /> | Internal error: Oops: 0000000086000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP<br /> | CPU: 3 PID: 130 Comm: rmmod Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7 #6<br /> | Hardware name: FVP Base RevC (DT)<br /> | pstate: 63402809 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=-c)<br /> | pc : 0x0<br /> | lr : ffa_device_remove+0x20/0x2c<br /> | Call trace:<br /> | 0x0<br /> | device_release_driver_internal+0x16c/0x260<br /> | driver_detach+0x90/0xd0<br /> | bus_remove_driver+0xdc/0x11c<br /> | driver_unregister+0x30/0x54<br /> | ffa_driver_unregister+0x14/0x20<br /> | cleanup_module+0x18/0xeec<br /> | __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x234/0x378<br /> | invoke_syscall+0x40/0x108<br /> | el0_svc_common+0xb4/0xf0<br /> | do_el0_svc+0x30/0xa4<br /> | el0_svc+0x2c/0x7c<br /> | el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0<br /> | el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> soc: mediatek: mtk-svs: Enable the IRQ later<br /> <br /> If the system does not come from reset (like when is booted via<br /> kexec()), the peripheral might triger an IRQ before the data structures<br /> are initialised.<br /> <br /> <br /> [ 0.227710] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000f08<br /> [ 0.227913] Call trace:<br /> [ 0.227918] svs_isr+0x8c/0x538

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> iommufd: Set end correctly when doing batch carry<br /> <br /> Even though the test suite covers this it somehow became obscured that<br /> this wasn&amp;#39;t working.<br /> <br /> The test iommufd_ioas.mock_domain.access_domain_destory would blow up<br /> rarely.<br /> <br /> end should be set to 1 because this just pushed an item, the carry, to the<br /> pfns list.<br /> <br /> Sometimes the test would blow up with:<br /> <br /> BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000<br /> #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode<br /> #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page<br /> PGD 0 P4D 0<br /> Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP<br /> CPU: 5 PID: 584 Comm: iommufd Not tainted 6.5.0-rc1-dirty #1236<br /> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014<br /> RIP: 0010:batch_unpin+0xa2/0x100 [iommufd]<br /> Code: 17 48 81 fe ff ff 07 00 77 70 48 8b 15 b7 be 97 e2 48 85 d2 74 14 48 8b 14 fa 48 85 d2 74 0b 40 0f b6 f6 48 c1 e6 04 48 01 f2 8b 3a 48 c1 e0 06 89 ca 48 89 de 48 83 e7 f0 48 01 c7 e8 96 dc<br /> RSP: 0018:ffffc90001677a58 EFLAGS: 00010246<br /> RAX: 00007f7e2646f000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001<br /> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000fefc4c8d RDI: 0000000000fefc4c<br /> RBP: ffffc90001677a80 R08: 0000000000000048 R09: 0000000000000200<br /> R10: 0000000000030b98 R11: ffffffff81f3bb40 R12: 0000000000000001<br /> R13: ffff888101f75800 R14: ffffc90001677ad0 R15: 00000000000001fe<br /> FS: 00007f9323679740(0000) GS:ffff8881ba540000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000<br /> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033<br /> CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000105ede003 CR4: 00000000003706a0<br /> DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000<br /> DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> ? show_regs+0x5c/0x70<br /> ? __die+0x1f/0x60<br /> ? page_fault_oops+0x15d/0x440<br /> ? lock_release+0xbc/0x240<br /> ? exc_page_fault+0x4a4/0x970<br /> ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30<br /> ? batch_unpin+0xa2/0x100 [iommufd]<br /> ? batch_unpin+0xba/0x100 [iommufd]<br /> __iopt_area_unfill_domain+0x198/0x430 [iommufd]<br /> ? __mutex_lock+0x8c/0xb80<br /> ? __mutex_lock+0x6aa/0xb80<br /> ? xa_erase+0x28/0x30<br /> ? iopt_table_remove_domain+0x162/0x320 [iommufd]<br /> ? lock_release+0xbc/0x240<br /> iopt_area_unfill_domain+0xd/0x10 [iommufd]<br /> iopt_table_remove_domain+0x195/0x320 [iommufd]<br /> iommufd_hw_pagetable_destroy+0xb3/0x110 [iommufd]<br /> iommufd_object_destroy_user+0x8e/0xf0 [iommufd]<br /> iommufd_device_detach+0xc5/0x140 [iommufd]<br /> iommufd_selftest_destroy+0x1f/0x70 [iommufd]<br /> iommufd_object_destroy_user+0x8e/0xf0 [iommufd]<br /> iommufd_destroy+0x3a/0x50 [iommufd]<br /> iommufd_fops_ioctl+0xfb/0x170 [iommufd]<br /> __x64_sys_ioctl+0x40d/0x9a0<br /> do_syscall_64+0x3c/0x80<br /> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> x86: fix clear_user_rep_good() exception handling annotation<br /> <br /> This code no longer exists in mainline, because it was removed in<br /> commit d2c95f9d6802 ("x86: don&amp;#39;t use REP_GOOD or ERMS for user memory<br /> clearing") upstream.<br /> <br /> However, rather than backport the full range of x86 memory clearing and<br /> copying cleanups, fix the exception table annotation placement for the<br /> final &amp;#39;rep movsb&amp;#39; in clear_user_rep_good(): rather than pointing at the<br /> actual instruction that did the user space access, it pointed to the<br /> register move just before it.<br /> <br /> That made sense from a code flow standpoint, but not from an actual<br /> usage standpoint: it means that if user access takes an exception, the<br /> exception handler won&amp;#39;t actually find the instruction in the exception<br /> tables.<br /> <br /> As a result, rather than fixing it up and returning -EFAULT, it would<br /> then turn it into a kernel oops report instead, something like:<br /> <br /> BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000020081000<br /> #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode<br /> #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page<br /> ...<br /> RIP: 0010:clear_user_rep_good+0x1c/0x30 arch/x86/lib/clear_page_64.S:147<br /> ...<br /> Call Trace:<br /> __clear_user arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:103 [inline]<br /> clear_user arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h:124 [inline]<br /> iov_iter_zero+0x709/0x1290 lib/iov_iter.c:800<br /> iomap_dio_hole_iter fs/iomap/direct-io.c:389 [inline]<br /> iomap_dio_iter fs/iomap/direct-io.c:440 [inline]<br /> __iomap_dio_rw+0xe3d/0x1cd0 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:601<br /> iomap_dio_rw+0x40/0xa0 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:689<br /> ext4_dio_read_iter fs/ext4/file.c:94 [inline]<br /> ext4_file_read_iter+0x4be/0x690 fs/ext4/file.c:145<br /> call_read_iter include/linux/fs.h:2183 [inline]<br /> do_iter_readv_writev+0x2e0/0x3b0 fs/read_write.c:733<br /> do_iter_read+0x2f2/0x750 fs/read_write.c:796<br /> vfs_readv+0xe5/0x150 fs/read_write.c:916<br /> do_preadv+0x1b6/0x270 fs/read_write.c:1008<br /> __do_sys_preadv2 fs/read_write.c:1070 [inline]<br /> __se_sys_preadv2 fs/read_write.c:1061 [inline]<br /> __x64_sys_preadv2+0xef/0x150 fs/read_write.c:1061<br /> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]<br /> do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80<br /> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd<br /> <br /> which then looks like a filesystem bug rather than the incorrect<br /> exception annotation that it is.<br /> <br /> [ The alternative to this one-liner fix is to take the upstream series<br /> that cleans this all up:<br /> <br /> 68674f94ffc9 ("x86: don&amp;#39;t use REP_GOOD or ERMS for small memory copies")<br /> 20f3337d350c ("x86: don&amp;#39;t use REP_GOOD or ERMS for small memory clearing")<br /> adfcf4231b8c ("x86: don&amp;#39;t use REP_GOOD or ERMS for user memory copies")<br /> * d2c95f9d6802 ("x86: don&amp;#39;t use REP_GOOD or ERMS for user memory clearing")<br /> 3639a535587d ("x86: move stac/clac from user copy routines into callers")<br /> 577e6a7fd50d ("x86: inline the &amp;#39;rep movs&amp;#39; in user copies for the FSRM case")<br /> 8c9b6a88b7e2 ("x86: improve on the non-rep &amp;#39;clear_user&amp;#39; function")<br /> 427fda2c8a49 ("x86: improve on the non-rep &amp;#39;copy_user&amp;#39; function")<br /> * e046fe5a36a9 ("x86: set FSRS automatically on AMD CPUs that have FSRM")<br /> e1f2750edc4a ("x86: remove &amp;#39;zerorest&amp;#39; argument from __copy_user_nocache()")<br /> 034ff37d3407 ("x86: rewrite &amp;#39;__copy_user_nocache&amp;#39; function")<br /> <br /> with either the whole series or at a minimum the two marked commits<br /> being needed to fix this issue ]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ext4: fix invalid free tracking in ext4_xattr_move_to_block()<br /> <br /> In ext4_xattr_move_to_block(), the value of the extended attribute<br /> which we need to move to an external block may be allocated by<br /> kvmalloc() if the value is stored in an external inode. So at the end<br /> of the function the code tried to check if this was the case by<br /> testing entry-&gt;e_value_inum.<br /> <br /> However, at this point, the pointer to the xattr entry is no longer<br /> valid, because it was removed from the original location where it had<br /> been stored. So we could end up calling kvfree() on a pointer which<br /> was not allocated by kvmalloc(); or we could also potentially leak<br /> memory by not freeing the buffer when it should be freed. Fix this by<br /> storing whether it should be freed in a separate variable.