Vulnerabilities

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ALSA: usb-audio: Fix use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_free()<br /> <br /> When snd_usb_create_mixer() fails, snd_usb_mixer_free() frees<br /> mixer-&gt;id_elems but the controls already added to the card still<br /> reference the freed memory. Later when snd_card_register() runs,<br /> the OSS mixer layer calls their callbacks and hits a use-after-free read.<br /> <br /> Call trace:<br /> get_ctl_value+0x63f/0x820 sound/usb/mixer.c:411<br /> get_min_max_with_quirks.isra.0+0x240/0x1f40 sound/usb/mixer.c:1241<br /> mixer_ctl_feature_info+0x26b/0x490 sound/usb/mixer.c:1381<br /> snd_mixer_oss_build_test+0x174/0x3a0 sound/core/oss/mixer_oss.c:887<br /> ...<br /> snd_card_register+0x4ed/0x6d0 sound/core/init.c:923<br /> usb_audio_probe+0x5ef/0x2a90 sound/usb/card.c:1025<br /> <br /> Fix by calling snd_ctl_remove() for all mixer controls before freeing<br /> id_elems. We save the next pointer first because snd_ctl_remove()<br /> frees the current element.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> slimbus: core: fix device reference leak on report present<br /> <br /> Slimbus devices can be allocated dynamically upon reception of<br /> report-present messages.<br /> <br /> Make sure to drop the reference taken when looking up already registered<br /> devices.<br /> <br /> Note that this requires taking an extra reference in case the device has<br /> not yet been registered and has to be allocated.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> intel_th: fix device leak on output open()<br /> <br /> Make sure to drop the reference taken when looking up the th device<br /> during output device open() on errors and on close().<br /> <br /> Note that a recent commit fixed the leak in a couple of open() error<br /> paths but not all of them, and the reference is still leaking on<br /> successful open().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> wifi: rsi: Fix memory corruption due to not set vif driver data size<br /> <br /> The struct ieee80211_vif contains trailing space for vif driver data,<br /> when struct ieee80211_vif is allocated, the total memory size that is<br /> allocated is sizeof(struct ieee80211_vif) + size of vif driver data.<br /> The size of vif driver data is set by each WiFi driver as needed.<br /> <br /> The RSI911x driver does not set vif driver data size, no trailing space<br /> for vif driver data is therefore allocated past struct ieee80211_vif .<br /> The RSI911x driver does however use the vif driver data to store its<br /> vif driver data structure "struct vif_priv". An access to vif-&gt;drv_priv<br /> leads to access out of struct ieee80211_vif bounds and corruption of<br /> some memory.<br /> <br /> In case of the failure observed locally, rsi_mac80211_add_interface()<br /> would write struct vif_priv *vif_info = (struct vif_priv *)vif-&gt;drv_priv;<br /> vif_info-&gt;vap_id = vap_idx. This write corrupts struct fq_tin member<br /> struct list_head new_flows . The flow = list_first_entry(head, struct<br /> fq_flow, flowchain); in fq_tin_reset() then reports non-NULL bogus<br /> address, which when accessed causes a crash.<br /> <br /> The trigger is very simple, boot the machine with init=/bin/sh , mount<br /> devtmpfs, sysfs, procfs, and then do "ip link set wlan0 up", "sleep 1",<br /> "ip link set wlan0 down" and the crash occurs.<br /> <br /> Fix this by setting the correct size of vif driver data, which is the<br /> size of "struct vif_priv", so that memory is allocated and the driver<br /> can store its driver data in it, instead of corrupting memory around<br /> it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net/sched: Enforce that teql can only be used as root qdisc<br /> <br /> Design intent of teql is that it is only supposed to be used as root qdisc.<br /> We need to check for that constraint.<br /> <br /> Although not important, I will describe the scenario that unearthed this<br /> issue for the curious.<br /> <br /> GangMin Kim managed to concot a scenario as follows:<br /> <br /> ROOT qdisc 1:0 (QFQ)<br /> ├── class 1:1 (weight=15, lmax=16384) netem with delay 6.4s<br /> └── class 1:2 (weight=1, lmax=1514) teql<br /> <br /> GangMin sends a packet which is enqueued to 1:1 (netem).<br /> Any invocation of dequeue by QFQ from this class will not return a packet<br /> until after 6.4s. In the meantime, a second packet is sent and it lands on<br /> 1:2. teql&amp;#39;s enqueue will return success and this will activate class 1:2.<br /> Main issue is that teql only updates the parent visible qlen (sch-&gt;q.qlen)<br /> at dequeue. Since QFQ will only call dequeue if peek succeeds (and teql&amp;#39;s<br /> peek always returns NULL), dequeue will never be called and thus the qlen<br /> will remain as 0. With that in mind, when GangMin updates 1:2&amp;#39;s lmax value,<br /> the qfq_change_class calls qfq_deact_rm_from_agg. Since the child qdisc&amp;#39;s<br /> qlen was not incremented, qfq fails to deactivate the class, but still<br /> frees its pointers from the aggregate. So when the first packet is<br /> rescheduled after 6.4 seconds (netem&amp;#39;s delay), a dangling pointer is<br /> accessed causing GangMin&amp;#39;s causing a UAF.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> can: esd_usb: esd_usb_read_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak<br /> <br /> Fix similar memory leak as in commit 7352e1d5932a ("can: gs_usb:<br /> gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak").<br /> <br /> In esd_usb_open(), the URBs for USB-in transfers are allocated, added to<br /> the dev-&gt;rx_submitted anchor and submitted. In the complete callback<br /> esd_usb_read_bulk_callback(), the URBs are processed and resubmitted. In<br /> esd_usb_close() the URBs are freed by calling<br /> usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&amp;dev-&gt;rx_submitted).<br /> <br /> However, this does not take into account that the USB framework unanchors<br /> the URB before the complete function is called. This means that once an<br /> in-URB has been completed, it is no longer anchored and is ultimately not<br /> released in esd_usb_close().<br /> <br /> Fix the memory leak by anchoring the URB in the<br /> esd_usb_read_bulk_callback() to the dev-&gt;rx_submitted anchor.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ALSA: ctxfi: Fix potential OOB access in audio mixer handling<br /> <br /> In the audio mixer handling code of ctxfi driver, the conf field is<br /> used as a kind of loop index, and it&amp;#39;s referred in the index callbacks<br /> (amixer_index() and sum_index()).<br /> <br /> As spotted recently by fuzzers, the current code causes OOB access at<br /> those functions.<br /> | UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in /build/reproducible-path/linux-6.17.8/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctamixer.c:347:48<br /> | index 8 is out of range for type &amp;#39;unsigned char [8]&amp;#39;<br /> <br /> After the analysis, the cause was found to be the lack of the proper<br /> (re-)initialization of conj field.<br /> <br /> This patch addresses those OOB accesses by adding the proper<br /> initializations of the loop indices.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> mm/vma: fix anon_vma UAF on mremap() faulted, unfaulted merge<br /> <br /> Patch series "mm/vma: fix anon_vma UAF on mremap() faulted, unfaulted<br /> merge", v2.<br /> <br /> Commit 879bca0a2c4f ("mm/vma: fix incorrectly disallowed anonymous VMA<br /> merges") introduced the ability to merge previously unavailable VMA merge<br /> scenarios.<br /> <br /> However, it is handling merges incorrectly when it comes to mremap() of a<br /> faulted VMA adjacent to an unfaulted VMA. The issues arise in three<br /> cases:<br /> <br /> 1. Previous VMA unfaulted:<br /> <br /> copied -----|<br /> v<br /> |-----------|.............|<br /> | unfaulted |(faulted VMA)|<br /> |-----------|.............|<br /> prev<br /> <br /> 2. Next VMA unfaulted:<br /> <br /> copied -----|<br /> v<br /> |.............|-----------|<br /> |(faulted VMA)| unfaulted |<br /> |.............|-----------|<br /> next<br /> <br /> 3. Both adjacent VMAs unfaulted:<br /> <br /> copied -----|<br /> v<br /> |-----------|.............|-----------|<br /> | unfaulted |(faulted VMA)| unfaulted |<br /> |-----------|.............|-----------|<br /> prev next<br /> <br /> This series fixes each of these cases, and introduces self tests to assert<br /> that the issues are corrected.<br /> <br /> I also test a further case which was already handled, to assert that my<br /> changes continues to correctly handle it:<br /> <br /> 4. prev unfaulted, next faulted:<br /> <br /> copied -----|<br /> v<br /> |-----------|.............|-----------|<br /> | unfaulted |(faulted VMA)| faulted |<br /> |-----------|.............|-----------|<br /> prev next<br /> <br /> This bug was discovered via a syzbot report, linked to in the first patch<br /> in the series, I confirmed that this series fixes the bug.<br /> <br /> I also discovered that we are failing to check that the faulted VMA was<br /> not forked when merging a copied VMA in cases 1-3 above, an issue this<br /> series also addresses.<br /> <br /> I also added self tests to assert that this is resolved (and confirmed<br /> that the tests failed prior to this).<br /> <br /> I also cleaned up vma_expand() as part of this work, renamed<br /> vma_had_uncowed_parents() to vma_is_fork_child() as the previous name was<br /> unduly confusing, and simplified the comments around this function.<br /> <br /> <br /> This patch (of 4):<br /> <br /> Commit 879bca0a2c4f ("mm/vma: fix incorrectly disallowed anonymous VMA<br /> merges") introduced the ability to merge previously unavailable VMA merge<br /> scenarios.<br /> <br /> The key piece of logic introduced was the ability to merge a faulted VMA<br /> immediately next to an unfaulted VMA, which relies upon dup_anon_vma() to<br /> correctly handle anon_vma state.<br /> <br /> In the case of the merge of an existing VMA (that is changing properties<br /> of a VMA and then merging if those properties are shared by adjacent<br /> VMAs), dup_anon_vma() is invoked correctly.<br /> <br /> However in the case of the merge of a new VMA, a corner case peculiar to<br /> mremap() was missed.<br /> <br /> The issue is that vma_expand() only performs dup_anon_vma() if the target<br /> (the VMA that will ultimately become the merged VMA): is not the next VMA,<br /> i.e. the one that appears after the range in which the new VMA is to be<br /> established.<br /> <br /> A key insight here is that in all other cases other than mremap(), a new<br /> VMA merge either expands an existing VMA, meaning that the target VMA will<br /> be that VMA, or would have anon_vma be NULL.<br /> <br /> Specifically:<br /> <br /> * __mmap_region() - no anon_vma in place, initial mapping.<br /> * do_brk_flags() - expanding an existing VMA.<br /> * vma_merge_extend() - expanding an existing VMA.<br /> * relocate_vma_down() - no anon_vma in place, initial mapping.<br /> <br /> In addition, we are in the unique situation of needing to duplicate<br /> anon_vma state from a VMA that is neither the previous or next VMA being<br /> merged with.<br /> <br /> dup_anon_vma() deals exclusively with the target=unfaulted, src=faulted<br /> case. This leaves four possibilities, in each case where the copied VMA<br /> is faulted:<br /> <br /> 1. Previous VMA unfaulted:<br /> <br /> copied -----|<br /> <br /> ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ALSA: scarlett2: Fix buffer overflow in config retrieval<br /> <br /> The scarlett2_usb_get_config() function has a logic error in the<br /> endianness conversion code that can cause buffer overflows when<br /> count &gt; 1.<br /> <br /> The code checks `if (size == 2)` where `size` is the total buffer size in<br /> bytes, then loops `count` times treating each element as u16 (2 bytes).<br /> This causes the loop to access `count * 2` bytes when the buffer only<br /> has `size` bytes allocated.<br /> <br /> Fix by checking the element size (config_item-&gt;size) instead of the<br /> total buffer size. This ensures the endianness conversion matches the<br /> actual element type.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> gpio: cdev: Fix resource leaks on errors in lineinfo_changed_notify()<br /> <br /> On error handling paths, lineinfo_changed_notify() doesn&amp;#39;t free the<br /> allocated resources which results leaks. Fix it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> can: mcba_usb: mcba_usb_read_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak<br /> <br /> Fix similar memory leak as in commit 7352e1d5932a ("can: gs_usb:<br /> gs_usb_receive_bulk_callback(): fix URB memory leak").<br /> <br /> In mcba_usb_probe() -&gt; mcba_usb_start(), the URBs for USB-in transfers are<br /> allocated, added to the priv-&gt;rx_submitted anchor and submitted. In the<br /> complete callback mcba_usb_read_bulk_callback(), the URBs are processed and<br /> resubmitted. In mcba_usb_close() -&gt; mcba_urb_unlink() the URBs are freed by<br /> calling usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&amp;priv-&gt;rx_submitted).<br /> <br /> However, this does not take into account that the USB framework unanchors<br /> the URB before the complete function is called. This means that once an<br /> in-URB has been completed, it is no longer anchored and is ultimately not<br /> released in usb_kill_anchored_urbs().<br /> <br /> Fix the memory leak by anchoring the URB in the<br /> mcba_usb_read_bulk_callback()to the priv-&gt;rx_submitted anchor.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net: phy: intel-xway: fix OF node refcount leakage<br /> <br /> Automated review spotted am OF node reference count leakage when<br /> checking if the &amp;#39;leds&amp;#39; child node exists.<br /> <br /> Call of_put_node() to correctly maintain the refcount.