Vulnerabilities

A malicious actor who lures an authenticated user to a malicious page could exploit a Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) misconfiguration found in UniFi OS to trigger actions in UniFi OS using that user's session.

A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit a Path Traversal vulnerability found in UniFi Protect Floodlight devices to access files on the UniFi Protect Floodlight.

A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit an Improper Input Validation vulnerability found in UniFi Network Application to execute a Denial of Service (DoS) attack on the application.

A malicious actor with access to the network and low privileges could exploit a series of authenticated SQL Injection vulnerabilities found in UniFi OS to escalate privileges within such UniFi OS devices or instances.

A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit an Improper Access Control vulnerability found in UniFi Protect Application to bypass authentication in certain UniFi Protect Application API endpoints.

A malicious actor with access to the network and high privileges could exploit a Path Traversal vulnerability found in self-hosted instances of UniFi Network Application to escalate write permission on the host device.

A malicious actor with access to the network could exploit an Improper Access Control vulnerability found in UniFi Protect Application to bypass authentication for data streaming.

A malicious actor with access to the network and under certain conditions could exploit an Improper Initialization vulnerability found in UniFi Protect Application to bypass authentication in UniFi Protect Cameras.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> Bluetooth: fix UAF in l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() vs l2cap_conn_del()<br /> <br /> bt_accept_dequeue() unlinks a not-yet-accepted child from the parent<br /> accept queue and release_sock()s it before returning, so the returned<br /> sk has no caller reference and is unlocked.<br /> <br /> l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() walks these children on listening-socket<br /> close. A concurrent HCI disconnect drives hci_rx_work -&gt;<br /> l2cap_conn_del() which runs l2cap_chan_del() + l2cap_sock_kill() and<br /> frees the child sk and its l2cap_chan; cleanup_listen() then uses both:<br /> <br /> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in l2cap_sock_kill<br /> l2cap_sock_kill / l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen / __x64_sys_close<br /> Freed by: l2cap_conn_del -&gt; l2cap_sock_close_cb -&gt; l2cap_sock_kill<br /> <br /> This is distinct from the two fixes already in this area: commit<br /> e83f5e24da741 ("Bluetooth: serialize accept_q access") serialises the<br /> accept_q list/poll and takes temporary refs inside bt_accept_dequeue(),<br /> and CVE-2025-39860 serialises the userspace close()/accept() race by<br /> calling cleanup_listen() under lock_sock() in l2cap_sock_release().<br /> Neither covers l2cap_conn_del() running from hci_rx_work, so this UAF<br /> still reproduces on current bluetooth/master.<br /> <br /> Take the reference at the source: bt_accept_dequeue() does sock_hold()<br /> while sk is still locked, before release_sock(); callers sock_put().<br /> cleanup_listen() pins the chan with l2cap_chan_hold_unless_zero() under<br /> a brief child sk lock (serialising vs l2cap_sock_teardown_cb()), drops<br /> it before l2cap_chan_lock(), and skips a duplicate l2cap_sock_kill() on<br /> SOCK_DEAD. conn-&gt;lock is not taken here: cleanup_listen() runs under<br /> the parent sk lock and that would invert<br /> conn-&gt;lock -&gt; chan-&gt;lock -&gt; sk_lock (lockdep).<br /> <br /> KASAN/SMP: an unprivileged listen/close vs HCI-disconnect race produced<br /> 12 use-after-free reports per run before this change; 0, and no lockdep<br /> report, over 1600+ raced iterations after it on bluetooth/master.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> Bluetooth: L2CAP: use chan timer to close channels in cleanup_listen()<br /> <br /> l2cap_chan_close() removes the channel from conn-&gt;chan_l, which<br /> must be done under conn-&gt;lock. cleanup_listen() runs under the<br /> parent sk_lock, so acquiring conn-&gt;lock would invert the<br /> established conn-&gt;lock -&gt; chan-&gt;lock -&gt; sk_lock order.<br /> <br /> Instead of calling l2cap_chan_close() directly, schedule<br /> l2cap_chan_timeout with delay 0 to close the channel<br /> asynchronously. The timeout handler already acquires conn-&gt;lock<br /> and chan-&gt;lock in the correct order.<br /> <br /> The timer is only armed when chan-&gt;conn is still set: if it is<br /> already NULL, l2cap_conn_del() has already processed this channel<br /> (l2cap_chan_del + l2cap_sock_teardown_cb + l2cap_sock_close_cb),<br /> so there is nothing left to do. If l2cap_conn_del() races in<br /> after the timer is armed, __clear_chan_timer() inside<br /> l2cap_chan_del() cancels it; if the timer has already fired, the<br /> handler returns harmlessly because chan-&gt;conn was cleared.

A malicious actor with access to the network and low privileges could exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) to escalate privileges within such UniFi OS devices or instances.

A malicious actor with access to the network and low privileges could exploit an Improper Input Validation vulnerability found in UniFi OS to execute a Command Injection on the host device.