CVE-2026-44965

In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, six App Widget configuration activities (IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, DashboardWidgetActivity) are exported with no permission guard. Each accepts a caller-supplied AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID and, when no deep-link destination is resolved, uses it to load the matching widget&amp;#39;s stored session and automatically log in as that user. Because Android widget IDs are small sequential integers, a co-installed application can brute-force this value to find one that matches a widget configured on the victim&amp;#39;s device.<br /> This requires:<br /> A malicious application co-installed on the victim&amp;#39;s device.<br /> At least one of the six widgets configured on the victim&amp;#39;s home screen.<br /> An active Datadog session cached locally.<br /> Impact: The matching configuration activity opens in the foreground under the victim&amp;#39;s session and renders live infrastructure data. Exposure is limited to a visual side channel (e.g., screen recording or accessibility services); the calling application cannot programmatically read the rendered data.