CVE-2026-68096
Severity CVSS v4.0:
Pending analysis
Type:
Unavailable / Other
Publication date:
10/08/2026
Last modified:
17/08/2026
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br />
<br />
audit: fix recursive locking deadlock in audit_dupe_exe()<br />
<br />
A deadlock occurs in the audit subsystem when duplicating<br />
executable-related rules.<br />
<br />
When a file is moved (e.g., via do_renameat2()), the VFS layer locks<br />
the parent directory (I_MUTEX_PARENT), which synchronously triggers an<br />
fsnotify_move event. If an existing executable audit rule matches the<br />
file being moved, the audit subsystem catches this event and calls<br />
audit_dupe_exe() to duplicate the watch and update the rule. Then,<br />
audit_alloc_mark() would call kern_path_parent() to resolve the path,<br />
leading to a blind attempt to acquire the exact same I_MUTEX_PARENT lock<br />
already held by the task, resulting in the following recursive locking<br />
deadlock:<br />
<br />
============================================<br />
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected<br />
6.12.0-55.27.1.el10_0.x86_64+debug #1 Not tainted<br />
--------------------------------------------<br />
mv/5099 is trying to acquire lock:<br />
ffff888132845358 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3},<br />
at: __kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0<br />
<br />
but task is already holding lock:<br />
ffff888132846b58 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{3:3},<br />
at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0<br />
<br />
other info that might help us debug this:<br />
Possible unsafe locking scenario:<br />
<br />
CPU0<br />
----<br />
lock(&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1);<br />
lock(&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1);<br />
<br />
*** DEADLOCK ***<br />
<br />
May be due to missing lock nesting notation<br />
<br />
6 locks held by mv/5099:<br />
#0: ffff888112a9c440 (sb_writers#13)<br />
at: do_renameat2+0x34c/0xbc0<br />
#1: ffff888112a9c790 (&type->s_vfs_rename_key#3)<br />
at: do_renameat2+0x415/0xbc0<br />
#2: ffff888132846b58 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1)<br />
at: lock_two_directories+0x13f/0x2b0<br />
#3: ffff888132845358 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/5)<br />
at: lock_two_directories+0x175/0x2b0<br />
#4: ffffffffb3a1fb10 (&fsnotify_mark_srcu)<br />
at: fsnotify+0x454/0x28a0<br />
#5: ffffffffaf886230 (audit_filter_mutex)<br />
at: audit_update_watch+0x36/0x11e0<br />
<br />
stack backtrace:<br />
Call Trace:<br />
<br />
dump_stack_lvl+0x6f/0xb0<br />
print_deadlock_bug.cold+0xbd/0xca<br />
validate_chain+0x83a/0xf00<br />
__lock_acquire+0xcac/0x1d20<br />
lock_acquire.part.0+0x11b/0x360<br />
down_write_nested+0x9f/0x230<br />
__kern_path_locked+0x10a/0x2f0<br />
kern_path_locked+0x26/0x40<br />
audit_alloc_mark+0xfb/0x4f0<br />
audit_dupe_exe+0x6c/0xe0<br />
audit_dupe_rule+0x6c2/0xc00<br />
audit_update_watch+0x4cc/0x11e0<br />
audit_watch_handle_event+0x12c/0x1b0<br />
send_to_group+0x5d0/0x8b0<br />
fsnotify+0x615/0x28a0<br />
fsnotify_move+0x1d8/0x630<br />
vfs_rename+0xdcd/0x1df0<br />
do_renameat2+0x9d4/0xbc0<br />
__x64_sys_renameat+0x192/0x260<br />
do_syscall_64+0x92/0x180<br />
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e<br />
RIP: 0033:0x7f0491fe8c4e<br />
Code: 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 c1 e1 16 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff<br />
c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 49 89 ca b8 08 01 00 00 0f 05 <br />
3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 0a c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 15 89<br />
RSP: 002b:00007ffc7210bf38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000108<br />
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f0491fe8c4e<br />
RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 00007ffc7210e6c8 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c<br />
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001<br />
R10: 00005575eb2dae2a R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005575eb2dae2a<br />
R13: 00007ffc7210e6c8 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00000000ffffff9c<br />
<br />
<br />
The aforementioned deadlock can be consistently reproduced by running<br />
the script below:<br />
<br />
audit-dupe-exe-deadlock.sh<br />
--------------------------<br />
#!/bin/bash<br />
auditctl -D<br />
mkdir -p /tmp/foo<br />
touch /tmp/file<br />
auditctl -a always,exit -F exe=/tmp/file -F path=/tmp/file -S all -k dr<br />
mv /tmp/file /tmp/foo/file<br />
rm -Rf /tmp/foo<br />
<br />
This patch fixes the issue by introducing struct audit_watch_ctx to pass<br />
the fsnotify event context down to audit_alloc_mark(). By utilizing the<br />
already-resolved directory inode provided by the event, we bypass the<br />
kern_path_parent() path resol<br />
---truncated---
Impact
Base Score 3.x
7.50
Severity 3.x
HIGH
References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/36eb77f14b4e6f2dc1008c1fabe31236397be27a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b601938314c24fcd1afb6659cad92fe96c9c2f8
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/40879c39d6740f3dddfb52b5d6ba7fb8cceb84d8
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d1f66c69898ffb1a718926c32a777ecc471caca
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81905b5acbe77284734438df3fbec1158e6429a3


