Vulnerabilities

Repository Migration Follows Git HTTP Redirects After URL Allow/Block Validation, Enabling Internal Git Repository Exfiltration

CVE-2026-55402 is an out of bounds read vulnerability in Secure Access <br /> servers prior to version 14.57. Attackers with an ‘in the middle’ <br /> position can send specially crafted data to a server causing a <br /> persistent denial of service.

Internal API HTTP client hardcodes InsecureSkipVerify:true with no config override (CWE-295)

OIDC userinfo Endpoint Returns Identity Claims Without Enforcing API Token Scopes

Null Pointer Dereference in AddTime API Causes Authenticated Denial of Service

Email Management API Bypasses ManageCredentials Feature Restrictions

RSS/Atom feed handlers bypass API-token scope &amp; public-only confinement (incomplete fix of #37698)

Public-only tokens bypass private-resource restrictions on `/api/v1/user` self routes

Denial of Service via Unbounded io.ReadAll in NPM Package Tag Endpoint

Blind SSRF in OAuth2 avatar synchronization via unvalidated OIDC picture claim

The GET /api/v1/user/actions/runners/registration-token endpoint (and its owner- and repository-level equivalents) creates a new runner registration token if none exists, yet the API scope middleware classifies it as read-only because it is a GET request. A holder of a leaked read:user-scoped token can therefore mint a registration token and register a malicious Actions runner that executes workflow jobs with access to repository secrets and source code.

Data::MuForm::Localizer versions through 0.05 for Perl execute Perl from a message catalog header, reached at an arbitrary path because load_lexicon interpolates the language attribute into the catalog filename.<br /> <br /> load_lexicon builds the catalog path by appending `Messages/$lang.po` to the directory holding Localizer.pm, where $lang is the language attribute, with no check that it names a bare locale tag. A value holding `../` segments walks out of the message directory, so any readable path with a `.po` suffix is loaded. While parsing the catalog, extract_header_msgstr takes the `Plural-Forms:` header, prefixes `$` to the bare words nplurals, plural and n, and passes the rest verbatim into a string that is evaluated: the nplurals form evaluates the header expression immediately, and the plural_code form compiles it into a subroutine whose body runs when a plural message is localized. A header of `nplurals=2; plural=(system(&amp;#39;...&amp;#39;),0);` therefore runs that command as the catalog loads. The evaluation inherits strict, so an expression that assigns to an undeclared variable fails to compile, while one built from calls alone does not.<br /> <br /> An application that sets the language attribute from request data, an Accept-Language header or a locale parameter, and an attacker who can place a file with a `.po` suffix and chosen contents at a readable path, together give code execution as the application user. The message expansion path is not affected: expand_named substitutes only the placeholder names the caller supplies, and _mangle_value returns the value unchanged.