Vulnerabilities

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> i2c: piix4: Fix adapter not be removed in piix4_remove()<br /> <br /> In piix4_probe(), the piix4 adapter will be registered in:<br /> <br /> piix4_probe()<br /> piix4_add_adapters_sb800() / piix4_add_adapter()<br /> i2c_add_adapter()<br /> <br /> Based on the probed device type, piix4_add_adapters_sb800() or single<br /> piix4_add_adapter() will be called.<br /> For the former case, piix4_adapter_count is set as the number of adapters,<br /> while for antoher case it is not set and kept default *zero*.<br /> <br /> When piix4 is removed, piix4_remove() removes the adapters added in<br /> piix4_probe(), basing on the piix4_adapter_count value.<br /> Because the count is zero for the single adapter case, the adapter won&amp;#39;t<br /> be removed and makes the sources allocated for adapter leaked, such as<br /> the i2c client and device.<br /> <br /> These sources can still be accessed by i2c or bus and cause problems.<br /> An easily reproduced case is that if a new adapter is registered, i2c<br /> will get the leaked adapter and try to call smbus_algorithm, which was<br /> already freed:<br /> <br /> Triggered by: rmmod i2c_piix4 &amp;&amp; modprobe max31730<br /> <br /> BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc053d860<br /> #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode<br /> #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page<br /> Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN<br /> CPU: 0 PID: 3752 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G<br /> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)<br /> RIP: 0010:i2c_default_probe (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c:2259) i2c_core<br /> RSP: 0018:ffff888107477710 EFLAGS: 00000246<br /> ...<br /> <br /> i2c_detect (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c:2302) i2c_core<br /> __process_new_driver (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c:1336) i2c_core<br /> bus_for_each_dev (drivers/base/bus.c:301)<br /> i2c_for_each_dev (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c:1823) i2c_core<br /> i2c_register_driver (drivers/i2c/i2c-core-base.c:1861) i2c_core<br /> do_one_initcall (init/main.c:1296)<br /> do_init_module (kernel/module/main.c:2455)<br /> ...<br /> <br /> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---<br /> <br /> Fix this problem by correctly set piix4_adapter_count as 1 for the<br /> single adapter so it can be normally removed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net: mdio: fix undefined behavior in bit shift for __mdiobus_register<br /> <br /> Shifting signed 32-bit value by 31 bits is undefined, so changing<br /> significant bit to unsigned. The UBSAN warning calltrace like below:<br /> <br /> UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c:586:27<br /> left shift of 1 by 31 places cannot be represented in type &amp;#39;int&amp;#39;<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> dump_stack_lvl+0x7d/0xa5<br /> dump_stack+0x15/0x1b<br /> ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x4e<br /> __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1e7/0x20c<br /> __mdiobus_register+0x49d/0x4e0<br /> fixed_mdio_bus_init+0xd8/0x12d<br /> do_one_initcall+0x76/0x430<br /> kernel_init_freeable+0x3b3/0x422<br /> kernel_init+0x24/0x1e0<br /> ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30<br />

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net/smc: Fix possible leaked pernet namespace in smc_init()<br /> <br /> In smc_init(), register_pernet_subsys(&amp;smc_net_stat_ops) is called<br /> without any error handling.<br /> If it fails, registering of &amp;smc_net_ops won&amp;#39;t be reverted.<br /> And if smc_nl_init() fails, &amp;smc_net_stat_ops itself won&amp;#39;t be reverted.<br /> <br /> This leaves wild ops in subsystem linkedlist and when another module<br /> tries to call register_pernet_operations() it triggers page fault:<br /> <br /> BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff81b964c<br /> RIP: 0010:register_pernet_operations+0x1b9/0x5f0<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> register_pernet_subsys+0x29/0x40<br /> ebtables_init+0x58/0x1000 [ebtables]<br /> ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ipv6: fix WARNING in ip6_route_net_exit_late()<br /> <br /> During the initialization of ip6_route_net_init_late(), if file<br /> ipv6_route or rt6_stats fails to be created, the initialization is<br /> successful by default. Therefore, the ipv6_route or rt6_stats file<br /> doesn&amp;#39;t be found during the remove in ip6_route_net_exit_late(). It<br /> will cause WRNING.<br /> <br /> The following is the stack information:<br /> name &amp;#39;rt6_stats&amp;#39;<br /> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9 at fs/proc/generic.c:712 remove_proc_entry+0x389/0x460<br /> Modules linked in:<br /> Workqueue: netns cleanup_net<br /> RIP: 0010:remove_proc_entry+0x389/0x460<br /> PKRU: 55555554<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> ops_exit_list+0xb0/0x170<br /> cleanup_net+0x4ea/0xb00<br /> process_one_work+0x9bf/0x1710<br /> worker_thread+0x665/0x1080<br /> kthread+0x2e4/0x3a0<br /> ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30<br />

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> capabilities: fix potential memleak on error path from vfs_getxattr_alloc()<br /> <br /> In cap_inode_getsecurity(), we will use vfs_getxattr_alloc() to<br /> complete the memory allocation of tmpbuf, if we have completed<br /> the memory allocation of tmpbuf, but failed to call handler-&gt;get(...),<br /> there will be a memleak in below logic:<br /> <br /> |-- ret = (int)vfs_getxattr_alloc(mnt_userns, ...)<br /> | /* ^^^ alloc for tmpbuf */<br /> |-- value = krealloc(*xattr_value, error + 1, flags)<br /> | /* ^^^ alloc memory */<br /> |-- error = handler-&gt;get(handler, ...)<br /> | /* error! */<br /> |-- *xattr_value = value<br /> | /* xattr_value is &amp;tmpbuf (memory leak!) */<br /> <br /> So we will try to free(tmpbuf) after vfs_getxattr_alloc() fails to fix it.<br /> <br /> [PM: subject line and backtrace tweaks]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> tracing: kprobe: Fix memory leak in test_gen_kprobe/kretprobe_cmd()<br /> <br /> test_gen_kprobe_cmd() only free buf in fail path, hence buf will leak<br /> when there is no failure. Move kfree(buf) from fail path to common path<br /> to prevent the memleak. The same reason and solution in<br /> test_gen_kretprobe_cmd().<br /> <br /> unreferenced object 0xffff888143b14000 (size 2048):<br /> comm "insmod", pid 52490, jiffies 4301890980 (age 40.553s)<br /> hex dump (first 32 bytes):<br /> 70 3a 6b 70 72 6f 62 65 73 2f 67 65 6e 5f 6b 70 p:kprobes/gen_kp<br /> 72 6f 62 65 5f 74 65 73 74 20 64 6f 5f 73 79 73 robe_test do_sys<br /> backtrace:<br /> [] kmalloc_trace+0x27/0xa0<br /> [] 0xffffffffa059006f<br /> [] do_one_initcall+0x87/0x2a0<br /> [] do_init_module+0xdf/0x320<br /> [] load_module+0x3006/0x3390<br /> [] __do_sys_finit_module+0x113/0x1b0<br /> [] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80<br /> [] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ftrace: Fix use-after-free for dynamic ftrace_ops<br /> <br /> KASAN reported a use-after-free with ftrace ops [1]. It was found from<br /> vmcore that perf had registered two ops with the same content<br /> successively, both dynamic. After unregistering the second ops, a<br /> use-after-free occurred.<br /> <br /> In ftrace_shutdown(), when the second ops is unregistered, the<br /> FTRACE_UPDATE_CALLS command is not set because there is another enabled<br /> ops with the same content. Also, both ops are dynamic and the ftrace<br /> callback function is ftrace_ops_list_func, so the<br /> FTRACE_UPDATE_TRACE_FUNC command will not be set. Eventually the value<br /> of &amp;#39;command&amp;#39; will be 0 and ftrace_shutdown() will skip the rcu<br /> synchronization.<br /> <br /> However, ftrace may be activated. When the ops is released, another CPU<br /> may be accessing the ops. Add the missing synchronization to fix this<br /> problem.<br /> <br /> [1]<br /> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __ftrace_ops_list_func kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7020 [inline]<br /> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ftrace_ops_list_func+0x2b0/0x31c kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7049<br /> Read of size 8 at addr ffff56551965bbc8 by task syz-executor.2/14468<br /> <br /> CPU: 1 PID: 14468 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 5.10.0 #7<br /> Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)<br /> Call trace:<br /> dump_backtrace+0x0/0x40c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:132<br /> show_stack+0x30/0x40 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:196<br /> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]<br /> dump_stack+0x1b4/0x248 lib/dump_stack.c:118<br /> print_address_description.constprop.0+0x28/0x48c mm/kasan/report.c:387<br /> __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:547 [inline]<br /> kasan_report+0x118/0x210 mm/kasan/report.c:564<br /> check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:187 [inline]<br /> __asan_load8+0x98/0xc0 mm/kasan/generic.c:253<br /> __ftrace_ops_list_func kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7020 [inline]<br /> ftrace_ops_list_func+0x2b0/0x31c kernel/trace/ftrace.c:7049<br /> ftrace_graph_call+0x0/0x4<br /> __might_sleep+0x8/0x100 include/linux/perf_event.h:1170<br /> __might_fault mm/memory.c:5183 [inline]<br /> __might_fault+0x58/0x70 mm/memory.c:5171<br /> do_strncpy_from_user lib/strncpy_from_user.c:41 [inline]<br /> strncpy_from_user+0x1f4/0x4b0 lib/strncpy_from_user.c:139<br /> getname_flags+0xb0/0x31c fs/namei.c:149<br /> getname+0x2c/0x40 fs/namei.c:209<br /> [...]<br /> <br /> Allocated by task 14445:<br /> kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:48<br /> kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:56 [inline]<br /> __kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:479 [inline]<br /> __kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0x110/0x13c mm/kasan/common.c:449<br /> kasan_kmalloc+0xc/0x14 mm/kasan/common.c:493<br /> kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x440/0x924 mm/slub.c:2950<br /> kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:563 [inline]<br /> kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:675 [inline]<br /> perf_event_alloc.part.0+0xb4/0x1350 kernel/events/core.c:11230<br /> perf_event_alloc kernel/events/core.c:11733 [inline]<br /> __do_sys_perf_event_open kernel/events/core.c:11831 [inline]<br /> __se_sys_perf_event_open+0x550/0x15f4 kernel/events/core.c:11723<br /> __arm64_sys_perf_event_open+0x6c/0x80 kernel/events/core.c:11723<br /> [...]<br /> <br /> Freed by task 14445:<br /> kasan_save_stack+0x24/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:48<br /> kasan_set_track+0x24/0x34 mm/kasan/common.c:56<br /> kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:358<br /> __kasan_slab_free.part.0+0x11c/0x1b0 mm/kasan/common.c:437<br /> __kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:445 [inline]<br /> kasan_slab_free+0x2c/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:446<br /> slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1569 [inline]<br /> slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1608 [inline]<br /> slab_free mm/slub.c:3179 [inline]<br /> kfree+0x12c/0xc10 mm/slub.c:4176<br /> perf_event_alloc.part.0+0xa0c/0x1350 kernel/events/core.c:11434<br /> perf_event_alloc kernel/events/core.c:11733 [inline]<br /> __do_sys_perf_event_open kernel/events/core.c:11831 [inline]<br /> __se_sys_perf_event_open+0x550/0x15f4 kernel/events/core.c:11723<br /> [...]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> cxl/region: Fix region HPA ordering validation<br /> <br /> Some regions may not have any address space allocated. Skip them when<br /> validating HPA order otherwise a crash like the following may result:<br /> <br /> devm_cxl_add_region: cxl_acpi cxl_acpi.0: decoder3.4: created region9<br /> BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000<br /> [..]<br /> RIP: 0010:store_targetN+0x655/0x1740 [cxl_core]<br /> [..]<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x144/0x200<br /> vfs_write+0x24a/0x4d0<br /> ksys_write+0x69/0xf0<br /> do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x90<br /> <br /> store_targetN+0x655/0x1740:<br /> alloc_region_ref at drivers/cxl/core/region.c:676<br /> (inlined by) cxl_port_attach_region at drivers/cxl/core/region.c:850<br /> (inlined by) cxl_region_attach at drivers/cxl/core/region.c:1290<br /> (inlined by) attach_target at drivers/cxl/core/region.c:1410<br /> (inlined by) store_targetN at drivers/cxl/core/region.c:1453

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> cxl/region: Fix decoder allocation crash<br /> <br /> When an intermediate port&amp;#39;s decoders have been exhausted by existing<br /> regions, and creating a new region with the port in question in it&amp;#39;s<br /> hierarchical path is attempted, cxl_port_attach_region() fails to find a<br /> port decoder (as would be expected), and drops into the failure / cleanup<br /> path.<br /> <br /> However, during cleanup of the region reference, a sanity check attempts<br /> to dereference the decoder, which in the above case didn&amp;#39;t exist. This<br /> causes a NULL pointer dereference BUG.<br /> <br /> To fix this, refactor the decoder allocation and de-allocation into<br /> helper routines, and in this &amp;#39;free&amp;#39; routine, check that the decoder,<br /> @cxld, is valid before attempting any operations on it.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> cxl/pmem: Fix cxl_pmem_region and cxl_memdev leak<br /> <br /> When a cxl_nvdimm object goes through a -&gt;remove() event (device<br /> physically removed, nvdimm-bridge disabled, or nvdimm device disabled),<br /> then any associated regions must also be disabled. As highlighted by the<br /> cxl-create-region.sh test [1], a single device may host multiple<br /> regions, but the driver was only tracking one region at a time. This<br /> leads to a situation where only the last enabled region per nvdimm<br /> device is cleaned up properly. Other regions are leaked, and this also<br /> causes cxl_memdev reference leaks.<br /> <br /> Fix the tracking by allowing cxl_nvdimm objects to track multiple region<br /> associations.

Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> fscrypt: stop using keyrings subsystem for fscrypt_master_key<br /> <br /> The approach of fs/crypto/ internally managing the fscrypt_master_key<br /> structs as the payloads of "struct key" objects contained in a<br /> "struct key" keyring has outlived its usefulness. The original idea was<br /> to simplify the code by reusing code from the keyrings subsystem.<br /> However, several issues have arisen that can&amp;#39;t easily be resolved:<br /> <br /> - When a master key struct is destroyed, blk_crypto_evict_key() must be<br /> called on any per-mode keys embedded in it. (This started being the<br /> case when inline encryption support was added.) Yet, the keyrings<br /> subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys, even past the<br /> time the filesystem was unmounted. Therefore, currently there is no<br /> easy way to call blk_crypto_evict_key() when a master key is<br /> destroyed. Currently, this is worked around by holding an extra<br /> reference to the filesystem&amp;#39;s request_queue(s). But it was overlooked<br /> that the request_queue reference is *not* guaranteed to pin the<br /> corresponding blk_crypto_profile too; for device-mapper devices that<br /> support inline crypto, it doesn&amp;#39;t. This can cause a use-after-free.<br /> <br /> - When the last inode that was using an incompletely-removed master key<br /> is evicted, the master key removal is completed by removing the key<br /> struct from the keyring. Currently this is done via key_invalidate().<br /> Yet, key_invalidate() takes the key semaphore. This can deadlock when<br /> called from the shrinker, since in fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(), memory is<br /> allocated with GFP_KERNEL under the same semaphore.<br /> <br /> - More generally, the fact that the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily<br /> delay the destruction of keys (via garbage collection delay, or via<br /> random processes getting temporary key references) is undesirable, as<br /> it means we can&amp;#39;t strictly guarantee that all secrets are ever wiped.<br /> <br /> - Doing the master key lookups via the keyrings subsystem results in the<br /> key_permission LSM hook being called. fscrypt doesn&amp;#39;t want this, as<br /> all access control for encrypted files is designed to happen via the<br /> files themselves, like any other files. The workaround which SELinux<br /> users are using is to change their SELinux policy to grant key search<br /> access to all domains. This works, but it is an odd extra step that<br /> shouldn&amp;#39;t really have to be done.<br /> <br /> The fix for all these issues is to change the implementation to what I<br /> should have done originally: don&amp;#39;t use the keyrings subsystem to keep<br /> track of the filesystem&amp;#39;s fscrypt_master_key structs. Instead, just<br /> store them in a regular kernel data structure, and rework the reference<br /> counting, locking, and lifetime accordingly. Retain support for<br /> RCU-mode key lookups by using a hash table. Replace fscrypt_sb_free()<br /> with fscrypt_sb_delete(), which releases the keys synchronously and runs<br /> a bit earlier during unmount, so that block devices are still available.<br /> <br /> A side effect of this patch is that neither the master keys themselves<br /> nor the filesystem keyrings will be listed in /proc/keys anymore.<br /> ("Master key users" and the master key users keyrings will still be<br /> listed.) However, this was mostly an implementation detail, and it was<br /> intended just for debugging purposes. I don&amp;#39;t know of anyone using it.<br /> <br /> This patch does *not* change how "master key users" (-&gt;mk_users) works;<br /> that still uses the keyrings subsystem. That is still needed for key<br /> quotas, and changing that isn&amp;#39;t necessary to solve the issues listed<br /> above. If we decide to change that too, it would be a separate patch.<br /> <br /> I&amp;#39;ve marked this as fixing the original commit that added the fscrypt<br /> keyring, but as noted above the most important issue that this patch<br /> fixes wasn&amp;#39;t introduced until the addition of inline encryption support.