Vulnerabilities

With the aim of informing, warning and helping professionals with the latest security vulnerabilities in technology systems, we have made a database available for users interested in this information, which is in Spanish and includes all of the latest documented and recognised vulnerabilities.

This repository, with over 75,000 registers, is based on the information from the NVD (National Vulnerability Database) – by virtue of a partnership agreement – through which INCIBE translates the included information into Spanish.

On occasions this list will show vulnerabilities that have still not been translated, as they are added while the INCIBE team is still carrying out the translation process. The CVE  (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) Standard for Information Security Vulnerability Names is used with the aim to support the exchange of information between different tools and databases.

All vulnerabilities collected are linked to different information sources, as well as available patches or solutions provided by manufacturers and developers. It is possible to carry out advanced searches, as there is the option to select different criteria to narrow down the results, some examples being vulnerability types, manufacturers and impact levels, among others.

Through RSS feeds or Newsletters we can be informed daily about the latest vulnerabilities added to the repository. Below there is a list, updated daily, where you can discover the latest vulnerabilities.

CVE-2024-56600

Publication date:
27/12/2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net: inet6: do not leave a dangling sk pointer in inet6_create()<br /> <br /> sock_init_data() attaches the allocated sk pointer to the provided sock<br /> object. If inet6_create() fails later, the sk object is released, but the<br /> sock object retains the dangling sk pointer, which may cause use-after-free<br /> later.<br /> <br /> Clear the sock sk pointer on error.
Severity CVSS v4.0: Pending analysis
Last modification:
03/11/2025

CVE-2024-56601

Publication date:
27/12/2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net: inet: do not leave a dangling sk pointer in inet_create()<br /> <br /> sock_init_data() attaches the allocated sk object to the provided sock<br /> object. If inet_create() fails later, the sk object is freed, but the<br /> sock object retains the dangling pointer, which may create use-after-free<br /> later.<br /> <br /> Clear the sk pointer in the sock object on error.
Severity CVSS v4.0: Pending analysis
Last modification:
03/11/2025

CVE-2024-56602

Publication date:
27/12/2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net: ieee802154: do not leave a dangling sk pointer in ieee802154_create()<br /> <br /> sock_init_data() attaches the allocated sk object to the provided sock<br /> object. If ieee802154_create() fails later, the allocated sk object is<br /> freed, but the dangling pointer remains in the provided sock object, which<br /> may allow use-after-free.<br /> <br /> Clear the sk pointer in the sock object on error.
Severity CVSS v4.0: Pending analysis
Last modification:
03/11/2025

CVE-2024-56603

Publication date:
27/12/2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net: af_can: do not leave a dangling sk pointer in can_create()<br /> <br /> On error can_create() frees the allocated sk object, but sock_init_data()<br /> has already attached it to the provided sock object. This will leave a<br /> dangling sk pointer in the sock object and may cause use-after-free later.
Severity CVSS v4.0: Pending analysis
Last modification:
03/11/2025

CVE-2024-56604

Publication date:
27/12/2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> Bluetooth: RFCOMM: avoid leaving dangling sk pointer in rfcomm_sock_alloc()<br /> <br /> bt_sock_alloc() attaches allocated sk object to the provided sock object.<br /> If rfcomm_dlc_alloc() fails, we release the sk object, but leave the<br /> dangling pointer in the sock object, which may cause use-after-free.<br /> <br /> Fix this by swapping calls to bt_sock_alloc() and rfcomm_dlc_alloc().
Severity CVSS v4.0: Pending analysis
Last modification:
03/11/2025

CVE-2024-56605

Publication date:
27/12/2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> Bluetooth: L2CAP: do not leave dangling sk pointer on error in l2cap_sock_create()<br /> <br /> bt_sock_alloc() allocates the sk object and attaches it to the provided<br /> sock object. On error l2cap_sock_alloc() frees the sk object, but the<br /> dangling pointer is still attached to the sock object, which may create<br /> use-after-free in other code.
Severity CVSS v4.0: Pending analysis
Last modification:
03/11/2025

CVE-2024-56588

Publication date:
27/12/2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> scsi: hisi_sas: Create all dump files during debugfs initialization<br /> <br /> For the current debugfs of hisi_sas, after user triggers dump, the<br /> driver allocate memory space to save the register information and create<br /> debugfs files to display the saved information. In this process, the<br /> debugfs files created after each dump.<br /> <br /> Therefore, when the dump is triggered while the driver is unbind, the<br /> following hang occurs:<br /> <br /> [67840.853907] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000000000a0<br /> [67840.862947] Mem abort info:<br /> [67840.865855] ESR = 0x0000000096000004<br /> [67840.869713] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits<br /> [67840.875125] SET = 0, FnV = 0<br /> [67840.878291] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0<br /> [67840.881545] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault<br /> [67840.886528] Data abort info:<br /> [67840.889524] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000<br /> [67840.895117] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0<br /> [67840.900284] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0<br /> [67840.905709] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000002803a1f000<br /> [67840.912263] [00000000000000a0] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000<br /> [67840.919177] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP<br /> [67840.996435] pstate: 80400009 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)<br /> [67841.003628] pc : down_write+0x30/0x98<br /> [67841.007546] lr : start_creating.part.0+0x60/0x198<br /> [67841.012495] sp : ffff8000b979ba20<br /> [67841.016046] x29: ffff8000b979ba20 x28: 0000000000000010 x27: 0000000000024b40<br /> [67841.023412] x26: 0000000000000012 x25: ffff20202b355ae8 x24: ffff20202b35a8c8<br /> [67841.030779] x23: ffffa36877928208 x22: ffffa368b4972240 x21: ffff8000b979bb18<br /> [67841.038147] x20: ffff00281dc1e3c0 x19: fffffffffffffffe x18: 0000000000000020<br /> [67841.045515] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffa368b128a530 x15: ffffffffffffffff<br /> [67841.052888] x14: ffff8000b979bc18 x13: ffffffffffffffff x12: ffff8000b979bb18<br /> [67841.060263] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffa368b1289b18<br /> [67841.067640] x8 : 0000000000000012 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 00000000000003a9<br /> [67841.075014] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff002818c5cb00 x3 : 0000000000000001<br /> [67841.082388] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : ffff002818c5cb00 x0 : 00000000000000a0<br /> [67841.089759] Call trace:<br /> [67841.092456] down_write+0x30/0x98<br /> [67841.096017] start_creating.part.0+0x60/0x198<br /> [67841.100613] debugfs_create_dir+0x48/0x1f8<br /> [67841.104950] debugfs_create_files_v3_hw+0x88/0x348 [hisi_sas_v3_hw]<br /> [67841.111447] debugfs_snapshot_regs_v3_hw+0x708/0x798 [hisi_sas_v3_hw]<br /> [67841.118111] debugfs_trigger_dump_v3_hw_write+0x9c/0x120 [hisi_sas_v3_hw]<br /> [67841.125115] full_proxy_write+0x68/0xc8<br /> [67841.129175] vfs_write+0xd8/0x3f0<br /> [67841.132708] ksys_write+0x70/0x108<br /> [67841.136317] __arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x38<br /> [67841.140440] invoke_syscall+0x50/0x128<br /> [67841.144385] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc8/0xf0<br /> [67841.149273] do_el0_svc+0x24/0x38<br /> [67841.152773] el0_svc+0x38/0xd8<br /> [67841.156009] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xc0/0xc8<br /> [67841.160361] el0t_64_sync+0x1a4/0x1a8<br /> [67841.164189] Code: b9000882 d2800002 d2800023 f9800011 (c85ffc05)<br /> [67841.170443] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---<br /> <br /> To fix this issue, create all directories and files during debugfs<br /> initialization. In this way, the driver only needs to allocate memory<br /> space to save information each time the user triggers dumping.
Severity CVSS v4.0: Pending analysis
Last modification:
09/01/2025

CVE-2024-56591

Publication date:
27/12/2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> Bluetooth: hci_conn: Use disable_delayed_work_sync<br /> <br /> This makes use of disable_delayed_work_sync instead<br /> cancel_delayed_work_sync as it not only cancel the ongoing work but also<br /> disables new submit which is disarable since the object holding the work<br /> is about to be freed.
Severity CVSS v4.0: Pending analysis
Last modification:
07/10/2025

CVE-2024-56592

Publication date:
27/12/2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> bpf: Call free_htab_elem() after htab_unlock_bucket()<br /> <br /> For htab of maps, when the map is removed from the htab, it may hold the<br /> last reference of the map. bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() will invoke<br /> bpf_map_free_id() to free the id of the removed map element. However,<br /> bpf_map_fd_put_ptr() is invoked while holding a bucket lock<br /> (raw_spin_lock_t), and bpf_map_free_id() attempts to acquire map_idr_lock<br /> (spinlock_t), triggering the following lockdep warning:<br /> <br /> =============================<br /> [ BUG: Invalid wait context ]<br /> 6.11.0-rc4+ #49 Not tainted<br /> -----------------------------<br /> test_maps/4881 is trying to lock:<br /> ffffffff84884578 (map_idr_lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: bpf_map_free_id.part.0+0x21/0x70<br /> other info that might help us debug this:<br /> context-{5:5}<br /> 2 locks held by test_maps/4881:<br /> #0: ffffffff846caf60 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0xf9/0x270<br /> #1: ffff888149ced148 (&amp;htab-&gt;lockdep_key#2){....}-{2:2}, at: htab_map_update_elem+0x178/0xa80<br /> stack backtrace:<br /> CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 4881 Comm: test_maps Not tainted 6.11.0-rc4+ #49<br /> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), ...<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> dump_stack_lvl+0x6e/0xb0<br /> dump_stack+0x10/0x20<br /> __lock_acquire+0x73e/0x36c0<br /> lock_acquire+0x182/0x450<br /> _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x43/0x70<br /> bpf_map_free_id.part.0+0x21/0x70<br /> bpf_map_put+0xcf/0x110<br /> bpf_map_fd_put_ptr+0x9a/0xb0<br /> free_htab_elem+0x69/0xe0<br /> htab_map_update_elem+0x50f/0xa80<br /> bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0x131/0x270<br /> htab_map_update_elem+0x50f/0xa80<br /> bpf_fd_htab_map_update_elem+0x131/0x270<br /> bpf_map_update_value+0x266/0x380<br /> __sys_bpf+0x21bb/0x36b0<br /> __x64_sys_bpf+0x45/0x60<br /> x64_sys_call+0x1b2a/0x20d0<br /> do_syscall_64+0x5d/0x100<br /> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e<br /> <br /> One way to fix the lockdep warning is using raw_spinlock_t for<br /> map_idr_lock as well. However, bpf_map_alloc_id() invokes<br /> idr_alloc_cyclic() after acquiring map_idr_lock, it will trigger a<br /> similar lockdep warning because the slab&amp;#39;s lock (s-&gt;cpu_slab-&gt;lock) is<br /> still a spinlock.<br /> <br /> Instead of changing map_idr_lock&amp;#39;s type, fix the issue by invoking<br /> htab_put_fd_value() after htab_unlock_bucket(). However, only deferring<br /> the invocation of htab_put_fd_value() is not enough, because the old map<br /> pointers in htab of maps can not be saved during batched deletion.<br /> Therefore, also defer the invocation of free_htab_elem(), so these<br /> to-be-freed elements could be linked together similar to lru map.<br /> <br /> There are four callers for -&gt;map_fd_put_ptr:<br /> <br /> (1) alloc_htab_elem() (through htab_put_fd_value())<br /> It invokes -&gt;map_fd_put_ptr() under a raw_spinlock_t. The invocation of<br /> htab_put_fd_value() can not simply move after htab_unlock_bucket(),<br /> because the old element has already been stashed in htab-&gt;extra_elems.<br /> It may be reused immediately after htab_unlock_bucket() and the<br /> invocation of htab_put_fd_value() after htab_unlock_bucket() may release<br /> the newly-added element incorrectly. Therefore, saving the map pointer<br /> of the old element for htab of maps before unlocking the bucket and<br /> releasing the map_ptr after unlock. Beside the map pointer in the old<br /> element, should do the same thing for the special fields in the old<br /> element as well.<br /> <br /> (2) free_htab_elem() (through htab_put_fd_value())<br /> Its caller includes __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem(),<br /> htab_map_delete_elem() and __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch().<br /> <br /> For htab_map_delete_elem(), simply invoke free_htab_elem() after<br /> htab_unlock_bucket(). For __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch(), just<br /> like lru map, linking the to-be-freed element into node_to_free list<br /> and invoking free_htab_elem() for these element after unlock. It is safe<br /> to reuse batch_flink as the link for node_to_free, because these<br /> elements have been removed from the hash llist.<br /> <br /> Because htab of maps doesn&amp;#39;t support lookup_and_delete operation,<br /> __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_elem() doesn&amp;#39;t have the problem, so kept<br /> it as<br /> ---truncated---
Severity CVSS v4.0: Pending analysis
Last modification:
08/10/2025

CVE-2024-56589

Publication date:
27/12/2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> scsi: hisi_sas: Add cond_resched() for no forced preemption model<br /> <br /> For no forced preemption model kernel, in the scenario where the<br /> expander is connected to 12 high performance SAS SSDs, the following<br /> call trace may occur:<br /> <br /> [ 214.409199][ C240] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#240 stuck for 22s! [irq/149-hisi_sa:3211]<br /> [ 214.568533][ C240] pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--)<br /> [ 214.575224][ C240] pc : fput_many+0x8c/0xdc<br /> [ 214.579480][ C240] lr : fput+0x1c/0xf0<br /> [ 214.583302][ C240] sp : ffff80002de2b900<br /> [ 214.587298][ C240] x29: ffff80002de2b900 x28: ffff1082aa412000<br /> [ 214.593291][ C240] x27: ffff3062a0348c08 x26: ffff80003a9f6000<br /> [ 214.599284][ C240] x25: ffff1062bbac5c40 x24: 0000000000001000<br /> [ 214.605277][ C240] x23: 000000000000000a x22: 0000000000000001<br /> [ 214.611270][ C240] x21: 0000000000001000 x20: 0000000000000000<br /> [ 214.617262][ C240] x19: ffff3062a41ae580 x18: 0000000000010000<br /> [ 214.623255][ C240] x17: 0000000000000001 x16: ffffdb3a6efe5fc0<br /> [ 214.629248][ C240] x15: ffffffffffffffff x14: 0000000003ffffff<br /> [ 214.635241][ C240] x13: 000000000000ffff x12: 000000000000029c<br /> [ 214.641234][ C240] x11: 0000000000000006 x10: ffff80003a9f7fd0<br /> [ 214.647226][ C240] x9 : ffffdb3a6f0482fc x8 : 0000000000000001<br /> [ 214.653219][ C240] x7 : 0000000000000002 x6 : 0000000000000080<br /> [ 214.659212][ C240] x5 : ffff55480ee9b000 x4 : fffffde7f94c6554<br /> [ 214.665205][ C240] x3 : 0000000000000002 x2 : 0000000000000020<br /> [ 214.671198][ C240] x1 : 0000000000000021 x0 : ffff3062a41ae5b8<br /> [ 214.677191][ C240] Call trace:<br /> [ 214.680320][ C240] fput_many+0x8c/0xdc<br /> [ 214.684230][ C240] fput+0x1c/0xf0<br /> [ 214.687707][ C240] aio_complete_rw+0xd8/0x1fc<br /> [ 214.692225][ C240] blkdev_bio_end_io+0x98/0x140<br /> [ 214.696917][ C240] bio_endio+0x160/0x1bc<br /> [ 214.701001][ C240] blk_update_request+0x1c8/0x3bc<br /> [ 214.705867][ C240] scsi_end_request+0x3c/0x1f0<br /> [ 214.710471][ C240] scsi_io_completion+0x7c/0x1a0<br /> [ 214.715249][ C240] scsi_finish_command+0x104/0x140<br /> [ 214.720200][ C240] scsi_softirq_done+0x90/0x180<br /> [ 214.724892][ C240] blk_mq_complete_request+0x5c/0x70<br /> [ 214.730016][ C240] scsi_mq_done+0x48/0xac<br /> [ 214.734194][ C240] sas_scsi_task_done+0xbc/0x16c [libsas]<br /> [ 214.739758][ C240] slot_complete_v3_hw+0x260/0x760 [hisi_sas_v3_hw]<br /> [ 214.746185][ C240] cq_thread_v3_hw+0xbc/0x190 [hisi_sas_v3_hw]<br /> [ 214.752179][ C240] irq_thread_fn+0x34/0xa4<br /> [ 214.756435][ C240] irq_thread+0xc4/0x130<br /> [ 214.760520][ C240] kthread+0x108/0x13c<br /> [ 214.764430][ C240] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18<br /> <br /> This is because in the hisi_sas driver, both the hardware interrupt<br /> handler and the interrupt thread are executed on the same CPU. In the<br /> performance test scenario, function irq_wait_for_interrupt() will always<br /> return 0 if lots of interrupts occurs and the CPU will be continuously<br /> consumed. As a result, the CPU cannot run the watchdog thread. When the<br /> watchdog time exceeds the specified time, call trace occurs.<br /> <br /> To fix it, add cond_resched() to execute the watchdog thread.
Severity CVSS v4.0: Pending analysis
Last modification:
03/11/2025

CVE-2024-56590

Publication date:
27/12/2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix not checking skb length on hci_acldata_packet<br /> <br /> This fixes not checking if skb really contains an ACL header otherwise<br /> the code may attempt to access some uninitilized/invalid memory past the<br /> valid skb-&gt;data.
Severity CVSS v4.0: Pending analysis
Last modification:
03/11/2025

CVE-2024-56593

Publication date:
27/12/2024
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> wifi: brcmfmac: Fix oops due to NULL pointer dereference in brcmf_sdiod_sglist_rw()<br /> <br /> This patch fixes a NULL pointer dereference bug in brcmfmac that occurs<br /> when a high &amp;#39;sd_sgentry_align&amp;#39; value applies (e.g. 512) and a lot of queued SKBs<br /> are sent from the pkt queue.<br /> <br /> The problem is the number of entries in the pre-allocated sgtable, it is<br /> nents = max(rxglom_size, txglom_size) + max(rxglom_size, txglom_size) &gt;&gt; 4 + 1.<br /> Given the default [rt]xglom_size=32 it&amp;#39;s actually 35 which is too small.<br /> Worst case, the pkt queue can end up with 64 SKBs. This occurs when a new SKB<br /> is added for each original SKB if tailroom isn&amp;#39;t enough to hold tail_pad.<br /> At least one sg entry is needed for each SKB. So, eventually the "skb_queue_walk loop"<br /> in brcmf_sdiod_sglist_rw may run out of sg entries. This makes sg_next return<br /> NULL and this causes the oops.<br /> <br /> The patch sets nents to max(rxglom_size, txglom_size) * 2 to be able handle<br /> the worst-case.<br /> Btw. this requires only 64-35=29 * 16 (or 20 if CONFIG_NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH) = 464<br /> additional bytes of memory.
Severity CVSS v4.0: Pending analysis
Last modification:
03/11/2025