Vulnerabilities

PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab v0.8.3 contains a server-side request forgery issue in the optional scheduler's webhook delivery path. When a task is submitted to `POST /tasks` with a user-controlled `callbackUrl`, the v0.8.3 scheduler sends an outbound HTTP `POST` to that URL when the task reaches a terminal state. In that release, the webhook path validated only the URL scheme and did not reject loopback, private, link-local, or other non-public destinations. Because the v0.8.3 implementation also used the default HTTP client behavior, redirects were followed and the destination was not pinned to validated IPs. This allowed blind SSRF from the PinchTab server to attacker-chosen HTTP(S) targets reachable from the server. This issue is narrower than a general unauthenticated internet-facing SSRF. The scheduler is optional and off by default, and in token-protected deployments the attacker must already be able to submit tasks using the server's master API token. In PinchTab's intended deployment model, that token represents administrative control rather than a low-privilege role. Tokenless deployments lower the barrier further, but that is a separate insecure configuration state rather than impact created by the webhook bug itself. PinchTab's default deployment model is local-first and user-controlled, with loopback bind and token-based access in the recommended setup. That lowers practical risk in default use, even though it does not remove the underlying webhook issue when the scheduler is enabled and reachable. This was addressed in v0.8.4 by validating callback targets before dispatch, rejecting non-public IP ranges, pinning delivery to validated IPs, disabling redirect following, and validating `callbackUrl` during task submission.

PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.7.8` through `v0.8.3` accepted the API token from a `token` URL query parameter in addition to the `Authorization` header. When a valid API credential is sent in the URL, it can be exposed through request URIs recorded by intermediaries or client-side tooling, such as reverse proxy access logs, browser history, shell history, clipboard history, and tracing systems that capture full URLs. This issue is an unsafe credential transport pattern rather than a direct authentication bypass. It only affects deployments where a token is configured and a client actually uses the query-parameter form. PinchTab's security guidance already recommended `Authorization: Bearer `, but `v0.8.3` still accepted `?token=` and included first-party flows that generated and consumed URLs containing the token. This was addressed in v0.8.4 by removing query-string token authentication and requiring safer header- or session-based authentication flows.

PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.7.7` through `v0.8.4` contain incomplete request-throttling protections for auth-checkable endpoints. In `v0.7.7` through `v0.8.3`, a fully implemented `RateLimitMiddleware` existed in `internal/handlers/middleware.go` but was not inserted into the production HTTP handler chain, so requests were not subject to the intended per-IP throttle. In the same pre-`v0.8.4` range, the original limiter also keyed clients using `X-Forwarded-For`, which would have allowed client-controlled header spoofing if the middleware had been enabled. `v0.8.4` addressed those two issues by wiring the limiter into the live handler chain and switching the key to the immediate peer IP, but it still exempted `/health` and `/metrics` from rate limiting even though `/health` remained an auth-checkable endpoint when a token was configured. This issue weakens defense in depth for deployments where an attacker can reach the API, especially if a weak human-chosen token is used. It is not a direct authentication bypass or token disclosure issue by itself. PinchTab is documented as local-first by default and uses `127.0.0.1` plus a generated random token in the recommended setup. PinchTab's default deployment model is a local-first, user-controlled environment between the user and their agents; wider exposure is an intentional operator choice. This lowers practical risk in the default configuration, even though it does not by itself change the intrinsic base characteristics of the bug. This was fully addressed in `v0.8.5` by applying `RateLimitMiddleware` in the production handler chain, deriving the client address from the immediate peer IP instead of trusting forwarded headers by default, and removing the `/health` and `/metrics` exemption so auth-checkable endpoints are throttled as well.

PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.8.3` through `v0.8.5` allow arbitrary JavaScript execution through `POST /wait` and `POST /tabs/{id}/wait` when the request uses `fn` mode, even if `security.allowEvaluate` is disabled. `POST /evaluate` correctly enforces the `security.allowEvaluate` guard, which is disabled by default. However, in the affected releases, `POST /wait` accepted a user-controlled `fn` expression, embedded it directly into executable JavaScript, and evaluated it in the browser context without checking the same policy. This is a security-policy bypass rather than a separate authentication bypass. Exploitation still requires authenticated API access, but a caller with the server token can execute arbitrary JavaScript in a tab context even when the operator explicitly disabled JavaScript evaluation. The current worktree fixes this by applying the same policy boundary to `fn` mode in `/wait` that already exists on `/evaluate`, while preserving the non-code wait modes. As of time of publication, a patched version is not yet available.

PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.8.4` contains a Windows-only command injection issue in the orphaned Chrome cleanup path. When an instance is stopped, the Windows cleanup routine builds a PowerShell `-Command` string using a `needle` derived from the profile path. In `v0.8.4`, that string interpolation escapes backslashes but does not safely neutralize other PowerShell metacharacters. If an attacker can launch an instance using a crafted profile name and then trigger the cleanup path, they may be able to execute arbitrary PowerShell commands on the Windows host in the security context of the PinchTab process user. This is not an unauthenticated internet RCE. It requires authenticated, administrative-equivalent API access to instance lifecycle endpoints, and the resulting command execution inherits the permissions of the PinchTab OS user rather than bypassing host privilege boundaries. Version 0.8.5 contains a patch for the issue.

The Grafana MSSQL data source plugin contains a logic flaw that allows a low-privileged user (Viewer) to bypass API restrictions and trigger a catastrophic Out-Of-Memory (OOM) memory exhaustion, crashing the host container.

Lychee is a free, open-source photo-management tool. The patch introduced for GHSA-cpgw-wgf3-xc6v (SSRF via `Photo::fromUrl`) contains an incomplete IP validation check that fails to block loopback addresses and link-local addresses. Prior to version 7.5.1, an authenticated user can still reach internal services using direct IP addresses, bypassing all four protection configuration settings even when they are set to their secure defaults. Version 7.5.1 contains a fix for the issue.

TSPortal is the WikiTide Foundation’s in-house platform used by the Trust and Safety team to manage reports, investigations, appeals, and transparency work. Prior to version 34, a flaw in TSPortal allowed attackers to create arbitrary user records in the database by abusing validation logic. While validation correctly rejected invalid usernames, a side effect within a validation rule caused user records to be created regardless of whether the request succeeded. This could be exploited to cause uncontrolled database growth, leading to a potential denial of service (DoS). Version 34 contains a fix for the issue.

A flaw was found in p11-kit. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability by calling the C_DeriveKey function on a remote token with specific IBM kyber or IBM btc derive mechanism parameters set to NULL. This could lead to the RPC-client attempting to return an uninitialized value, potentially resulting in a NULL dereference or undefined behavior. This issue may cause an application level denial of service or other unpredictable system states.

A flaw was found in GIMP. Heap-buffer-overflow vulnerability exists in the fread_pascal_string function when processing a specially crafted PSD (Photoshop Document) file. This occurs because the buffer allocated for a Pascal string is not properly null-terminated, leading to an out-of-bounds read when strlen() is subsequently called. Successfully exploiting this vulnerability can cause the application to crash, resulting in an application level Denial of Service.

A flaw was found in GIMP's PSP (Paint Shop Pro) file parser. A remote attacker could exploit an integer overflow vulnerability in the read_creator_block() function by providing a specially crafted PSP image file. This vulnerability occurs when a 32-bit length value from the file is used for memory allocation without proper validation, leading to a heap overflow and an out-of-bounds write. Successful exploitation could result in an application level denial of service.

A flaw was found in GIMP. An integer overflow vulnerability exists when processing ICO image files, specifically in the `ico_read_info` and `ico_read_icon` functions. This issue arises because a size calculation for image buffers can wrap around due to a 32-bit integer evaluation, allowing oversized image headers to bypass security checks. A remote attacker could exploit this by providing a specially crafted ICO file, leading to a buffer overflow and memory corruption, which may result in an application level denial of service.