Vulnerabilities

Apache IoTDB DataNode’s internal RPC interface for creating Trigger instances uses the uploaded Trigger JAR name to build a file path without sufficient validation. If the internal DataNode RPC port is exposed to an untrusted network, an attacker may use path traversal sequences in the JAR name to write files outside the intended Trigger installation directory. This could allow arbitrary file write with the permissions of the IoTDB process.<br /> <br /> This issue affects Apache IoTDB: from 1.3.3 before 2.0.8.<br /> <br /> Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.8, which fixes the issue.

Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in Apache IoTDB.<br /> Certain Thrift RPC query handlers lack strict validation of the sessionId<br /> parameter. An attacker can construct requests with a forged sessionId and,<br /> without performing openSession authentication, receive valid query results.<br /> This allows authentication bypass and unauthorized reading of time-series<br /> data.<br /> <br /> <br /> This issue affects Apache IoTDB: from 1.3.3 before 2.0.8.<br /> <br /> Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.8, which fixes the issue.

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in Apache IoTDB. <br /> <br /> Some interface fails to impose reasonable<br /> limits on the time span and aggregation interval of the query. An attacker<br /> can construct a request with extreme parameters (e.g., a very large time<br /> range combined with a minimal interval). This forces the DataNode to build<br /> an enormous result set in memory, which exhausts the Java heap and causes<br /> the DataNode process to crash.<br /> <br /> This issue affects Apache IoTDB: from 1.3.3 before 2.0.8.<br /> <br /> Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.0.8, which fixes the issue.

Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel, Apache Camel JMS component.<br /> <br /> JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms() in camel-jms - and the equivalent JmsBinding in camel-sjms - deserializes the payload of an incoming JMS ObjectMessage via jakarta.jms.ObjectMessage.getObject() whenever the mapJmsMessage option is enabled (the default) and Camel acts as a JMS consumer. The CVE-2026-40860 hardening added a post-deserialization class check that rejects classes outside the default allow-list java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*. However org.apache.camel.support.DefaultExchangeHolder itself lives in the allow-listed org.apache.camel.** namespace, so an ObjectMessage whose top-level object is a DefaultExchangeHolder passes the check. The receiving side then calls DefaultExchangeHolder.unmarshal() on it without requiring the transferExchange option to be enabled - an asymmetric trust boundary, since the sending side gates ObjectMessage and transferExchange handling but the receiving side did not - writing every non-null field of the holder into the Exchange: the message body, the IN and OUT headers, the exchange properties, the variables, the exchange id and the exception. An attacker who can publish an ObjectMessage to a queue or topic consumed by an affected Camel application can therefore inject arbitrary Exchange state using only universally-trusted java.lang and java.util types, with no deserialization gadget chain required, to manipulate routing and headers, exchange properties and error handling. The same handling applies to camel-sjms and camel-sjms2, and to the JMS-family components built on JmsComponent and JmsBinding: camel-amqp, camel-activemq and camel-activemq6. This is a bypass of the CVE-2026-40860 fix rather than a flaw in it.<br /> This issue affects Apache Camel: from 3.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0; Apache Camel: from 3.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.<br /> <br /> Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, JMS ObjectMessage handling is disabled by default in camel-jms, camel-sjms and the JMS-family components (a new objectMessageEnabled option defaults to false at the component and endpoint level), so an incoming ObjectMessage - including a DefaultExchangeHolder payload - is no longer deserialized unless the option is explicitly enabled; only set objectMessageEnabled=true when the consumed JMS destination is fed exclusively by trusted producers. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, restrict publish access to the queues and topics consumed by Camel to trusted producers via JMS broker authorization, and do not expose JMS consumers that map ObjectMessage bodies to untrusted networks; a JMS-provider deserialization allow-list does not mitigate this specific bypass because the crafted payload uses only universally-trusted classes.

Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel Hazelcast component.<br /> <br /> The camel-hazelcast component creates and manages Hazelcast instances using a default configuration that applies no Java deserialization filter. When Camel builds the Hazelcast Config itself - that is, when no user-supplied HazelcastInstance, hazelcastConfigUri, or referenced Config bean is provided - neither Hazelcast&amp;#39;s JavaSerializationFilterConfig nor a Camel-side ObjectInputFilter is configured, so objects received over the Hazelcast cluster protocol are deserialized inside Hazelcast&amp;#39;s own serialization layer (ObjectInputStream.readObject) before Camel ever processes them. An attacker who can join or otherwise reach the Hazelcast cluster can publish a crafted serialized Java object that is then deserialized on every Camel node, resulting in remote code execution. The exposure is present by default and requires no opt-in endpoint configuration: any route using a hazelcast consumer (hazelcast-topic, hazelcast-queue, hazelcast-seda, hazelcast-map, hazelcast-multimap, hazelcast-replicatedmap, hazelcast-list, hazelcast-set), as well as the HazelcastAggregationRepository and HazelcastIdempotentRepository, is affected whenever the managed instance is created from Camel&amp;#39;s default configuration.<br /> This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.<br /> <br /> Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix makes Camel apply a default Hazelcast JavaSerializationFilterConfig (whitelisting the java., javax. and org.apache.camel. class-name prefixes and blacklisting java.net.) to instances it creates from its own default configuration, while leaving any user-supplied Config or HazelcastInstance untouched. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, configure a deserialization filter on the Hazelcast instance (Hazelcast JavaSerializationFilterConfig, or the JVM-wide system property -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*) and enable Hazelcast cluster authentication and TLS to restrict who can reach the cluster.

Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.<br /> <br /> The default ObjectInputFilter pattern shipped with several Apache Camel components for defense-in-depth deserialization filtering (&amp;#39;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*&amp;#39;, or the no-&amp;#39;javax.**&amp;#39; variant in the aggregation-repository components) uses a recursive &amp;#39;java.**&amp;#39; glob that admits classes whose hashCode/equals/readObject methods perform network I/O, notably java.net.URL and java.net.InetAddress. When an attacker can deliver a Java-serialized payload to an affected Camel consumer, deserialization of a HashMap (or any collection that calls hashCode on its elements) containing java.net.URL keys causes the JVM to issue DNS queries to the attacker-supplied host during the deserialization side-effect. The class-level filter check passes because the resulting object&amp;#39;s class (HashMap) is allow-listed; the DNS query is observable on an attacker-controlled DNS server, providing an out-of-band side channel. The exposure is highest on the camel-jms family because JmsBinding.extractBodyFromJms invokes ObjectMessage.getObject() unconditionally when mapJmsMessage=true (default). Affected components: camel-jms, camel-sjms, camel-amqp, camel-mina, camel-netty, camel-netty-http, camel-vertx-http, camel-infinispan, and the aggregation repository components camel-leveldb, camel-cassandraql, camel-consul, camel-sql (JDBC aggregation repository).<br /> This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.14.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0.<br /> <br /> Users are recommended to upgrade to a version that contains the CAMEL-23372 fix once available: 4.21.0 for the 4.21.x line, 4.18.3 for the 4.18.x line, and 4.14.8 for the 4.14.x line. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, configure a JMS-provider-side allow-list (Apache ActiveMQ Artemis &amp;#39;deserializationAllowList&amp;#39; / &amp;#39;deserializationDenyList&amp;#39;, Apache ActiveMQ Classic &amp;#39;org.apache.activemq.SERIALIZABLE_PACKAGES&amp;#39;) as the primary mitigation, and/or override the in-code default via the endpoint-level &amp;#39;deserializationFilter&amp;#39; option or the JVM-wide &amp;#39;-Djdk.serialFilter&amp;#39; system property with an explicit deny: &amp;#39;!java.net.**;java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*&amp;#39; (or &amp;#39;!java.net.**;java.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*&amp;#39; for the aggregation-repository components, which do not include javax.**).

Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command (&amp;#39;Argument Injection&amp;#39;) vulnerability in Apache Camel Docling component.<br /> <br /> The camel-docling component invokes the external `docling` command-line tool by assembling an argument list in DoclingProducer and executing it through java.lang.ProcessBuilder. Custom CLI arguments supplied through the `CamelDoclingCustomArguments` exchange header (a List) were appended to that argument list with insufficient validation: the original implementation relied on a denylist of disallowed flags and only rejected path values that contained a literal `../` sequence. As a result, a Camel route that forwards externally-influenced data into the `CamelDoclingCustomArguments` header (or into the path-bearing headers used to build the invocation) could cause the producer to pass unrecognized or unintended `docling` CLI flags to the subprocess, and could supply path-like argument values that resolved outside the intended directory through traversal sequences not caught by the literal `../` check. Because Camel itself builds the `docling` invocation from these values, the component is responsible for constraining them, and the weak validation allowed CLI-argument injection and directory traversal in the arguments passed to the external tool. The invocation uses the list-based form of ProcessBuilder, so a shell does not interpret the argument values; OS command injection through shell metacharacters was not possible, and the metacharacter rejection added by the fix is defense-in-depth.<br /> This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3.<br /> <br /> Users are recommended to upgrade to a release that contains the CAMEL-23212 fix. On the mainline the fix is included from Apache Camel 4.19.0 (and later releases such as 4.20.0). For users on the 4.18.x LTS releases stream, upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix replaces the denylist with a strict allowlist of recognized `docling` CLI flags (rejecting any unrecognized flag, and rejecting producer-managed flags such as the output-directory flags), defensively rejects shell metacharacters in argument values, and normalizes path-like values with Path.normalize() before validating them so that traversal sequences which bypass a literal `../` check are detected. As defence in depth, route authors should avoid mapping untrusted message content into the `CamelDoclingCustomArguments` header and the path-bearing headers, and should strip Camel-internal headers from messages that arrive from untrusted producers.

Prog Management System developed by PROG MIS has a SQL Injection vulnerability, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to inject arbitrary SQL commands to read database contents.

uniFLOW Universal Login Manager (ULM) Standalone<br /> contains an information disclosure vulnerability that may allow an<br /> authenticated administrator to access sensitive configuration information<br /> through the ULM Remote User Interface (RUI). Exploitation requires<br /> administrative privileges and may disclose configuration data associated with<br /> SMTP or LDAP integrations. ULM deployments connected to uniFLOW Server or<br /> uniFLOW Online are not affected.

The FileOrganizer WordPress plugin before 1.1.9, Advanced File Manager WordPress plugin before 5.4.12, File Manager Pro WordPress plugin before 2.1.1, File Manager WordPress plugin before 8.0.4 do not properly escape a parameter before passing it to a shell command when processing image operations, allowing authenticated users to perform OS Command Injection. This requires the server to have the ImageMagick convert CLI available without either the PHP imagick or GD extensions.

ERP App developed by PROG MIS has a Use of Hard-coded Credentials vulnerability, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to log in to view application code and obtain the database account and password.

Prog<br /> Management System developed by PROG MIS has a Exposure of Sensitive<br /> Information vulnerability, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to view<br /> a specific page and obtain the database account and password.