Vulnerabilities

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> reset: amlogic: t7: Fix null reset ops<br /> <br /> Fix missing reset ops causing kernel null pointer dereference.<br /> This SOC&amp;#39;s reset is currently not used yet.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> crypto: eip93 - fix hmac setkey algo selection<br /> <br /> eip93_hmac_setkey() allocates a temporary ahash transform for<br /> computing HMAC ipad/opad key material. The allocation uses the<br /> driver-specific cra_driver_name (e.g. "sha256-eip93") but passes<br /> CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC as the mask, which excludes async algorithms.<br /> <br /> Since the EIP93 hash algorithms are the only ones registered<br /> under those driver names and they are inherently async, the<br /> lookup is self-contradictory and always fails with -ENOENT.<br /> <br /> When called from the AEAD setkey path, this failure leaves the<br /> SA record partially initialized with zeroed digest fields. A<br /> subsequent crypto operation then dereferences a NULL pointer in<br /> the request context, resulting in a kernel panic:<br /> <br /> ```<br /> pc : eip93_aead_handle_result+0xc8c/0x1240 [crypto_hw_eip93]<br /> lr : eip93_aead_handle_result+0xbec/0x1240 [crypto_hw_eip93]<br /> sp : ffffffc082feb820<br /> x29: ffffffc082feb820 x28: ffffff8011043980 x27: 0000000000000000<br /> x26: 0000000000000000 x25: ffffffc078da0bc8 x24: 0000000091043980<br /> x23: ffffff8004d59e50 x22: ffffff8004d59410 x21: ffffff8004d593c0<br /> x20: ffffff8004d593c0 x19: ffffff8004d4f300 x18: 0000000000000000<br /> x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000007fda7aa498<br /> x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000<br /> x11: 0000000000000000 x10: fffffffff8127a80 x9 : 0000000000000000<br /> x8 : ffffff8004d4f380 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f<br /> x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : 0000000000000008 x3 : 0000000000000009<br /> x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : 0000000028000003 x0 : ffffff8004d388c0<br /> Code: 910142b6 f94012e0 f9002aa0 f90006d3 (f9400740)<br /> ```<br /> <br /> The reported symbol eip93_aead_handle_result+0xc8c is a<br /> resolution artifact from static functions being merged under<br /> the nearest exported symbol. Decoding the faulting sequence:<br /> <br /> ```<br /> 910142b6 ADD X22, X21, #0x50<br /> f94012e0 LDR X0, [X23, #0x20]<br /> f9002aa0 STR X0, [X21, #0x50]<br /> f90006d3 STR X19, [X22, #0x8]<br /> f9400740 LDR X0, [X26, #0x8]<br /> ```<br /> <br /> The faulting LDR at [X26, #0x8] is loading ctx-&gt;flags<br /> (offset 8 in eip93_hash_ctx), where ctx has been resolved<br /> to NULL from a partially initialized or unreachable<br /> transform context following the failed setkey.<br /> <br /> Fix this by dropping the CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC mask from the<br /> crypto_alloc_ahash() call. The code already handles async<br /> completion correctly via crypto_wait_req(), so there is no<br /> requirement to restrict the lookup to synchronous algorithms.<br /> <br /> Note that hashing a single 64-byte block through the hardware<br /> is likely slower than doing it in software due to the DMA<br /> round-trip overhead, but offloading it may still spare CPU<br /> cycles on the slower embedded cores where this IP is found.<br /> <br /> [Detailed investigation report of this bug]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> f2fs: protect extension_list reading with sb_lock in f2fs_sbi_show()<br /> <br /> In f2fs_sbi_show(), the extension_list, extension_count and<br /> hot_ext_count are read without holding sbi-&gt;sb_lock. If a concurrent<br /> sysfs store modifies the extension list via f2fs_update_extension_list(),<br /> the show path may read inconsistent count and array contents, potentially<br /> leading to out-of-bounds access or displaying stale data.<br /> <br /> Fix this by holding sb_lock around the entire extension list read<br /> and format operation.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> scsi: sg: Resolve soft lockup issue when opening /dev/sgX<br /> <br /> The parameter def_reserved_size defines the default buffer size reserved<br /> for each Sg_fd and should be restricted to a range between 0 and 1,048,576<br /> (see https://tldp.org/HOWTO/SCSI-Generic-HOWTO/proc.html). Although the<br /> function sg_proc_write_dressz enforces this limit, it is possible to bypass<br /> it by directly modifying the module parameter as shown below, which then<br /> causes a soft lockup:<br /> <br /> echo -1 &gt; /sys/module/sg/parameters/def_reserved_size<br /> exec 4 /dev/sg0<br /> <br /> watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#5 stuck for 26 seconds! [bash:537]<br /> Modules loaded:<br /> CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 537 Command: bash, kernel version 6.19.0-rc3+ #134,<br /> PREEMPT disabled<br /> Hardware: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS version<br /> 1.16.1-2.fc37 dated 04/01/2014<br /> ...<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> sg_build_reserve+0x5c/0xa0<br /> sg_add_sfp+0x168/0x270<br /> sg_open+0x16e/0x340<br /> chrdev_open+0xbe/0x230<br /> do_dentry_open+0x175/0x480<br /> vfs_open+0x34/0xf0<br /> do_open+0x265/0x3d0<br /> path_openat+0x110/0x290<br /> do_filp_open+0xc3/0x170<br /> do_sys_openat2+0x71/0xe0<br /> __x64_sys_openat+0x6d/0xa0<br /> do_syscall_64+0x62/0x310<br /> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e<br /> <br /> The fix is to use module_param_cb to validate and reject invalid values<br /> assigned to def_reserved_size.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> usb: typec: ps883x: Fix Oops at unbind<br /> <br /> When trying to unbind a device in order to bind to it vfio-platform as:<br /> <br /> echo bc0000.geniqup &gt; /sys/bus/platform/devices/bc0000.geniqup/driver/unbind<br /> <br /> I get the following Oops:<br /> <br /> [ 436.478639] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000020<br /> [ 436.487762] Mem abort info:<br /> [ 436.490716] ESR = 0x0000000096000004<br /> [ 436.494595] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits<br /> [ 436.500071] SET = 0, FnV = 0<br /> [ 436.503250] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0<br /> [ 436.506505] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault<br /> [ 436.511533] Data abort info:<br /> [ 436.514558] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000<br /> [ 436.520215] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0<br /> [ 436.525436] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0<br /> [ 436.530918] user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000008861a9000<br /> [ 436.537554] [0000000000000020] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000<br /> [ 436.544548] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP<br /> [ 436.550374] Modules linked in:<br /> [ 436.553542] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 671 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 7.0.0-rc3-g56fcdd0911a5-dirty #2 PREEMPT<br /> [ 436.564440] Tainted: [W]=WARN<br /> [ 436.567515] Hardware name: LENOVO 91B6CTO1WW/3796, BIOS O6NKT3BA 05/02/2025<br /> [ 436.574675] pstate: 21400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)<br /> [ 436.581841] pc : ps883x_retimer_remove+0x14/0x94<br /> [ 436.586605] lr : i2c_device_remove+0x28/0x84<br /> [ 436.591017] sp : ffff8000847137c0<br /> <br /> That&amp;#39;s because the ps883x_retimer_remove() retrieves the driver data<br /> from i2c_get_clientdata() which was never set at probe. So, add<br /> i2c_set_clientdata() at the end of the probe.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> tty: hvc_iucv: fix off-by-one in number of supported devices<br /> <br /> MAX_HVC_IUCV_LINES == HVC_ALLOC_TTY_ADAPTERS == 8.<br /> This is the number of entries in:<br /> static struct hvc_iucv_private *hvc_iucv_table[MAX_HVC_IUCV_LINES];<br /> <br /> Sometimes hvc_iucv_table[] is limited by:<br /> (a) if (num &gt; hvc_iucv_devices) // for error detection<br /> or<br /> (b) for (i = 0; i MAX_HVC_IUCV_LINES)<br /> <br /> If hvc_iucv_devices == 8, (a) allows the code to access hvc_iucv_table[8].<br /> Oops.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net: phonet: do not BUG_ON() in pn_socket_autobind() on failed bind<br /> <br /> syzbot reported a kernel BUG triggered from pn_socket_sendmsg() via<br /> pn_socket_autobind():<br /> <br /> kernel BUG at net/phonet/socket.c:213!<br /> RIP: 0010:pn_socket_autobind net/phonet/socket.c:213 [inline]<br /> RIP: 0010:pn_socket_sendmsg+0x240/0x250 net/phonet/socket.c:421<br /> Call Trace:<br /> sock_sendmsg_nosec+0x112/0x150 net/socket.c:797<br /> __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:812 [inline]<br /> __sys_sendto+0x402/0x590 net/socket.c:2280<br /> ...<br /> <br /> pn_socket_autobind() calls pn_socket_bind() with port 0 and, on<br /> -EINVAL, assumes the socket was already bound and asserts that the<br /> port is non-zero:<br /> <br /> err = pn_socket_bind(sock, ..., sizeof(struct sockaddr_pn));<br /> if (err != -EINVAL)<br /> return err;<br /> BUG_ON(!pn_port(pn_sk(sock-&gt;sk)-&gt;sobject));<br /> return 0; /* socket was already bound */<br /> <br /> However pn_socket_bind() also returns -EINVAL when sk-&gt;sk_state is not<br /> TCP_CLOSE, even when the socket has never been bound and pn_port() is<br /> still 0. In that case the BUG_ON() fires and panics the kernel from a<br /> user-triggerable path.<br /> <br /> Treat the "bind returned -EINVAL but pn_port() is still 0" case as a<br /> regular error and propagate -EINVAL to the caller instead of crashing.<br /> Existing callers already translate a non-zero return from<br /> pn_socket_autobind() into -ENOBUFS/-EAGAIN, so returning -EINVAL here<br /> only changes behaviour from panic to a normal errno.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> drm/amdgpu: fix AMDGPU_INFO_READ_MMR_REG<br /> <br /> There were multiple issues in that code.<br /> <br /> First of all the order between the reset semaphore and the mm_lock was<br /> wrong (e.g. copy_to_user) was called while holding the lock.<br /> <br /> Then we allocated memory while holding the reset semaphore which is also<br /> a pretty big bug and can deadlock.<br /> <br /> Then we used down_read_trylock() instead of waiting for the reset to<br /> finish.<br /> <br /> (cherry picked from commit 361b6e6b303d4b691f6c5974d3eaab67ca6dd90e)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> mailbox: mailbox-test: don&amp;#39;t free the reused channel<br /> <br /> The RX channel can be aliased to the TX channel if it has a different<br /> MMIO. This special case needs to be handled when freeing the channels<br /> otherwise a double-free occurs.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> mailbox: add sanity check for channel array<br /> <br /> Fail gracefully if there is no channel array attached to the mailbox<br /> controller. Otherwise the later dereference will cause an OOPS which<br /> might not be seen because mailbox controllers might instantiate very<br /> early. Remove the comment explaining the obvious while here.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> mailbox: mailbox-test: free channels on probe error<br /> <br /> On probe error, free the previously obtained channels. This not only<br /> prevents a leak, but also UAF scenarios because the client structure<br /> will be removed nonetheless because it was allocated with devm.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net: mana: Guard mana_remove against double invocation<br /> <br /> If PM resume fails (e.g., mana_attach() returns an error), mana_probe()<br /> calls mana_remove(), which tears down the device and sets<br /> gd-&gt;gdma_context = NULL and gd-&gt;driver_data = NULL.<br /> <br /> However, a failed resume callback does not automatically unbind the<br /> driver. When the device is eventually unbound, mana_remove() is invoked<br /> a second time. Without a NULL check, it dereferences gc-&gt;dev with<br /> gc == NULL, causing a kernel panic.<br /> <br /> Add an early return if gdma_context or driver_data is NULL so the second<br /> invocation is harmless. Move the dev = gc-&gt;dev assignment after the<br /> guard so it cannot dereference NULL.