Vulnerabilities

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> drm/mediatek: mtk_drm_crtc: Add checks for devm_kcalloc<br /> <br /> As the devm_kcalloc may return NULL, the return value needs to be checked<br /> to avoid NULL poineter dereference.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> Input: raspberrypi-ts - fix refcount leak in rpi_ts_probe<br /> <br /> rpi_firmware_get() take reference, we need to release it in error paths<br /> as well. Use devm_rpi_firmware_get() helper to handling the resources.<br /> Also remove the existing rpi_firmware_put().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> wifi: mt76: mt76x0: fix oob access in mt76x0_phy_get_target_power<br /> <br /> After &amp;#39;commit ba45841ca5eb ("wifi: mt76: mt76x02: simplify struct<br /> mt76x02_rate_power")&amp;#39;, mt76x02 relies on ht[0-7] rate_power data for<br /> vht mcs{0,7}, while it uses vth[0-1] rate_power for vht mcs {8,9}.<br /> Fix a possible out-of-bound access in mt76x0_phy_get_target_power routine.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> blk-crypto: make blk_crypto_evict_key() more robust<br /> <br /> If blk_crypto_evict_key() sees that the key is still in-use (due to a<br /> bug) or that -&gt;keyslot_evict failed, it currently just returns while<br /> leaving the key linked into the keyslot management structures.<br /> <br /> However, blk_crypto_evict_key() is only called in contexts such as inode<br /> eviction where failure is not an option. So actually the caller<br /> proceeds with freeing the blk_crypto_key regardless of the return value<br /> of blk_crypto_evict_key().<br /> <br /> These two assumptions don&amp;#39;t match, and the result is that there can be a<br /> use-after-free in blk_crypto_reprogram_all_keys() after one of these<br /> errors occurs. (Note, these errors *shouldn&amp;#39;t* happen; we&amp;#39;re just<br /> talking about what happens if they do anyway.)<br /> <br /> Fix this by making blk_crypto_evict_key() unlink the key from the<br /> keyslot management structures even on failure.<br /> <br /> Also improve some comments.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> btrfs: insert tree mod log move in push_node_left<br /> <br /> There is a fairly unlikely race condition in tree mod log rewind that<br /> can result in a kernel panic which has the following trace:<br /> <br /> [530.569] BTRFS critical (device sda3): unable to find logical 0 length 4096<br /> [530.585] BTRFS critical (device sda3): unable to find logical 0 length 4096<br /> [530.602] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000002<br /> [530.618] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode<br /> [530.629] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page<br /> [530.641] PGD 0 P4D 0<br /> [530.647] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP<br /> [530.654] CPU: 30 PID: 398973 Comm: below Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S O K 5.12.0-0_fbk13_clang_7455_gb24de3bdb045 #1<br /> [530.680] Hardware name: Quanta Mono Lake-M.2 SATA 1HY9U9Z001G/Mono Lake-M.2 SATA, BIOS F20_3A15 08/16/2017<br /> [530.703] RIP: 0010:__btrfs_map_block+0xaa/0xd00<br /> [530.755] RSP: 0018:ffffc9002c2f7600 EFLAGS: 00010246<br /> [530.767] RAX: ffffffffffffffea RBX: ffff888292e41000 RCX: f2702d8b8be15100<br /> [530.784] RDX: ffff88885fda6fb8 RSI: ffff88885fd973c8 RDI: ffff88885fd973c8<br /> [530.800] RBP: ffff888292e410d0 R08: ffffffff82fd7fd0 R09: 00000000fffeffff<br /> [530.816] R10: ffffffff82e57fd0 R11: ffffffff82e57d70 R12: 0000000000000000<br /> [530.832] R13: 0000000000001000 R14: 0000000000001000 R15: ffffc9002c2f76f0<br /> [530.848] FS: 00007f38d64af000(0000) GS:ffff88885fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000<br /> [530.866] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033<br /> [530.880] CR2: 0000000000000002 CR3: 00000002b6770004 CR4: 00000000003706e0<br /> [530.896] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000<br /> [530.912] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400<br /> [530.928] Call Trace:<br /> [530.934] ? btrfs_printk+0x13b/0x18c<br /> [530.943] ? btrfs_bio_counter_inc_blocked+0x3d/0x130<br /> [530.955] btrfs_map_bio+0x75/0x330<br /> [530.963] ? kmem_cache_alloc+0x12a/0x2d0<br /> [530.973] ? btrfs_submit_metadata_bio+0x63/0x100<br /> [530.984] btrfs_submit_metadata_bio+0xa4/0x100<br /> [530.995] submit_extent_page+0x30f/0x360<br /> [531.004] read_extent_buffer_pages+0x49e/0x6d0<br /> [531.015] ? submit_extent_page+0x360/0x360<br /> [531.025] btree_read_extent_buffer_pages+0x5f/0x150<br /> [531.037] read_tree_block+0x37/0x60<br /> [531.046] read_block_for_search+0x18b/0x410<br /> [531.056] btrfs_search_old_slot+0x198/0x2f0<br /> [531.066] resolve_indirect_ref+0xfe/0x6f0<br /> [531.076] ? ulist_alloc+0x31/0x60<br /> [531.084] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x12e/0x2b0<br /> [531.095] find_parent_nodes+0x720/0x1830<br /> [531.105] ? ulist_alloc+0x10/0x60<br /> [531.113] iterate_extent_inodes+0xea/0x370<br /> [531.123] ? btrfs_previous_extent_item+0x8f/0x110<br /> [531.134] ? btrfs_search_path_in_tree+0x240/0x240<br /> [531.146] iterate_inodes_from_logical+0x98/0xd0<br /> [531.157] ? btrfs_search_path_in_tree+0x240/0x240<br /> [531.168] btrfs_ioctl_logical_to_ino+0xd9/0x180<br /> [531.179] btrfs_ioctl+0xe2/0x2eb0<br /> <br /> This occurs when logical inode resolution takes a tree mod log sequence<br /> number, and then while backref walking hits a rewind on a busy node<br /> which has the following sequence of tree mod log operations (numbers<br /> filled in from a specific example, but they are somewhat arbitrary)<br /> <br /> REMOVE_WHILE_FREEING slot 532<br /> REMOVE_WHILE_FREEING slot 531<br /> REMOVE_WHILE_FREEING slot 530<br /> ...<br /> REMOVE_WHILE_FREEING slot 0<br /> REMOVE slot 455<br /> REMOVE slot 454<br /> REMOVE slot 453<br /> ...<br /> REMOVE slot 0<br /> ADD slot 455<br /> ADD slot 454<br /> ADD slot 453<br /> ...<br /> ADD slot 0<br /> MOVE src slot 0 -&gt; dst slot 456 nritems 533<br /> REMOVE slot 455<br /> REMOVE slot 454<br /> REMOVE slot 453<br /> ...<br /> REMOVE slot 0<br /> <br /> When this sequence gets applied via btrfs_tree_mod_log_rewind, it<br /> allocates a fresh rewind eb, and first inserts the correct key info for<br /> the 533 elements, then overwrites the first 456 of them, then decrements<br /> the count by 456 via the add ops, then rewinds the move by doing a<br /> memmove from 456:988-&gt;0:532. We have never written anything past 532,<br /> ---truncated---

Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> powerpc/rtas: avoid scheduling in rtas_os_term()<br /> <br /> It&amp;#39;s unsafe to use rtas_busy_delay() to handle a busy status from<br /> the ibm,os-term RTAS function in rtas_os_term():<br /> <br /> Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b<br /> BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:618<br /> in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0<br /> preempt_count: 2, expected: 0<br /> CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G D 6.0.0-rc5-02182-gf8553a572277-dirty #9<br /> Call Trace:<br /> [c000000007b8f000] [c000000001337110] dump_stack_lvl+0xb4/0x110 (unreliable)<br /> [c000000007b8f040] [c0000000002440e4] __might_resched+0x394/0x3c0<br /> [c000000007b8f0e0] [c00000000004f680] rtas_busy_delay+0x120/0x1b0<br /> [c000000007b8f100] [c000000000052d04] rtas_os_term+0xb8/0xf4<br /> [c000000007b8f180] [c0000000001150fc] pseries_panic+0x50/0x68<br /> [c000000007b8f1f0] [c000000000036354] ppc_panic_platform_handler+0x34/0x50<br /> [c000000007b8f210] [c0000000002303c4] notifier_call_chain+0xd4/0x1c0<br /> [c000000007b8f2b0] [c0000000002306cc] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xac/0x1c0<br /> [c000000007b8f2f0] [c0000000001d62b8] panic+0x228/0x4d0<br /> [c000000007b8f390] [c0000000001e573c] do_exit+0x140c/0x1420<br /> [c000000007b8f480] [c0000000001e586c] make_task_dead+0xdc/0x200<br /> <br /> Use rtas_busy_delay_time() instead, which signals without side effects<br /> whether to attempt the ibm,os-term RTAS call again.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> mtd: lpddr2_nvm: Fix possible null-ptr-deref<br /> <br /> It will cause null-ptr-deref when resource_size(add_range) invoked,<br /> if platform_get_resource() returns NULL.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> media: coda: Add check for dcoda_iram_alloc<br /> <br /> As the coda_iram_alloc may return NULL pointer,<br /> it should be better to check the return value<br /> in order to avoid NULL poineter dereference,<br /> same as the others.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> netdevsim: fix memory leak in nsim_drv_probe() when nsim_dev_resources_register() failed<br /> <br /> If some items in nsim_dev_resources_register() fail, memory leak will<br /> occur. The following is the memory leak information.<br /> <br /> unreferenced object 0xffff888074c02600 (size 128):<br /> comm "echo", pid 8159, jiffies 4294945184 (age 493.530s)<br /> hex dump (first 32 bytes):<br /> 40 47 ea 89 ff ff ff ff 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 @G..............<br /> ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ................<br /> backtrace:<br /> [] kmalloc_trace+0x22/0x60<br /> [] devl_resource_register+0x144/0x4e0<br /> [] nsim_drv_probe+0x37a/0x1260<br /> [] really_probe+0x20b/0xb10<br /> [] __driver_probe_device+0x1b3/0x4a0<br /> [] driver_probe_device+0x49/0x140<br /> [] __device_attach_driver+0x18c/0x2a0<br /> [] bus_for_each_drv+0x151/0x1d0<br /> [] __device_attach+0x1c9/0x4e0<br /> [] bus_probe_device+0x1d5/0x280<br /> [] device_add+0xae0/0x1cb0<br /> [] new_device_store+0x3b6/0x5f0<br /> [] bus_attr_store+0x72/0xa0<br /> [] sysfs_kf_write+0x106/0x160<br /> [] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3a8/0x5a0<br /> [] vfs_write+0x8f0/0xc80

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> media: dvb-core: Fix double free in dvb_register_device()<br /> <br /> In function dvb_register_device() -&gt; dvb_register_media_device() -&gt;<br /> dvb_create_media_entity(), dvb-&gt;entity is allocated and initialized. If<br /> the initialization fails, it frees the dvb-&gt;entity, and return an error<br /> code. The caller takes the error code and handles the error by calling<br /> dvb_media_device_free(), which unregisters the entity and frees the<br /> field again if it is not NULL. As dvb-&gt;entity may not NULLed in<br /> dvb_create_media_entity() when the allocation of dvbdev-&gt;pad fails, a<br /> double free may occur. This may also cause an Use After free in<br /> media_device_unregister_entity().<br /> <br /> Fix this by storing NULL to dvb-&gt;entity when it is freed.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> iommu/amd: Fix pci device refcount leak in ppr_notifier()<br /> <br /> As comment of pci_get_domain_bus_and_slot() says, it returns<br /> a pci device with refcount increment, when finish using it,<br /> the caller must decrement the reference count by calling<br /> pci_dev_put(). So call it before returning from ppr_notifier()<br /> to avoid refcount leak.