CVE-2025-37794
Publication date:
01/05/2025
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br />
<br />
wifi: mac80211: Purge vif txq in ieee80211_do_stop()<br />
<br />
After ieee80211_do_stop() SKB from vif&#39;s txq could still be processed.<br />
Indeed another concurrent vif schedule_and_wake_txq call could cause<br />
those packets to be dequeued (see ieee80211_handle_wake_tx_queue())<br />
without checking the sdata current state.<br />
<br />
Because vif.drv_priv is now cleared in this function, this could lead to<br />
driver crash.<br />
<br />
For example in ath12k, ahvif is store in vif.drv_priv. Thus if<br />
ath12k_mac_op_tx() is called after ieee80211_do_stop(), ahvif->ah can be<br />
NULL, leading the ath12k_warn(ahvif->ah,...) call in this function to<br />
trigger the NULL deref below.<br />
<br />
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dfffffc000000001<br />
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]<br />
batman_adv: bat0: Interface deactivated: brbh1337<br />
Mem abort info:<br />
ESR = 0x0000000096000004<br />
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits<br />
SET = 0, FnV = 0<br />
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0<br />
FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault<br />
Data abort info:<br />
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000<br />
CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0<br />
GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0<br />
[dfffffc000000001] address between user and kernel address ranges<br />
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP<br />
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 978 Comm: lbd Not tainted 6.13.0-g633f875b8f1e #114<br />
Hardware name: HW (DT)<br />
pstate: 10000005 (nzcV daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)<br />
pc : ath12k_mac_op_tx+0x6cc/0x29b8 [ath12k]<br />
lr : ath12k_mac_op_tx+0x174/0x29b8 [ath12k]<br />
sp : ffffffc086ace450<br />
x29: ffffffc086ace450 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 1ffffff810d59ca4<br />
x26: ffffff801d05f7c0 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 000000004000001e<br />
x23: ffffff8009ce4926 x22: ffffff801f9c0800 x21: ffffff801d05f7f0<br />
x20: ffffff8034a19f40 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffff801f9c0958<br />
x17: ffffff800bc0a504 x16: dfffffc000000000 x15: ffffffc086ace4f8<br />
x14: ffffff801d05f83c x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffffffb003a0bf03<br />
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffffffb003a0bf02 x9 : ffffff8034a19f40<br />
x8 : ffffff801d05f818 x7 : 1ffffff0069433dc x6 : ffffff8034a19ee0<br />
x5 : ffffff801d05f7f0 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000001<br />
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : dfffffc000000000 x0 : 0000000000000008<br />
Call trace:<br />
ath12k_mac_op_tx+0x6cc/0x29b8 [ath12k] (P)<br />
ieee80211_handle_wake_tx_queue+0x16c/0x260<br />
ieee80211_queue_skb+0xeec/0x1d20<br />
ieee80211_tx+0x200/0x2c8<br />
ieee80211_xmit+0x22c/0x338<br />
__ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x7e8/0xc60<br />
ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xc4/0xee0<br />
__ieee80211_subif_start_xmit_8023.isra.0+0x854/0x17a0<br />
ieee80211_subif_start_xmit_8023+0x124/0x488<br />
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x160/0x5a8<br />
__dev_queue_xmit+0x6f8/0x3120<br />
br_dev_queue_push_xmit+0x120/0x4a8<br />
__br_forward+0xe4/0x2b0<br />
deliver_clone+0x5c/0xd0<br />
br_flood+0x398/0x580<br />
br_dev_xmit+0x454/0x9f8<br />
dev_hard_start_xmit+0x160/0x5a8<br />
__dev_queue_xmit+0x6f8/0x3120<br />
ip6_finish_output2+0xc28/0x1b60<br />
__ip6_finish_output+0x38c/0x638<br />
ip6_output+0x1b4/0x338<br />
ip6_local_out+0x7c/0xa8<br />
ip6_send_skb+0x7c/0x1b0<br />
ip6_push_pending_frames+0x94/0xd0<br />
rawv6_sendmsg+0x1a98/0x2898<br />
inet_sendmsg+0x94/0xe0<br />
__sys_sendto+0x1e4/0x308<br />
__arm64_sys_sendto+0xc4/0x140<br />
do_el0_svc+0x110/0x280<br />
el0_svc+0x20/0x60<br />
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x104/0x138<br />
el0t_64_sync+0x154/0x158<br />
<br />
To avoid that, empty vif&#39;s txq at ieee80211_do_stop() so no packet could<br />
be dequeued after ieee80211_do_stop() (new packets cannot be queued<br />
because SDATA_STATE_RUNNING is cleared at this point).
Severity CVSS v4.0: Pending analysis
Last modification:
02/05/2025