CVE-2026-13481

*** Pendiente de traducción *** The IEEE 1588 PTP management-message parser in subsys/net/lib/ptp/tlv.c mishandles the PTP_MGMT_TIME management id. In tlv_mgmt_post_recv(), the PTP_MGMT_TIME case casts mgmt_tlv-&gt;data to a 10-byte struct ptp_timestamp and reads it (then byte-swaps and writes it back) without first checking that the TLV data field is at least sizeof(struct ptp_timestamp). Every sibling management id in the same switch validates its length first; PTP_MGMT_TIME was the only case lacking that check.<br /> <br /> The length passed in is the management data size (tlv-&gt;length - 2), and the upstream guard in ptp_tlv_post_recv() only requires tlv-&gt;length &gt; 2, while msg_tlv_post_recv() validates only that the TLV fits within the received byte count, not a per-id minimum. A peer on the local PTP segment can therefore send a PTP_MSG_MANAGEMENT message carrying a short PTP_MGMT_TIME TLV (data as small as 2 bytes), causing the parser to read and write 8 bytes beyond the validated data. The message type and TLV contents are taken straight off the wire, so the path is reachable by any adjacent attacker when CONFIG_PTP is enabled.<br /> <br /> The over-read and write-back stay within the struct ptp_msg allocation (mgmt_tlv-&gt;data lives in the leading mtu[NET_ETH_MTU] union member, so data + 10 lands at most a few bytes past mtu[], inside the same object), so this is an out-of-bounds read of adjacent in-object memory plus a bounded in-place corruption of the message&amp;#39;s parsed timestamp, not past-allocation memory corruption. Impact is limited to minor information exposure of adjacent bytes and corruption of the device&amp;#39;s parsed management TIME value; there is no crash on the access and no reachable reference-count corruption.<br /> <br /> The fix adds if (length