CVE-2026-66901

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Google::Auth versions before 0.09 for Perl allow server side request forgery and credential exfiltration via unvalidated URLs taken from the credentials JSON.<br /> <br /> The URLs the library requests are read from the credentials JSON, and their hosts were not checked against the universe domain before the request. For an external_account configuration, retrieve_subject_token fetched credential_source.url with headers from the same JSON, and fetch_access_token posted the subject token to token_url, then sent the STS access token it received to service_account_impersonation_url in an Authorization: Bearer header. The authorized_user, impersonated_service_account and service_account configurations posted the client secret and refresh token, the source access token, and a signed JWT assertion to their own JSON-supplied token_uri or impersonation URL.<br /> <br /> Any caller that builds credentials from a configuration it does not fully control issues those requests from the application&amp;#39;s network position, reaching hosts the configuration names, including internal services and link-local metadata endpoints, and hands them the credentials each request carries. The service_account assertion is bound to aud, so it is not replayable against Google.<br /> <br /> Version 0.06 added a _validate_url host check to the external_account class, keyed on a universe_domain read from the same credentials JSON. Version 0.07 gated a JSON-supplied universe domain behind GOOGLE_EXTERNAL_ACCOUNT_ALLOW_CUSTOM_UNIVERSES=1, deriving the pin flag from arguments that an earlier BUILDARGS pass had already merged on the make_creds path. Version 0.08 passed the pin decision through as an explicit constructor argument and moved _validate_url to Google::Auth::Credentials, adding the call to UserRefreshCredentials and ImpersonatedServiceAccountCredentials, and 0.09 added it to ServiceAccountCredentials.