Vulnerabilities

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> powerpc/rtas_flash: allow user copy to flash block cache objects<br /> <br /> With hardened usercopy enabled (CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y), using the<br /> /proc/powerpc/rtas/firmware_update interface to prepare a system<br /> firmware update yields a BUG():<br /> <br /> kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!<br /> Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]<br /> LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries<br /> Modules linked in:<br /> CPU: 0 PID: 2232 Comm: dd Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #2<br /> Hardware name: IBM,8408-E8E POWER8E (raw) 0x4b0201 0xf000004 of:IBM,FW860.50 (SV860_146) hv:phyp pSeries<br /> NIP: c0000000005991d0 LR: c0000000005991cc CTR: 0000000000000000<br /> REGS: c0000000148c76a0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.5.0-rc3+)<br /> MSR: 8000000000029033 CR: 24002242 XER: 0000000c<br /> CFAR: c0000000001fbd34 IRQMASK: 0<br /> [ ... GPRs omitted ... ]<br /> NIP usercopy_abort+0xa0/0xb0<br /> LR usercopy_abort+0x9c/0xb0<br /> Call Trace:<br /> usercopy_abort+0x9c/0xb0 (unreliable)<br /> __check_heap_object+0x1b4/0x1d0<br /> __check_object_size+0x2d0/0x380<br /> rtas_flash_write+0xe4/0x250<br /> proc_reg_write+0xfc/0x160<br /> vfs_write+0xfc/0x4e0<br /> ksys_write+0x90/0x160<br /> system_call_exception+0x178/0x320<br /> system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4<br /> <br /> The blocks of the firmware image are copied directly from user memory<br /> to objects allocated from flash_block_cache, so flash_block_cache must<br /> be created using kmem_cache_create_usercopy() to mark it safe for user<br /> access.<br /> <br /> [mpe: Trim and indent oops]

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> IB/hfi1: Fix possible panic during hotplug remove<br /> <br /> During hotplug remove it is possible that the update counters work<br /> might be pending, and may run after memory has been freed.<br /> Cancel the update counters work before freeing memory.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> tcp/udp: Fix memleaks of sk and zerocopy skbs with TX timestamp.<br /> <br /> syzkaller reported [0] memory leaks of an UDP socket and ZEROCOPY<br /> skbs. We can reproduce the problem with these sequences:<br /> <br /> sk = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)<br /> sk.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_TIMESTAMPING, SOF_TIMESTAMPING_TX_SOFTWARE)<br /> sk.setsockopt(SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROCOPY, 1)<br /> sk.sendto(b&amp;#39;&amp;#39;, MSG_ZEROCOPY, (&amp;#39;127.0.0.1&amp;#39;, 53))<br /> sk.close()<br /> <br /> sendmsg() calls msg_zerocopy_alloc(), which allocates a skb, sets<br /> skb-&gt;cb-&gt;ubuf.refcnt to 1, and calls sock_hold(). Here, struct<br /> ubuf_info_msgzc indirectly holds a refcnt of the socket. When the<br /> skb is sent, __skb_tstamp_tx() clones it and puts the clone into<br /> the socket&amp;#39;s error queue with the TX timestamp.<br /> <br /> When the original skb is received locally, skb_copy_ubufs() calls<br /> skb_unclone(), and pskb_expand_head() increments skb-&gt;cb-&gt;ubuf.refcnt.<br /> This additional count is decremented while freeing the skb, but struct<br /> ubuf_info_msgzc still has a refcnt, so __msg_zerocopy_callback() is<br /> not called.<br /> <br /> The last refcnt is not released unless we retrieve the TX timestamped<br /> skb by recvmsg(). Since we clear the error queue in inet_sock_destruct()<br /> after the socket&amp;#39;s refcnt reaches 0, there is a circular dependency.<br /> If we close() the socket holding such skbs, we never call sock_put()<br /> and leak the count, sk, and skb.<br /> <br /> TCP has the same problem, and commit e0c8bccd40fc ("net: stream:<br /> purge sk_error_queue in sk_stream_kill_queues()") tried to fix it<br /> by calling skb_queue_purge() during close(). However, there is a<br /> small chance that skb queued in a qdisc or device could be put<br /> into the error queue after the skb_queue_purge() call.<br /> <br /> In __skb_tstamp_tx(), the cloned skb should not have a reference<br /> to the ubuf to remove the circular dependency, but skb_clone() does<br /> not call skb_copy_ubufs() for zerocopy skb. So, we need to call<br /> skb_orphan_frags_rx() for the cloned skb to call skb_copy_ubufs().<br /> <br /> [0]:<br /> BUG: memory leak<br /> unreferenced object 0xffff88800c6d2d00 (size 1152):<br /> comm "syz-executor392", pid 264, jiffies 4294785440 (age 13.044s)<br /> hex dump (first 32 bytes):<br /> 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cd af e8 81 00 00 00 00 ................<br /> 02 00 07 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ...@............<br /> backtrace:<br /> [] sk_prot_alloc+0x64/0x2a0 net/core/sock.c:2024<br /> [] sk_alloc+0x3b/0x800 net/core/sock.c:2083<br /> [] inet_create net/ipv4/af_inet.c:319 [inline]<br /> [] inet_create+0x31e/0xe40 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:245<br /> [] __sock_create+0x2ab/0x550 net/socket.c:1515<br /> [] sock_create net/socket.c:1566 [inline]<br /> [] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1603 [inline]<br /> [] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1588 [inline]<br /> [] __sys_socket+0x138/0x250 net/socket.c:1636<br /> [] __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1649 [inline]<br /> [] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1647 [inline]<br /> [] __x64_sys_socket+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1647<br /> [] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]<br /> [] do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80<br /> [] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd<br /> <br /> BUG: memory leak<br /> unreferenced object 0xffff888017633a00 (size 240):<br /> comm "syz-executor392", pid 264, jiffies 4294785440 (age 13.044s)<br /> hex dump (first 32 bytes):<br /> 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................<br /> 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2d 6d 0c 80 88 ff ff .........-m.....<br /> backtrace:<br /> [] __alloc_skb+0x229/0x320 net/core/skbuff.c:497<br /> [] alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1265 [inline]<br /> [] sock_omalloc+0xaa/0x190 net/core/sock.c:2596<br /> [] msg_zerocopy_alloc net/core/skbuff.c:1294 [inline]<br /> []<br /> ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ipv6: Add lwtunnel encap size of all siblings in nexthop calculation<br /> <br /> In function rt6_nlmsg_size(), the length of nexthop is calculated<br /> by multipling the nexthop length of fib6_info and the number of<br /> siblings. However if the fib6_info has no lwtunnel but the siblings<br /> have lwtunnels, the nexthop length is less than it should be, and<br /> it will trigger a warning in inet6_rt_notify() as follows:<br /> <br /> WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 6082 at net/ipv6/route.c:6180 inet6_rt_notify+0x120/0x130<br /> ......<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> fib6_add_rt2node+0x685/0xa30<br /> fib6_add+0x96/0x1b0<br /> ip6_route_add+0x50/0xd0<br /> inet6_rtm_newroute+0x97/0xa0<br /> rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x156/0x3d0<br /> netlink_rcv_skb+0x5a/0x110<br /> netlink_unicast+0x246/0x350<br /> netlink_sendmsg+0x250/0x4c0<br /> sock_sendmsg+0x66/0x70<br /> ___sys_sendmsg+0x7c/0xd0<br /> __sys_sendmsg+0x5d/0xb0<br /> do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90<br /> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc<br /> <br /> This bug can be reproduced by script:<br /> <br /> ip -6 addr add 2002::2/64 dev ens2<br /> ip -6 route add 100::/64 via 2002::1 dev ens2 metric 100<br /> <br /> for i in 10 20 30 40 50 60 70;<br /> do<br /> ip link add link ens2 name ipv_$i type ipvlan<br /> ip -6 addr add 2002::$i/64 dev ipv_$i<br /> ifconfig ipv_$i up<br /> done<br /> <br /> for i in 10 20 30 40 50 60;<br /> do<br /> ip -6 route append 100::/64 encap ip6 dst 2002::$i via 2002::1<br /> dev ipv_$i metric 100<br /> done<br /> <br /> ip -6 route append 100::/64 via 2002::1 dev ipv_70 metric 100<br /> <br /> This patch fixes it by adding nexthop_len of every siblings using<br /> rt6_nh_nlmsg_size().

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> tracing/synthetic: Fix races on freeing last_cmd<br /> <br /> Currently, the "last_cmd" variable can be accessed by multiple processes<br /> asynchronously when multiple users manipulate synthetic_events node<br /> at the same time, it could lead to use-after-free or double-free.<br /> <br /> This patch add "lastcmd_mutex" to prevent "last_cmd" from being accessed<br /> asynchronously.<br /> <br /> ================================================================<br /> <br /> It&amp;#39;s easy to reproduce in the KASAN environment by running the two<br /> scripts below in different shells.<br /> <br /> script 1:<br /> while :<br /> do<br /> echo -n -e &amp;#39;\x88&amp;#39; &gt; /sys/kernel/tracing/synthetic_events<br /> done<br /> <br /> script 2:<br /> while :<br /> do<br /> echo -n -e &amp;#39;\xb0&amp;#39; &gt; /sys/kernel/tracing/synthetic_events<br /> done<br /> <br /> ================================================================<br /> double-free scenario:<br /> <br /> process A process B<br /> ------------------- ---------------<br /> 1.kstrdup last_cmd<br /> 2.free last_cmd<br /> 3.free last_cmd(double-free)<br /> <br /> ================================================================<br /> use-after-free scenario:<br /> <br /> process A process B<br /> ------------------- ---------------<br /> 1.kstrdup last_cmd<br /> 2.free last_cmd<br /> 3.tracing_log_err(use-after-free)<br /> <br /> ================================================================<br /> <br /> Appendix 1. KASAN report double-free:<br /> <br /> BUG: KASAN: double-free in kfree+0xdc/0x1d4<br /> Free of addr ***** by task sh/4879<br /> Call trace:<br /> ...<br /> kfree+0xdc/0x1d4<br /> create_or_delete_synth_event+0x60/0x1e8<br /> trace_parse_run_command+0x2bc/0x4b8<br /> synth_events_write+0x20/0x30<br /> vfs_write+0x200/0x830<br /> ...<br /> <br /> Allocated by task 4879:<br /> ...<br /> kstrdup+0x5c/0x98<br /> create_or_delete_synth_event+0x6c/0x1e8<br /> trace_parse_run_command+0x2bc/0x4b8<br /> synth_events_write+0x20/0x30<br /> vfs_write+0x200/0x830<br /> ...<br /> <br /> Freed by task 5464:<br /> ...<br /> kfree+0xdc/0x1d4<br /> create_or_delete_synth_event+0x60/0x1e8<br /> trace_parse_run_command+0x2bc/0x4b8<br /> synth_events_write+0x20/0x30<br /> vfs_write+0x200/0x830<br /> ...<br /> <br /> ================================================================<br /> Appendix 2. KASAN report use-after-free:<br /> <br /> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in strlen+0x5c/0x7c<br /> Read of size 1 at addr ***** by task sh/5483<br /> sh: CPU: 7 PID: 5483 Comm: sh<br /> ...<br /> __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x34/0x44<br /> strlen+0x5c/0x7c<br /> tracing_log_err+0x60/0x444<br /> create_or_delete_synth_event+0xc4/0x204<br /> trace_parse_run_command+0x2bc/0x4b8<br /> synth_events_write+0x20/0x30<br /> vfs_write+0x200/0x830<br /> ...<br /> <br /> Allocated by task 5483:<br /> ...<br /> kstrdup+0x5c/0x98<br /> create_or_delete_synth_event+0x80/0x204<br /> trace_parse_run_command+0x2bc/0x4b8<br /> synth_events_write+0x20/0x30<br /> vfs_write+0x200/0x830<br /> ...<br /> <br /> Freed by task 5480:<br /> ...<br /> kfree+0xdc/0x1d4<br /> create_or_delete_synth_event+0x74/0x204<br /> trace_parse_run_command+0x2bc/0x4b8<br /> synth_events_write+0x20/0x30<br /> vfs_write+0x200/0x830<br /> ...

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> cxl/acpi: Fix a use-after-free in cxl_parse_cfmws()<br /> <br /> KASAN and KFENCE detected an user-after-free in the CXL driver. This<br /> happens in the cxl_decoder_add() fail path. KASAN prints the following<br /> error:<br /> <br /> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in cxl_parse_cfmws (drivers/cxl/acpi.c:299)<br /> <br /> This happens in cxl_parse_cfmws(), where put_device() is called,<br /> releasing cxld, which is accessed later.<br /> <br /> Use the local variables in the dev_err() instead of pointing to the<br /> released memory. Since the dev_err() is printing a resource, change the open<br /> coded print format to use the %pr format specifier.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> kobject: Add sanity check for kset-&gt;kobj.ktype in kset_register()<br /> <br /> When I register a kset in the following way:<br /> static struct kset my_kset;<br /> kobject_set_name(&amp;my_kset.kobj, "my_kset");<br /> ret = kset_register(&amp;my_kset);<br /> <br /> A null pointer dereference exception is occurred:<br /> [ 4453.568337] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at \<br /> virtual address 0000000000000028<br /> ... ...<br /> [ 4453.810361] Call trace:<br /> [ 4453.813062] kobject_get_ownership+0xc/0x34<br /> [ 4453.817493] kobject_add_internal+0x98/0x274<br /> [ 4453.822005] kset_register+0x5c/0xb4<br /> [ 4453.825820] my_kobj_init+0x44/0x1000 [my_kset]<br /> ... ...<br /> <br /> Because I didn&amp;#39;t initialize my_kset.kobj.ktype.<br /> <br /> According to the description in Documentation/core-api/kobject.rst:<br /> - A ktype is the type of object that embeds a kobject. Every structure<br /> that embeds a kobject needs a corresponding ktype.<br /> <br /> So add sanity check to make sure kset-&gt;kobj.ktype is not NULL.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ubi: ubi_wl_put_peb: Fix infinite loop when wear-leveling work failed<br /> <br /> Following process will trigger an infinite loop in ubi_wl_put_peb():<br /> <br /> ubifs_bgt ubi_bgt<br /> ubifs_leb_unmap<br /> ubi_leb_unmap<br /> ubi_eba_unmap_leb<br /> ubi_wl_put_peb wear_leveling_worker<br /> e1 = rb_entry(rb_first(&amp;ubi-&gt;used)<br /> e2 = get_peb_for_wl(ubi)<br /> ubi_io_read_vid_hdr // return err (flash fault)<br /> out_error:<br /> ubi-&gt;move_from = ubi-&gt;move_to = NULL<br /> wl_entry_destroy(ubi, e1)<br /> ubi-&gt;lookuptbl[e-&gt;pnum] = NULL<br /> retry:<br /> e = ubi-&gt;lookuptbl[pnum]; // return NULL<br /> if (e == ubi-&gt;move_from) { // NULL == NULL gets true<br /> goto retry; // infinite loop !!!<br /> <br /> $ top<br /> PID USER PR NI VIRT RES SHR S %CPU %MEM COMMAND<br /> 7676 root 20 0 0 0 0 R 100.0 0.0 ubifs_bgt0_0<br /> <br /> Fix it by:<br /> 1) Letting ubi_wl_put_peb() returns directly if wearl leveling entry has<br /> been removed from &amp;#39;ubi-&gt;lookuptbl&amp;#39;.<br /> 2) Using &amp;#39;ubi-&gt;wl_lock&amp;#39; protecting wl entry deletion to preventing an<br /> use-after-free problem for wl entry in ubi_wl_put_peb().<br /> <br /> Fetch a reproducer in [Link].

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> iommu: Fix error unwind in iommu_group_alloc()<br /> <br /> If either iommu_group_grate_file() fails then the<br /> iommu_group is leaked.<br /> <br /> Destroy it on these error paths.<br /> <br /> Found by kselftest/iommu/iommufd_fail_nth

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ionic: catch failure from devlink_alloc<br /> <br /> Add a check for NULL on the alloc return. If devlink_alloc() fails and<br /> we try to use devlink_priv() on the NULL return, the kernel gets very<br /> unhappy and panics. With this fix, the driver load will still fail,<br /> but at least it won&amp;#39;t panic the kernel.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> drm/amdgpu/gfx: disable gfx9 cp_ecc_error_irq only when enabling legacy gfx ras<br /> <br /> gfx9 cp_ecc_error_irq is only enabled when legacy gfx ras is assert.<br /> So in gfx_v9_0_hw_fini, interrupt disablement for cp_ecc_error_irq<br /> should be executed under such condition, otherwise, an amdgpu_irq_put<br /> calltrace will occur.<br /> <br /> [ 7283.170322] RIP: 0010:amdgpu_irq_put+0x45/0x70 [amdgpu]<br /> [ 7283.170964] RSP: 0018:ffff9a5fc3967d00 EFLAGS: 00010246<br /> [ 7283.170967] RAX: ffff98d88afd3040 RBX: ffff98d89da20000 RCX: 0000000000000000<br /> [ 7283.170969] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff98d89da2bef8 RDI: ffff98d89da20000<br /> [ 7283.170971] RBP: ffff98d89da20000 R08: ffff98d89da2ca18 R09: 0000000000000006<br /> [ 7283.170973] R10: ffffd5764243c008 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000001050<br /> [ 7283.170975] R13: ffff98d89da38978 R14: ffffffff999ae15a R15: ffff98d880130105<br /> [ 7283.170978] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff98d996f00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000<br /> [ 7283.170981] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033<br /> [ 7283.170983] CR2: 00000000f7a9d178 CR3: 00000001c42ea000 CR4: 00000000003506e0<br /> [ 7283.170986] Call Trace:<br /> [ 7283.170988] <br /> [ 7283.170989] gfx_v9_0_hw_fini+0x1c/0x6d0 [amdgpu]<br /> [ 7283.171655] amdgpu_device_ip_suspend_phase2+0x101/0x1a0 [amdgpu]<br /> [ 7283.172245] amdgpu_device_suspend+0x103/0x180 [amdgpu]<br /> [ 7283.172823] amdgpu_pmops_freeze+0x21/0x60 [amdgpu]<br /> [ 7283.173412] pci_pm_freeze+0x54/0xc0<br /> [ 7283.173419] ? __pfx_pci_pm_freeze+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 7283.173425] dpm_run_callback+0x98/0x200<br /> [ 7283.173430] __device_suspend+0x164/0x5f0<br /> <br /> v2: drop gfx11 as it&amp;#39;s fixed in a different solution by retiring cp_ecc_irq funcs(Hawking)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> pwm: lpc32xx: Remove handling of PWM channels<br /> <br /> Because LPC32xx PWM controllers have only a single output which is<br /> registered as the only PWM device/channel per controller, it is known in<br /> advance that pwm-&gt;hwpwm value is always 0. On basis of this fact<br /> simplify the code by removing operations with pwm-&gt;hwpwm, there is no<br /> controls which require channel number as input.<br /> <br /> Even though I wasn&amp;#39;t aware at the time when I forward ported that patch,<br /> this fixes a null pointer dereference as lpc32xx-&gt;chip.pwms is NULL<br /> before devm_pwmchip_add() is called.