In May 2025 the KrebsOnSecurity site suffered a massive DDoS attack of approximately 6.3 Tbps. According to the information reported, it was a brief incident ( approximately 40 to 45 seconds) designed as a test of a new IoT botnet called Aisuru. The magnitude of the attack was unprecedented: it exceeded the 2016 Mirai attack (623 Gbps) by a factor of ten. At the time, the affected entity was under the protection of Google Project Shield (free anti-DDoS service for media), and Google confirmed that this was the largest attack its infrastructure had ever suffered. This incident is a clear example that DDoS attacks are becoming more and more powerful, and can compromise even the most prepared entities, so we will explain in detail the topic of DDoS attacks.
In the era of interconnection and digitization, industrial control systems (ICS) are increasingly exposed to cyber threats. These systems are vital for energy production, manufacturing and critical infrastructure management, and their protection has become an essential priority.
Risk analysis is fundamental in this context, as it allows identifying, assessing and prioritizing the risks that can affect ICS. This process, ranges from technical vulnerabilities to emerging threats, and is crucial for developing effective mitigation and protection strategies.
In this article, the challenges and solutions related to risk analysis in ICS will be explored, as well as the importance of the IEC 62443-3-2 standard in this critical process.
UMAS (Unified Messaging Application Services) is a Schneider Electric (SE) proprietary protocol used to configure and monitor Schneider Electric programmable logic controllers (PLCs). While it is true that the protocol is related to this manufacturer, the use of the protocol is quite widespread in different sectors, especially the energy sector, as is obvious.
The article will focus on the technical breakdown of the protocol and the use of the protocol. The article will also show weaknesses, strengths and some technical vulnerabilities detected in this protocol.
This post presents some lines of action that should be followed to deal with a DrDoS cyberattack based on the PortMapper protocol, describing in detail the prevention, identification and response phases to follow.
This post presents some lines of action that should be followed to deal with a DrDoS cyberattack based on the LDAP protocol, describing in detail the prevention, identification and response phases to follow.
This post presents some lines of action that should be followed to deal with a DrDoS cyberattack based on the QOTD protocol, describing in detail the prevention, identification and response phases to follow.
This post presents some lines of action that should be followed to deal with a DrDoS cyberattack based on the SSDP protocol, describing in detail the prevention, identification and response phases to follow.