CVE-2025-68358

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> btrfs: fix racy bitfield write in btrfs_clear_space_info_full()<br /> <br /> From the memory-barriers.txt document regarding memory barrier ordering<br /> guarantees:<br /> <br /> (*) These guarantees do not apply to bitfields, because compilers often<br /> generate code to modify these using non-atomic read-modify-write<br /> sequences. Do not attempt to use bitfields to synchronize parallel<br /> algorithms.<br /> <br /> (*) Even in cases where bitfields are protected by locks, all fields<br /> in a given bitfield must be protected by one lock. If two fields<br /> in a given bitfield are protected by different locks, the compiler&amp;#39;s<br /> non-atomic read-modify-write sequences can cause an update to one<br /> field to corrupt the value of an adjacent field.<br /> <br /> btrfs_space_info has a bitfield sharing an underlying word consisting of<br /> the fields full, chunk_alloc, and flush:<br /> <br /> struct btrfs_space_info {<br /> struct btrfs_fs_info * fs_info; /* 0 8 */<br /> struct btrfs_space_info * parent; /* 8 8 */<br /> ...<br /> int clamp; /* 172 4 */<br /> unsigned int full:1; /* 176: 0 4 */<br /> unsigned int chunk_alloc:1; /* 176: 1 4 */<br /> unsigned int flush:1; /* 176: 2 4 */<br /> ...<br /> <br /> Therefore, to be safe from parallel read-modify-writes losing a write to<br /> one of the bitfield members protected by a lock, all writes to all the<br /> bitfields must use the lock. They almost universally do, except for<br /> btrfs_clear_space_info_full() which iterates over the space_infos and<br /> writes out found-&gt;full = 0 without a lock.<br /> <br /> Imagine that we have one thread completing a transaction in which we<br /> finished deleting a block_group and are thus calling<br /> btrfs_clear_space_info_full() while simultaneously the data reclaim<br /> ticket infrastructure is running do_async_reclaim_data_space():<br /> <br /> T1 T2<br /> btrfs_commit_transaction<br /> btrfs_clear_space_info_full<br /> data_sinfo-&gt;full = 0<br /> READ: full:0, chunk_alloc:0, flush:1<br /> do_async_reclaim_data_space(data_sinfo)<br /> spin_lock(&amp;space_info-&gt;lock);<br /> if(list_empty(tickets))<br /> space_info-&gt;flush = 0;<br /> READ: full: 0, chunk_alloc:0, flush:1<br /> MOD/WRITE: full: 0, chunk_alloc:0, flush:0<br /> spin_unlock(&amp;space_info-&gt;lock);<br /> return;<br /> MOD/WRITE: full:0, chunk_alloc:0, flush:1<br /> <br /> and now data_sinfo-&gt;flush is 1 but the reclaim worker has exited. This<br /> breaks the invariant that flush is 0 iff there is no work queued or<br /> running. Once this invariant is violated, future allocations that go<br /> into __reserve_bytes() will add tickets to space_info-&gt;tickets but will<br /> see space_info-&gt;flush is set to 1 and not queue the work. After this,<br /> they will block forever on the resulting ticket, as it is now impossible<br /> to kick the worker again.<br /> <br /> I also confirmed by looking at the assembly of the affected kernel that<br /> it is doing RMW operations. For example, to set the flush (3rd) bit to 0,<br /> the assembly is:<br /> andb $0xfb,0x60(%rbx)<br /> and similarly for setting the full (1st) bit to 0:<br /> andb $0xfe,-0x20(%rax)<br /> <br /> So I think this is really a bug on practical systems. I have observed<br /> a number of systems in this exact state, but am currently unable to<br /> reproduce it.<br /> <br /> Rather than leaving this footgun lying around for the future, take<br /> advantage of the fact that there is room in the struct anyway, and that<br /> it is already quite large and simply change the three bitfield members to<br /> bools. This avoids writes to space_info-&gt;full having any effect on<br /> ---truncated---