CVE-2026-43495

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net: wwan: t7xx: validate port_count against message length in t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler<br /> <br /> t7xx_port_enum_msg_handler() uses the modem-supplied port_count field as<br /> a loop bound over port_msg-&gt;data[] without checking that the message buffer<br /> contains sufficient data. A modem sending port_count=65535 in a 12-byte<br /> buffer triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read of up to 262140 bytes.<br /> <br /> Add a sizeof(*port_msg) check before accessing the port message header<br /> fields to guard against undersized messages.<br /> <br /> Add a struct_size() check after extracting port_count and before the loop.<br /> <br /> In t7xx_parse_host_rt_data(), guard the rt_feature header read with a<br /> remaining-buffer check before accessing data_len, validate feat_data_len<br /> against the actual remaining buffer to prevent OOB reads and signed<br /> integer overflow on offset.<br /> <br /> Pass msg_len from both call sites: skb-&gt;len at the DPMAIF path after<br /> skb_pull(), and the validated feat_data_len at the handshake path.