CVE-2026-46043

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv<br /> <br /> rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least<br /> header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used.<br /> <br /> However, payload_size() subtracts both the attacker-controlled BTH pad<br /> field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt-&gt;paylen:<br /> <br /> payload_size = pkt-&gt;paylen - offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt)<br /> - RXE_ICRC_SIZE<br /> <br /> This means a short packet can still make payload_size() underflow even<br /> if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring<br /> header_size(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a<br /> packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave payload_size()<br /> negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users.<br /> <br /> Fix this by validating pkt-&gt;paylen against the full minimum length<br /> required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) +<br /> RXE_ICRC_SIZE.