CVE-2026-63910

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> dma-buf: fix UAF in dma_buf_fd() tracepoint<br /> <br /> Once FD_ADD() returns, the fd is live in the file descriptor table<br /> and a thread sharing that table can close() it before DMA_BUF_TRACE()<br /> runs. The close drops the last reference, __fput() frees the dma_buf,<br /> and the tracepoint then dereferences dmabuf to take dmabuf-&gt;name_lock<br /> -- slab-use-after-free.<br /> <br /> Split FD_ADD() back into get_unused_fd_flags() + fd_install() and<br /> emit the tracepoint between them. While the fdtable slot is reserved<br /> with a NULL file pointer, a racing close() returns -EBADF without<br /> entering __fput(), so the dma_buf stays alive across the trace. Same<br /> approach as commit 2d76319c4cbb ("dma-buf: fix UAF in dma_buf_put()<br /> tracepoint").<br /> <br /> This undoes the FD_ADD() conversion done in commit 34dfce523c90<br /> ("dma: convert dma_buf_fd() to FD_ADD()"); FD_ADD() has no place to<br /> hook the tracepoint safely.