CVE-2026-64445

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in OnAuth()<br /> <br /> OnAuth() has two bugs in the shared-key authentication path.<br /> <br /> When the Privacy bit is set, rtw_wep_decrypt() is called without<br /> verifying that the frame is long enough to contain a valid WEP IV and<br /> ICV. Inside rtw_wep_decrypt(), length is computed as:<br /> <br /> length = len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - iv_len<br /> <br /> and then passed as (length - 4) to crc32_le(). If len is less than<br /> WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + iv_len + icv_len (32 bytes), length - 4 is negative<br /> and, after the implicit cast to size_t, causes crc32_le() to read far<br /> beyond the frame buffer. Add a minimum length check before accessing<br /> the IV field and calling the decryption path.<br /> <br /> When processing a seq=3 response, rtw_get_ie() stores the Challenge<br /> Text IE length in ie_len, but the subsequent memcmp() always reads 128<br /> bytes regardless of ie_len. IEEE 802.11 mandates a challenge text of<br /> exactly 128 bytes; reject any IE whose length field differs, matching<br /> the check already applied to OnAuthClient().