CVE-2026-64527
Gravedad:
Pendiente de análisis
Tipo:
No Disponible / Otro tipo
Fecha de publicación:
25/07/2026
Última modificación:
25/07/2026
Descripción
*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br />
<br />
drm/hyperv: validate VMBus packet size in receive callback<br />
<br />
hyperv_receive_sub() reads msg->vid_hdr.type and dispatches into one<br />
of four message-type branches without knowing how many bytes the host<br />
wrote into hv->recv_buf. The completion path then runs<br />
memcpy(hv->init_buf, msg, VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE), so the consumer that<br />
wakes on wait_for_completion_timeout() can read up to 16 KiB of<br />
residue from a prior message as if it were the response payload.<br />
<br />
Pass bytes_recvd into hyperv_receive_sub() and reject any packet that<br />
does not cover the pipe + synthvid header. A single switch on<br />
msg->vid_hdr.type then computes the type-specific payload size: the<br />
three completion-driving types (SYNTHVID_VERSION_RESPONSE,<br />
SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE, SYNTHVID_VRAM_LOCATION_ACK) fall through<br />
to a shared exit that requires that size before memcpy/complete, while<br />
SYNTHVID_FEATURE_CHANGE validates its own payload and returns before<br />
reading is_dirt_needed. Unknown types are dropped.<br />
<br />
SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE is variable length: the host fills<br />
resolution_count entries, not the full SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT<br />
array. Validate the fixed prefix first so resolution_count can be<br />
read, bound it against the array, then require only the count-sized<br />
array, so the shorter responses the host actually sends are accepted.<br />
<br />
Only run the sub-handler when vmbus_recvpacket() returned success. The<br />
memcpy length is bytes_recvd, which is bounded by VMBUS_MAX_PACKET_SIZE<br />
only on a successful receive; on -ENOBUFS vmbus_recvpacket() instead<br />
reports the required length, which can exceed hv->recv_buf, so copying<br />
bytes_recvd would read and write past the 16 KiB buffers. Gating on the<br />
success return keeps the copy bounded. The nonzero-return path is itself<br />
a malformed-message case and is now logged rather than silently skipped;<br />
channel recovery is not attempted.<br />
<br />
Rejected packets are reported via drm_err_ratelimited() rather than<br />
silently dropped, matching the CoCo-hardened pattern in<br />
hv_kvp_onchannelcallback().
Impacto
Referencias a soluciones, herramientas e información
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/049a6b474823049fe60212f25f26e4b30f44ee8f
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/164dc7bf17609340233c6bf4f66bb7c7008a0511
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/57d5d697642e05d5dd2d40660817765943dd709f
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/588c84b461393ff1998ac7b97b04f953f642e0df
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f87763f47a3c22fb50265a00619ef10f2394b18
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8974d96b6a5496f33dc69a3ce28a7bf5078def4
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f5251226551bfec98c4705641b6f94ff1f238d91



