CVE-2026-64596

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> libfs: set SB_I_NOEXEC and SB_I_NODEV by default in init_pseudo()<br /> <br /> Since commit 1e7ab6f67824 ("anon_inode: rework assertions"),<br /> path_noexec() warns when an anonymous-inode file is mmap&amp;#39;d from a<br /> superblock that has not set SB_I_NOEXEC. dma-buf backs its files this<br /> way and never set the flag, so mmap of any exported buffer trips the<br /> warning on a CONFIG_DEBUG_VFS=y kernel:<br /> <br /> WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 121813 at fs/exec.c:118 path_noexec+0x47/0x50<br /> do_mmap+0x2b5/0x680<br /> vm_mmap_pgoff+0x129/0x210<br /> ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x177/0x240<br /> __x64_sys_mmap+0x33/0x70<br /> <br /> init_pseudo() sets up internal SB_NOUSER mounts that are never<br /> path-reachable. Set both flags here so every pseudo filesystem gets<br /> them by default instead of each caller setting them.<br /> <br /> SB_I_NODEV is inert for unreachable mounts. SB_I_NOEXEC has one<br /> visible effect: an executable mapping of a pseudo-fs fd, such as a<br /> dma-buf, now fails with -EPERM, which is the invariant the assertion<br /> enforces. No in-tree caller maps these executable.<br /> <br /> Reproduce on CONFIG_DEBUG_VFS=y:<br /> <br /> make -C tools/testing/selftests/dmabuf-heaps<br /> sudo ./tools/testing/selftests/dmabuf-heaps/dmabuf-heap -t system