Vulnerabilidades

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> s390/crypto: use vector instructions only if available for ChaCha20<br /> <br /> Commit 349d03ffd5f6 ("crypto: s390 - add crypto library interface for<br /> ChaCha20") added a library interface to the s390 specific ChaCha20<br /> implementation. However no check was added to verify if the required<br /> facilities are installed before branching into the assembler code.<br /> <br /> If compiled into the kernel, this will lead to the following crash,<br /> if vector instructions are not available:<br /> <br /> data exception: 0007 ilc:3 [#1] SMP<br /> Modules linked in:<br /> CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc7+ #11<br /> Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (KVM/Linux)<br /> Krnl PSW : 0704e00180000000 000000001857277a (chacha20_vx+0x32/0x818)<br /> R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3<br /> Krnl GPRS: 0000037f0000000a ffffffffffffff60 000000008184b000 0000000019f5c8e6<br /> 0000000000000109 0000037fffb13c58 0000037fffb13c78 0000000019bb1780<br /> 0000037fffb13c58 0000000019f5c8e6 000000008184b000 0000000000000109<br /> 00000000802d8000 0000000000000109 0000000018571ebc 0000037fffb13718<br /> Krnl Code: 000000001857276a: c07000b1f80b larl %r7,0000000019bb1780<br /> 0000000018572770: a708000a lhi %r0,10<br /> #0000000018572774: e78950000c36 vlm %v24,%v25,0(%r5),0<br /> &gt;000000001857277a: e7a060000806 vl %v26,0(%r6),0<br /> 0000000018572780: e7bf70004c36 vlm %v27,%v31,0(%r7),4<br /> 0000000018572786: e70b00000456 vlr %v0,%v27<br /> 000000001857278c: e71800000456 vlr %v1,%v24<br /> 0000000018572792: e74b00000456 vlr %v4,%v27<br /> Call Trace:<br /> [] chacha20_vx+0x32/0x818<br /> Last Breaking-Event-Address:<br /> [] chacha20_crypt_s390.constprop.0+0x6e/0xd8<br /> ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---<br /> Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b<br /> <br /> Fix this by adding a missing MACHINE_HAS_VX check.<br /> <br /> [agordeev@linux.ibm.com: remove duplicates in commit message]

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> HID: amd_sfh: Fix for shift-out-of-bounds<br /> <br /> Shift operation of &amp;#39;exp&amp;#39; and &amp;#39;shift&amp;#39; variables exceeds the maximum number<br /> of shift values in the u32 range leading to UBSAN shift-out-of-bounds.<br /> <br /> ...<br /> [ 6.120512] UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in drivers/hid/amd-sfh-hid/sfh1_1/amd_sfh_desc.c:149:50<br /> [ 6.120598] shift exponent 104 is too large for 64-bit type &amp;#39;long unsigned int&amp;#39;<br /> [ 6.120659] CPU: 4 PID: 96 Comm: kworker/4:1 Not tainted 6.4.0amd_1-next-20230519-dirty #10<br /> [ 6.120665] Hardware name: AMD Birman-PHX/Birman-PHX, BIOS SFH_with_HPD_SEN.FD 04/05/2023<br /> [ 6.120667] Workqueue: events amd_sfh_work_buffer [amd_sfh]<br /> [ 6.120687] Call Trace:<br /> [ 6.120690] <br /> [ 6.120694] dump_stack_lvl+0x48/0x70<br /> [ 6.120704] dump_stack+0x10/0x20<br /> [ 6.120707] ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x40<br /> [ 6.120716] __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x10f/0x170<br /> [ 6.120720] ? psi_group_change+0x25f/0x4b0<br /> [ 6.120729] float_to_int.cold+0x18/0xba [amd_sfh]<br /> [ 6.120739] get_input_rep+0x57/0x340 [amd_sfh]<br /> [ 6.120748] ? __schedule+0xba7/0x1b60<br /> [ 6.120756] ? __pfx_get_input_rep+0x10/0x10 [amd_sfh]<br /> [ 6.120764] amd_sfh_work_buffer+0x91/0x180 [amd_sfh]<br /> [ 6.120772] process_one_work+0x229/0x430<br /> [ 6.120780] worker_thread+0x4a/0x3c0<br /> [ 6.120784] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 6.120788] kthread+0xf7/0x130<br /> [ 6.120792] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10<br /> [ 6.120795] ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50<br /> [ 6.120804] <br /> ...<br /> <br /> Fix this by adding the condition to validate shift ranges.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> clk: imx: clk-imx8mp: improve error handling in imx8mp_clocks_probe()<br /> <br /> Replace of_iomap() and kzalloc() with devm_of_iomap() and devm_kzalloc()<br /> which can automatically release the related memory when the device<br /> or driver is removed or unloaded to avoid potential memory leak.<br /> <br /> In this case, iounmap(anatop_base) in line 427,433 are removed<br /> as manual release is not required.<br /> <br /> Besides, referring to clk-imx8mq.c, check the return code of<br /> of_clk_add_hw_provider, if it returns negtive, print error info<br /> and unregister hws, which makes the program more robust.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Rejected reason: This CVE ID has been rejected or withdrawn by its CVE Numbering Authority.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> blk-throttle: prevent overflow while calculating wait time<br /> <br /> There is a problem found by code review in tg_with_in_bps_limit() that<br /> &amp;#39;bps_limit * jiffy_elapsed_rnd&amp;#39; might overflow. Fix the problem by<br /> calling mul_u64_u64_div_u64() instead.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> hfs: fix OOB Read in __hfs_brec_find<br /> <br /> Syzbot reported a OOB read bug:<br /> <br /> ==================================================================<br /> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hfs_strcmp+0x117/0x190<br /> fs/hfs/string.c:84<br /> Read of size 1 at addr ffff88807eb62c4e by task kworker/u4:1/11<br /> CPU: 1 PID: 11 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted<br /> 6.1.0-rc6-syzkaller-00308-g644e9524388a #0<br /> Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0)<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]<br /> dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x28e lib/dump_stack.c:106<br /> print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:284<br /> print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:395<br /> kasan_report+0xcd/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:495<br /> hfs_strcmp+0x117/0x190 fs/hfs/string.c:84<br /> __hfs_brec_find+0x213/0x5c0 fs/hfs/bfind.c:75<br /> hfs_brec_find+0x276/0x520 fs/hfs/bfind.c:138<br /> hfs_write_inode+0x34c/0xb40 fs/hfs/inode.c:462<br /> write_inode fs/fs-writeback.c:1440 [inline]<br /> <br /> If the input inode of hfs_write_inode() is incorrect:<br /> struct inode<br /> struct hfs_inode_info<br /> struct hfs_cat_key<br /> struct hfs_name<br /> u8 len # len is greater than HFS_NAMELEN(31) which is the<br /> maximum length of an HFS filename<br /> <br /> OOB read occurred:<br /> hfs_write_inode()<br /> hfs_brec_find()<br /> __hfs_brec_find()<br /> hfs_cat_keycmp()<br /> hfs_strcmp() # OOB read occurred due to len is too large<br /> <br /> Fix this by adding a Check on len in hfs_write_inode() before calling<br /> hfs_brec_find().

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> regulator: core: Prevent integer underflow<br /> <br /> By using a ratio of delay to poll_enabled_time that is not integer<br /> time_remaining underflows and does not exit the loop as expected.<br /> As delay could be derived from DT and poll_enabled_time is defined<br /> in the driver this can easily happen.<br /> <br /> Use a signed iterator to make sure that the loop exits once<br /> the remaining time is negative.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> USB: gadget: Fix the memory leak in raw_gadget driver<br /> <br /> Currently, increasing raw_dev-&gt;count happens before invoke the<br /> raw_queue_event(), if the raw_queue_event() return error, invoke<br /> raw_release() will not trigger the dev_free() to be called.<br /> <br /> [ 268.905865][ T5067] raw-gadget.0 gadget.0: failed to queue event<br /> [ 268.912053][ T5067] udc dummy_udc.0: failed to start USB Raw Gadget: -12<br /> [ 268.918885][ T5067] raw-gadget.0: probe of gadget.0 failed with error -12<br /> [ 268.925956][ T5067] UDC core: USB Raw Gadget: couldn&amp;#39;t find an available UDC or it&amp;#39;s busy<br /> [ 268.934657][ T5067] misc raw-gadget: fail, usb_gadget_register_driver returned -16<br /> <br /> BUG: memory leak<br /> <br /> [] kmalloc_trace+0x24/0x90 mm/slab_common.c:1076<br /> [] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:582 [inline]<br /> [] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:703 [inline]<br /> [] dev_new drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/raw_gadget.c:191 [inline]<br /> [] raw_open+0x45/0x110 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/raw_gadget.c:385<br /> [] misc_open+0x1a9/0x1f0 drivers/char/misc.c:165<br /> <br /> [] kmalloc_trace+0x24/0x90 mm/slab_common.c:1076<br /> [] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:582 [inline]<br /> [] raw_ioctl_init+0xdf/0x410 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/raw_gadget.c:460<br /> [] raw_ioctl+0x5f9/0x1120 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/raw_gadget.c:1250<br /> [] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]<br /> <br /> [] kmalloc_trace+0x24/0x90 mm/slab_common.c:1076<br /> [] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:582 [inline]<br /> [] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:703 [inline]<br /> [] dummy_alloc_request+0x5a/0xe0 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/dummy_hcd.c:665<br /> [] usb_ep_alloc_request+0x22/0xd0 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c:196<br /> [] gadget_bind+0x6d/0x370 drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/raw_gadget.c:292<br /> <br /> This commit therefore invoke kref_get() under the condition that<br /> raw_queue_event() return success.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> riscv: ftrace: Fixup panic by disabling preemption<br /> <br /> In RISCV, we must use an AUIPC + JALR pair to encode an immediate,<br /> forming a jump that jumps to an address over 4K. This may cause errors<br /> if we want to enable kernel preemption and remove dependency from<br /> patching code with stop_machine(). For example, if a task was switched<br /> out on auipc. And, if we changed the ftrace function before it was<br /> switched back, then it would jump to an address that has updated 11:0<br /> bits mixing with previous XLEN:12 part.<br /> <br /> p: patched area performed by dynamic ftrace<br /> ftrace_prologue:<br /> p| REG_S ra, -SZREG(sp)<br /> p| auipc ra, 0x? ------------&gt; preempted<br /> ...<br /> change ftrace function<br /> ...<br /> p| jalr -?(ra)

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ext4: fix use-after-free read in ext4_find_extent for bigalloc + inline<br /> <br /> Syzbot found the following issue:<br /> loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 2048<br /> EXT4-fs (loop0): mounted filesystem 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 without journal. Quota mode: none.<br /> ==================================================================<br /> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_ext_binsearch_idx fs/ext4/extents.c:768 [inline]<br /> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_find_extent+0x76e/0xd90 fs/ext4/extents.c:931<br /> Read of size 4 at addr ffff888073644750 by task syz-executor420/5067<br /> <br /> CPU: 0 PID: 5067 Comm: syz-executor420 Not tainted 6.2.0-rc1-syzkaller #0<br /> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]<br /> dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x290 lib/dump_stack.c:106<br /> print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:306<br /> print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:417<br /> kasan_report+0xcd/0x100 mm/kasan/report.c:517<br /> ext4_ext_binsearch_idx fs/ext4/extents.c:768 [inline]<br /> ext4_find_extent+0x76e/0xd90 fs/ext4/extents.c:931<br /> ext4_clu_mapped+0x117/0x970 fs/ext4/extents.c:5809<br /> ext4_insert_delayed_block fs/ext4/inode.c:1696 [inline]<br /> ext4_da_map_blocks fs/ext4/inode.c:1806 [inline]<br /> ext4_da_get_block_prep+0x9e8/0x13c0 fs/ext4/inode.c:1870<br /> ext4_block_write_begin+0x6a8/0x2290 fs/ext4/inode.c:1098<br /> ext4_da_write_begin+0x539/0x760 fs/ext4/inode.c:3082<br /> generic_perform_write+0x2e4/0x5e0 mm/filemap.c:3772<br /> ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x122/0x3a0 fs/ext4/file.c:285<br /> ext4_file_write_iter+0x1d0/0x18f0<br /> call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2186 [inline]<br /> new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:491 [inline]<br /> vfs_write+0x7dc/0xc50 fs/read_write.c:584<br /> ksys_write+0x177/0x2a0 fs/read_write.c:637<br /> do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]<br /> do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80<br /> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd<br /> RIP: 0033:0x7f4b7a9737b9<br /> RSP: 002b:00007ffc5cac3668 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001<br /> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f4b7a9737b9<br /> RDX: 00000000175d9003 RSI: 0000000020000200 RDI: 0000000000000004<br /> RBP: 00007f4b7a933050 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000<br /> R10: 000000000000079f R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4b7a9330e0<br /> R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000<br /> <br /> <br /> Above issue is happens when enable bigalloc and inline data feature. As<br /> commit 131294c35ed6 fixed delayed allocation bug in ext4_clu_mapped for<br /> bigalloc + inline. But it only resolved issue when has inline data, if<br /> inline data has been converted to extent(ext4_da_convert_inline_data_to_extent)<br /> before writepages, there is no EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA flag. However<br /> i_data is still store inline data in this scene. Then will trigger UAF<br /> when find extent.<br /> To resolve above issue, there is need to add judge "ext4_has_inline_data(inode)"<br /> in ext4_clu_mapped().

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> btrfs: call __btrfs_remove_free_space_cache_locked on cache load failure<br /> <br /> Now that lockdep is staying enabled through our entire CI runs I started<br /> seeing the following stack in generic/475<br /> <br /> ------------[ cut here ]------------<br /> WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 2171864 at fs/btrfs/discard.c:604 btrfs_discard_update_discardable+0x98/0xb0<br /> CPU: 1 PID: 2171864 Comm: kworker/u4:0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc8+ #789<br /> Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014<br /> Workqueue: btrfs-cache btrfs_work_helper<br /> RIP: 0010:btrfs_discard_update_discardable+0x98/0xb0<br /> RSP: 0018:ffffb857c2f7bad0 EFLAGS: 00010246<br /> RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8c85c605c200 RCX: 0000000000000001<br /> RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff86807c5b RDI: ffffffff868a831e<br /> RBP: ffff8c85c4c54000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000<br /> R10: ffff8c85c66932f0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff8c85c3899010<br /> R13: ffff8c85d5be4f40 R14: ffff8c85c4c54000 R15: ffff8c86114bfa80<br /> FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8c863bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000<br /> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033<br /> CR2: 00007f2e7f168160 CR3: 000000010289a004 CR4: 0000000000370ee0<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> __btrfs_remove_free_space_cache+0x27/0x30<br /> load_free_space_cache+0xad2/0xaf0<br /> caching_thread+0x40b/0x650<br /> ? lock_release+0x137/0x2d0<br /> btrfs_work_helper+0xf2/0x3e0<br /> ? lock_is_held_type+0xe2/0x140<br /> process_one_work+0x271/0x590<br /> ? process_one_work+0x590/0x590<br /> worker_thread+0x52/0x3b0<br /> ? process_one_work+0x590/0x590<br /> kthread+0xf0/0x120<br /> ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20<br /> ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30<br /> <br /> This is the code<br /> <br /> ctl = block_group-&gt;free_space_ctl;<br /> discard_ctl = &amp;block_group-&gt;fs_info-&gt;discard_ctl;<br /> <br /> lockdep_assert_held(&amp;ctl-&gt;tree_lock);<br /> <br /> We have a temporary free space ctl for loading the free space cache in<br /> order to avoid having allocations happening while we&amp;#39;re loading the<br /> cache. When we hit an error we free it all up, however this also calls<br /> btrfs_discard_update_discardable, which requires<br /> block_group-&gt;free_space_ctl-&gt;tree_lock to be held. However this is our<br /> temporary ctl so this lock isn&amp;#39;t held. Fix this by calling<br /> __btrfs_remove_free_space_cache_locked instead so that we only clean up<br /> the entries and do not mess with the discardable stats.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ASoC: audio-graph-card: fix refcount leak of cpu_ep in __graph_for_each_link()<br /> <br /> The of_get_next_child() returns a node with refcount incremented, and<br /> decrements the refcount of prev. So in the error path of the while loop,<br /> of_node_put() needs be called for cpu_ep.