Vulnerabilidades

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> usbnet: Prevents free active kevent<br /> <br /> The root cause of this issue are:<br /> 1. When probing the usbnet device, executing usbnet_link_change(dev, 0, 0);<br /> put the kevent work in global workqueue. However, the kevent has not yet<br /> been scheduled when the usbnet device is unregistered. Therefore, executing<br /> free_netdev() results in the "free active object (kevent)" error reported<br /> here.<br /> <br /> 2. Another factor is that when calling usbnet_disconnect()-&gt;unregister_netdev(),<br /> if the usbnet device is up, ndo_stop() is executed to cancel the kevent.<br /> However, because the device is not up, ndo_stop() is not executed.<br /> <br /> The solution to this problem is to cancel the kevent before executing<br /> free_netdev().

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> can: gs_usb: gs_usb_xmit_callback(): fix handling of failed transmitted URBs<br /> <br /> The driver lacks the cleanup of failed transfers of URBs. This reduces the<br /> number of available URBs per error by 1. This leads to reduced performance<br /> and ultimately to a complete stop of the transmission.<br /> <br /> If the sending of a bulk URB fails do proper cleanup:<br /> - increase netdev stats<br /> - mark the echo_sbk as free<br /> - free the driver&amp;#39;s context and do accounting<br /> - wake the send queue

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> drm/msm: make sure last_fence is always updated<br /> <br /> Update last_fence in the vm-bind path instead of kernel managed path.<br /> <br /> last_fence is used to wait for work to finish in vm_bind contexts but not<br /> used for kernel managed contexts.<br /> <br /> This fixes a bug where last_fence is not waited on context close leading<br /> to faults as resources are freed while in use.<br /> <br /> Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/680080/

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> Bluetooth: hci_sock: Prevent race in socket write iter and sock bind<br /> <br /> There is a potential race condition between sock bind and socket write<br /> iter. bind may free the same cmd via mgmt_pending before write iter sends<br /> the cmd, just as syzbot reported in UAF[1].<br /> <br /> Here we use hci_dev_lock to synchronize the two, thereby avoiding the<br /> UAF mentioned in [1].<br /> <br /> [1]<br /> syzbot reported:<br /> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mgmt_pending_remove+0x3b/0x210 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:316<br /> Read of size 8 at addr ffff888077164818 by task syz.0.17/5989<br /> Call Trace:<br /> mgmt_pending_remove+0x3b/0x210 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:316<br /> set_link_security+0x5c2/0x710 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1918<br /> hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719<br /> hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839<br /> sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline]<br /> __sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:742<br /> sock_write_iter+0x279/0x360 net/socket.c:1195<br /> <br /> Allocated by task 5989:<br /> mgmt_pending_add+0x35/0x140 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:296<br /> set_link_security+0x557/0x710 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1910<br /> hci_mgmt_cmd+0x9c9/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1719<br /> hci_sock_sendmsg+0x6ca/0xef0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1839<br /> sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline]<br /> __sock_sendmsg+0x21c/0x270 net/socket.c:742<br /> sock_write_iter+0x279/0x360 net/socket.c:1195<br /> <br /> Freed by task 5991:<br /> mgmt_pending_free net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:311 [inline]<br /> mgmt_pending_foreach+0x30d/0x380 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:257<br /> mgmt_index_removed+0x112/0x2f0 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:9477<br /> hci_sock_bind+0xbe9/0x1000 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1314

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> x86/CPU/AMD: Add RDSEED fix for Zen5<br /> <br /> There&amp;#39;s an issue with RDSEED&amp;#39;s 16-bit and 32-bit register output<br /> variants on Zen5 which return a random value of 0 "at a rate inconsistent<br /> with randomness while incorrectly signaling success (CF=1)". Search the<br /> web for AMD-SB-7055 for more detail.<br /> <br /> Add a fix glue which checks microcode revisions.<br /> <br /> [ bp: Add microcode revisions checking, rewrite. ]

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> fs/namespace: fix reference leak in grab_requested_mnt_ns<br /> <br /> lookup_mnt_ns() already takes a reference on mnt_ns.<br /> grab_requested_mnt_ns() doesn&amp;#39;t need to take an extra reference.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> afs: Fix delayed allocation of a cell&amp;#39;s anonymous key<br /> <br /> The allocation of a cell&amp;#39;s anonymous key is done in a background thread<br /> along with other cell setup such as doing a DNS upcall. In the reported<br /> bug, this is triggered by afs_parse_source() parsing the device name given<br /> to mount() and calling afs_lookup_cell() with the name of the cell.<br /> <br /> The normal key lookup then tries to use the key description on the<br /> anonymous authentication key as the reference for request_key() - but it<br /> may not yet be set and so an oops can happen.<br /> <br /> This has been made more likely to happen by the fix for dynamic lookup<br /> failure.<br /> <br /> Fix this by firstly allocating a reference name and attaching it to the<br /> afs_cell record when the record is created. It can share the memory<br /> allocation with the cell name (unfortunately it can&amp;#39;t just overlap the cell<br /> name by prepending it with "afs@" as the cell name already has a &amp;#39;.&amp;#39;<br /> prepended for other purposes). This reference name is then passed to<br /> request_key().<br /> <br /> Secondly, the anon key is now allocated on demand at the point a key is<br /> requested in afs_request_key() if it is not already allocated. A mutex is<br /> used to prevent multiple allocation for a cell.<br /> <br /> Thirdly, make afs_request_key_rcu() return NULL if the anonymous key isn&amp;#39;t<br /> yet allocated (if we need it) and then the caller can return -ECHILD to<br /> drop out of RCU-mode and afs_request_key() can be called.<br /> <br /> Note that the anonymous key is kind of necessary to make the key lookup<br /> cache work as that doesn&amp;#39;t currently cache a negative lookup, but it&amp;#39;s<br /> probably worth some investigation to see if NULL can be used instead.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net: atlantic: fix fragment overflow handling in RX path<br /> <br /> The atlantic driver can receive packets with more than MAX_SKB_FRAGS (17)<br /> fragments when handling large multi-descriptor packets. This causes an<br /> out-of-bounds write in skb_add_rx_frag_netmem() leading to kernel panic.<br /> <br /> The issue occurs because the driver doesn&amp;#39;t check the total number of<br /> fragments before calling skb_add_rx_frag(). When a packet requires more<br /> than MAX_SKB_FRAGS fragments, the fragment index exceeds the array bounds.<br /> <br /> Fix by assuming there will be an extra frag if buff-&gt;len &gt; AQ_CFG_RX_HDR_SIZE,<br /> then all fragments are accounted for. And reusing the existing check to<br /> prevent the overflow earlier in the code path.<br /> <br /> This crash occurred in production with an Aquantia AQC113 10G NIC.<br /> <br /> Stack trace from production environment:<br /> ```<br /> RIP: 0010:skb_add_rx_frag_netmem+0x29/0xd0<br /> Code: 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 41 89<br /> ca 48 89 d7 48 63 ce 8b 90 c0 00 00 00 48 c1 e1 04 48 01 ca 48 03 90<br /> c8 00 00 00 89 7a 30 44 89 52 3c 44 89 42 38 40 f6 c7 01 75 74 48<br /> 89 fa 83<br /> RSP: 0018:ffffa9bec02a8d50 EFLAGS: 00010287<br /> RAX: ffff925b22e80a00 RBX: ffff925ad38d2700 RCX:<br /> fffffffe0a0c8000<br /> RDX: ffff9258ea95bac0 RSI: ffff925ae0a0c800 RDI:<br /> 0000000000037a40<br /> RBP: 0000000000000024 R08: 0000000000000000 R09:<br /> 0000000000000021<br /> R10: 0000000000000848 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:<br /> ffffa9bec02a8e24<br /> R13: ffff925ad8615570 R14: 0000000000000000 R15:<br /> ffff925b22e80a00<br /> FS: 0000000000000000(0000)<br /> GS:ffff925e47880000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000<br /> CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033<br /> CR2: ffff9258ea95baf0 CR3: 0000000166022004 CR4:<br /> 0000000000f72ef0<br /> PKRU: 55555554<br /> Call Trace:<br /> <br /> aq_ring_rx_clean+0x175/0xe60 [atlantic]<br /> ? aq_ring_rx_clean+0x14d/0xe60 [atlantic]<br /> ? aq_ring_tx_clean+0xdf/0x190 [atlantic]<br /> ? kmem_cache_free+0x348/0x450<br /> ? aq_vec_poll+0x81/0x1d0 [atlantic]<br /> ? __napi_poll+0x28/0x1c0<br /> ? net_rx_action+0x337/0x420<br /> ```<br /> <br /> Changes in v4:<br /> - Add Fixes: tag to satisfy patch validation requirements.<br /> <br /> Changes in v3:<br /> - Fix by assuming there will be an extra frag if buff-&gt;len &gt; AQ_CFG_RX_HDR_SIZE,<br /> then all fragments are accounted for.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net: sxgbe: fix potential NULL dereference in sxgbe_rx()<br /> <br /> Currently, when skb is null, the driver prints an error and then<br /> dereferences skb on the next line.<br /> <br /> To fix this, let&amp;#39;s add a &amp;#39;break&amp;#39; after the error message to switch<br /> to sxgbe_rx_refill(), which is similar to the approach taken by the<br /> other drivers in this particular case, e.g. calxeda with xgmac_rx().<br /> <br /> Found during a code review.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> platform/x86: intel: punit_ipc: fix memory corruption<br /> <br /> This passes the address of the pointer "&amp;punit_ipcdev" when the intent<br /> was to pass the pointer itself "punit_ipcdev" (without the ampersand).<br /> This means that the:<br /> <br /> complete(&amp;ipcdev-&gt;cmd_complete);<br /> <br /> in intel_punit_ioc() will write to a wrong memory address corrupting it.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> Bluetooth: hci_core: lookup hci_conn on RX path on protocol side<br /> <br /> The hdev lock/lookup/unlock/use pattern in the packet RX path doesn&amp;#39;t<br /> ensure hci_conn* is not concurrently modified/deleted. This locking<br /> appears to be leftover from before conn_hash started using RCU<br /> commit bf4c63252490b ("Bluetooth: convert conn hash to RCU")<br /> and not clear if it had purpose since then.<br /> <br /> Currently, there are code paths that delete hci_conn* from elsewhere<br /> than the ordered hdev-&gt;workqueue where the RX work runs in. E.g.<br /> commit 5af1f84ed13a ("Bluetooth: hci_sync: Fix UAF on hci_abort_conn_sync")<br /> introduced some of these, and there probably were a few others before<br /> it. It&amp;#39;s better to do the locking so that even if these run<br /> concurrently no UAF is possible.<br /> <br /> Move the lookup of hci_conn and associated socket-specific conn to<br /> protocol recv handlers, and do them within a single critical section<br /> to cover hci_conn* usage and lookup.<br /> <br /> syzkaller has reported a crash that appears to be this issue:<br /> <br /> [Task hdev-&gt;workqueue] [Task 2]<br /> hci_disconnect_all_sync<br /> l2cap_recv_acldata(hcon)<br /> hci_conn_get(hcon)<br /> hci_abort_conn_sync(hcon)<br /> hci_dev_lock<br /> hci_dev_lock<br /> hci_conn_del(hcon)<br /> v-------------------------------- hci_dev_unlock<br /> hci_conn_put(hcon)<br /> conn = hcon-&gt;l2cap_data (UAF)

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> mm/huge_memory: fix NULL pointer deference when splitting folio<br /> <br /> Commit c010d47f107f ("mm: thp: split huge page to any lower order pages")<br /> introduced an early check on the folio&amp;#39;s order via mapping-&gt;flags before<br /> proceeding with the split work.<br /> <br /> This check introduced a bug: for shmem folios in the swap cache and<br /> truncated folios, the mapping pointer can be NULL. Accessing<br /> mapping-&gt;flags in this state leads directly to a NULL pointer dereference.<br /> <br /> This commit fixes the issue by moving the check for mapping != NULL before<br /> any attempt to access mapping-&gt;flags.