Vulnerabilities

A flaw was found in the community.general Ansible collection&amp;#39;s nexmo module.<br /> The module constructs HTTP requests to the Vonage/Nexmo SMS API by encoding<br /> API credentials (api_key and api_secret) into URL query parameters and<br /> sending them via GET requests. This causes credentials to be exposed in web<br /> server access logs, proxy logs, HTTP Referer headers, and network monitoring<br /> tools, despite the Ansible argument specification marking these parameters<br /> as no_log. An attacker with access to any of these logging or monitoring<br /> points can obtain the full API credentials and gain unauthorized access to<br /> the victim&amp;#39;s Vonage/Nexmo account.

Module: plugins/modules/keyring_info.py <br /> <br /> CVSS 3.1: 5.5 MEDIUM — AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N <br /> <br /> Issue: The module retrieves a passphrase from the OS native keyring (GNOME Keyring, macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager) and places it directly into result["passphrase"] with no output suppression, no no_log protection, and no documentation warning. <br /> <br /> Root Cause:<br /> <br /> Line 105 (protected): keyring_password=dict(type="str", required=True, no_log=True)<br /> Line 127 (NOT protected): result["passphrase"] = passphrase<br /> <br /> Observed Output:<br /> <br /> {<br /> "changed": false,<br /> "passphrase": "MyMasterP@ssw0rd!SSH_Key_Secret"<br /> }<br /> Visible via register + debug:<br /> {<br /> "keyring_result": {<br /> "changed": false,<br /> "passphrase": "MyMasterP@ssw0rd!SSH_Key_Secret"<br /> }<br /> }<br /> <br /> Impact: <br /> <br /> Master passwords, SSH key passphrases and service credentials appear in all Ansible output <br /> <br /> register: keyring_result followed by debug: var=keyring_result prints passphrase in full <br /> <br /> Ansible fact caching backends (Redis, JSON file, memcached) may persist the passphrase <br /> <br /> AWX/Tower job logs silently store the live credential<br /> <br /> Fix:<br /> <br /> module.exit_json(changed=False, passphrase=passphrase, _ansible_no_log=True)<br /> <br /> Also add a documentation warning requiring callers to use no_log: true at the task level.<br /> <br /> PoCs<br /> <br /> <br /> Fig 1: PoC execution showing passphrase in plaintext output<br /> <br /> <br /> Fig 2: Source code showing no_log=True on input (line 105) vs unprotected output (line 127)

A missing authorization vulnerability was found in the Event-Driven Ansible (EDA) websocket API. The /api/eda/ws/ansible-rulebook endpoint does not verify user permissions when processing Worker messages. Any authenticated user can send a forged message with an arbitrary activation_id to receive plaintext credentials associated with that activation, including OAuth tokens, vault passwords, and SSH keys.

A flaw was found in the foreman-mcp-server. A session management vulnerability in the MCP Server allows unauthenticated attackers to hijack active administrative sessions due to an improper cache of authenticated client connections, by trusting a non-secret session ID without re-validating authentication tokens and by logging all newly created session IDs to standard logs. This issue can result in privilege escalation and infrastructure-wide code execution.

Traefik is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. From 3.7.0-ea.1 until 3.7.5, there is a medium severity vulnerability in Traefik&amp;#39;s Kubernetes Ingress NGINX provider that causes affected routes to fail open. When an Ingress explicitly enables BasicAuth or DigestAuth through the supported nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/auth-type and auth-secret annotations, but the referenced auth Secret cannot be resolved or parsed, Traefik logs the resolution error, skips installing the authentication middleware, and still emits a router to the backend service. A route that operators intended to protect is therefore published to the data plane without its authentication control, allowing unauthenticated access to the backend. The trigger is an invalid or unresolved auth dependency — a missing, malformed, unreadable, or policy-denied Secret — rather than an intentionally unprotected route. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.5.

Traefik is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. Prior to 3.6.21 and 3.7.5, there is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik&amp;#39;s Kubernetes Gateway provider affecting the crossProviderNamespaces allowlist. For HTTPRoute rules that declare multiple (WRR) backendRefs, Traefik evaluates the allowlist against the target backendRef.namespace instead of the route&amp;#39;s own namespace. As a result, an HTTPRoute created in a namespace that is not allow-listed can reference a cross-provider TraefikService such as api@internal, dashboard@internal or rest@internal by pointing backendRef.namespace at an allow-listed namespace covered by a Gateway API ReferenceGrant, exposing internal Traefik services on the data plane. Exploitation requires the ability to create an accepted HTTPRoute and a matching ReferenceGrant from an allow-listed namespace; it does not require any change to Traefik static configuration, RBAC, or the deployment itself. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.6.21 and 3.7.5.

Pi is a minimal terminal coding harness. From 0.74.0 until 0.78.1, Pi stored API keys and OAuth credentials in auth.json. A race condition in the file write path could briefly create or rewrite this file with permissions derived from the process umask before tightening the file to owner-only permissions. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.78.1.

Traefik is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. Prior to 3.7.3, there is a critical vulnerability in Traefik&amp;#39;s HTTP/3 (QUIC) TLS configuration selection that allows unauthenticated clients to bypass router-specific mTLS enforcement. When HTTP/3 is enabled on an entrypoint, the TLS handshake selects the applicable TLS configuration through an exact, case-sensitive lookup on the SNI value, which fails to match wildcard host patterns (e.g., *.example.com) or case variants of the configured hostname. Because the handshake falls back to the default TLS configuration — which may not require client certificates — a client can complete the QUIC handshake without presenting a certificate, while the subsequent HTTP routing layer still dispatches the request to a backend protected by a router-specific mTLS policy. The issue affects deployments where HTTP/3 is enabled, a router uses a wildcard Host rule or case-insensitive hostname matching, a router-specific TLSOptions enforces client certificate authentication, and UDP access to the entrypoint is reachable by an attacker. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.3.

Traefik is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. From 3.7.0 until 3.7.3, there is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik&amp;#39;s domain-fronting protection (SNICheck) that allows an unauthenticated client to bypass mutual TLS enforced through wildcard router TLSOptions. When a router uses a wildcard host rule such as Host(*.example.com) with stricter TLS options (for example RequireAndVerifyClientCert), SNICheck resolves the TLS options for the HTTP Host header using exact map lookups only and never applies wildcard matching. If another permissive SNI is served on the same entrypoint, an attacker can complete the TLS handshake under the permissive options and then send an HTTP Host header targeting the wildcard-protected backend, reaching it without presenting a client certificate. This affects the regular HTTPS / HTTP-2 path and does not require HTTP/3. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.3.

rtk filters and compresses command outputs before they reach your LLM context. Prior to 0.32.0, RTK (Rust Token Killer) improperly trusts project-local configuration files. RTK automatically loads .rtk/filters.toml from the working directory with highest priority and without user notification. An attacker can place a malicious filter file in a repository to apply regex-based modifications (e.g., strip_lines_matching) to shell command output before it is shown to the LLM, without any indication that the output has been modified. This allows attackers to selectively suppress or alter command output (including file contents, diffs, and security scan results) without detection, potentially concealing malicious code during AI-assisted development or review. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.32.0.

Traefik is an HTTP reverse proxy and load balancer. Prior to 2.11.48, 3.6.19, and 3.7.3, there is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik&amp;#39;s StripPrefix middleware that allows an unauthenticated attacker to bypass route-level authentication and authorization. When a public router matches on a PathPrefix rule and applies the StripPrefix middleware, a request path containing .. or its percent-encoded form %2e%2e can match the public route at routing time and then, after the prefix is stripped and the path is normalized, resolve to a path served by a separate, authenticated router. As a result, an attacker can reach protected backend paths — such as admin or internal configuration endpoints — without satisfying the authentication middleware attached to the protected router. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.11.48, 3.6.19, and 3.7.3.

Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes vulnerability in ash-project ash allows a user to set the value of a private action argument that is intended to be controlled only by trusted server-side code.<br /> <br /> Action arguments declared with public?: false are meant to be set internally (for example via Ash.Changeset.set_private_argument/3) and must not be settable from end-user input. When a changeset is built from a parameter map, Ash filters out private arguments, but the filtering is incomplete.<br /> <br /> In the regular changeset path (for_create, for_update, for_destroy), private arguments are stripped only when the parameter key is an atom. When the key is a binary (string), as is the case for user-supplied parameters, the private argument is kept and the user controls its value. In the atomic path (Ash.Changeset.fully_atomic_changeset/4, also reached through atomic and bulk updates), private arguments are not stripped at all, regardless of whether the key is an atom or a binary.<br /> <br /> An attacker who can submit parameters to an action that defines a private argument can therefore inject a value for that argument. Depending on how the application uses the argument (for example an acting_user_id driving authorization or record ownership), this can lead to an integrity violation or privilege escalation.<br /> <br /> This issue affects ash: from 3.0.0 before 3.29.3.