Vulnerabilidades

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Missing authorization check in the upload_azure, upload_sftp, and upload_smb VQL plugins allows an authenticated analyst-role user can initiate attacker-controlled outbound network connections from the Velociraptor server, bypassing the NETWORK ACL permission boundary. This enables internal network reconnaissance via port oracle and potential data exfiltration to external endpoints.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** A caller-supplied X-Grafana-URL request header controls the destination of mcp-grafana's outbound requests, and the grafana_api_request tool lets the caller also choose the HTTP method, path, and body. Because the destination is not restricted to the configured Grafana instance, a caller can direct requests at internal, loopback, and link-local network services (including metadata endpoints) and read the responses, resulting in server-side request forgery. The fix for CVE-2026-15583 prevented the configured service-account token from being sent to unintended destinations but did not restrict the destinations themselves.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** The USB DFU class implementation in Zephyr&amp;#39;s new (experimental) device_next USB device stack contains a NULL pointer dereference in handle_download() (subsys/usb/device_next/class/usbd_dfu.c). The handler computes MIN(setup-&gt;wLength, buf-&gt;len) and passes buf-&gt;data to the image write callback without checking that the buf net_buf pointer is non-NULL.<br /> <br /> The handler is reached over the USB control endpoint, driven by the USB host. For a DFU_DNLOAD (download) request with no Data OUT stage — notably the zero-length terminating download that the DFU protocol uses to end a firmware transfer — the USB core invokes the class handler with a NULL buffer. After the device has been advanced to the DFU_DNLOAD_IDLE state (by sending one valid download block and a GET_STATUS), a zero-length DFU_DNLOAD reaches handle_download() with buf == NULL, dereferencing it.<br /> <br /> The result is a NULL+offset read that triggers a fatal CPU fault, i.e. a denial of service (device crash/reset). The attacker is whatever controls the USB host the device is attached to; DFU download support must be enabled with a registered image. There is no memory corruption or information disclosure — impact is limited to availability. The fix adds an explicit if (buf != NULL) guard so the callback receives a zero-length, NULL-data transfer instead of crashing.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** The USB device-side CDC NCM class control-to-host handler usbd_cdc_ncm_cth in subsys/usb/device_next/class/usbd_cdc_ncm.c builds a fixed-size response for the GET_NTB_PARAMETERS (28-byte struct ntb_parameters) and GET_NTB_INPUT_SIZE (8-byte struct ntb_input_size) class requests and copies the whole structure into the control DATA IN buffer with net_buf_add_mem(buf, ..., sizeof(...)), ignoring the host-supplied wLength.<br /> <br /> The control DATA IN buffer is allocated by the USB stack with a capacity of exactly wLength bytes (usbd_ep_ctrl_data_in_alloc -&gt; udc_ctrl_data_alloc -&gt; net_buf_alloc_len(&amp;udc_ep_pool, wLength); no round-up is applied for the IN endpoint). Because net_buf_add_mem/net_buf_simple_add only bounds the copy with an __ASSERT_NO_MSG, which is compiled out in production builds, a host that issues one of these standard CDC NCM control requests with a wLength smaller than the response structure (e.g. wLength = 1) causes the handler to memcpy up to 27 bytes past the end of the allocated pool buffer.<br /> <br /> The request fields come straight from the USB SETUP packet, so any host (or USB interposer) the Zephyr device enumerates against can trigger the overflow with no authentication once an image built with the device_next USB stack and the CDC NCM class is connected. The out-of-bounds write corrupts adjacent allocations and metadata in the shared udc_ep_pool, primarily causing memory corruption and denial of service of the USB stack; the overflow length is bounded (wLength), matching the existing CDC ACM handler.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Path traversal in server import and admin file upload in Crafty Controller. Allows a remote, authenticated attacker to upload files to arbitrary paths permitted to the Crafty Controller application and perform remote code execution.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** The Realtek BEE Bluetooth HCI driver&amp;#39;s send callback, bt_hci_bee_send() in drivers/bluetooth/hci/hci_bee.c, violated the bt_hci_driver_api buffer-ownership contract. That contract requires the driver to consume (unref) the transmit net_buf only on success; on an error return the host caller retains ownership and unrefs the buffer itself. The pre-fix code routed all error paths through a shared cleanup label that unconditionally called net_buf_unref(buf) before returning the error code.<br /> <br /> Because the host TX paths (in subsys/bluetooth/host/hci_core.c) unref the buffer again after send() returns an error, the buffer is freed twice: the driver returns it to its net_buf pool and the host then unrefs the already-freed buffer, corrupting the shared pool / underflowing the reference count (CWE-415). The same error branch additionally dereferenced buf-&gt;len inside a LOG_ERR call after the buffer had already been unref&amp;#39;d, a read of freed memory (CWE-416) that is compiled in at the default error log level.<br /> <br /> The failing edges are reached when the controller&amp;#39;s host-to-controller buffer allocation fails or the controller send fails (resource-exhaustion / IO conditions). A remote Bluetooth peer can push the device toward these conditions indirectly by driving heavy host transmit activity, at which point the double-free corrupts the host net_buf pool and most likely crashes the device, with residual potential for further memory corruption. The impact is confined to builds using this specific Realtek BEE HCI driver.<br /> <br /> The fix returns early from each error path without unreffing and unrefs the buffer only on the success path, restoring the ownership contract and eliminating both the double-free and the use-after-free read.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Travel Agency Management System developed by Win Men Intermational has a SQL Injection vulnerability. Unauthenticated remote attackers can inject arbitrary SQL commands to read, modify, and delete database contents.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** The Kirki – Freeform Page Builder, Website Builder &amp; Customizer plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the post_meta Shortcode in all versions up to, and including, 6.2.0 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** The Bluetooth HCI driver for Bouffalo Lab on-chip BLE controllers (BL60x/BL70x/BL61x), bt_bflb_send() in drivers/bluetooth/hci/hci_bflb.c, violates the bt_hci_driver_api.send() buffer-ownership contract. That contract (documented at include/zephyr/drivers/bluetooth.h) requires the buffer reference to be consumed only on success; on error the caller still owns the reference and unrefs it. The driver instead routed all error paths through a shared label that unconditionally called net_buf_unref(buf) before returning the error code, consuming the buffer on failure as well.<br /> <br /> When send() returns an error, the host TX path (send_buf() in subsys/bluetooth/host/conn.c) unrefs the same buffer again, believing it still owns it. This double-unref over-decrements the net_buf reference count. Because the buffer is a TX fragment whose destroy callback also decrements its still-queued parent buffer, the parent is freed prematurely while reachable on the connection TX queue, producing a use-after-free and corruption of the shared net_buf pool rather than a benign leak.<br /> <br /> The error conditions are on the host-to-controller transmit path (controller send failure, or an unsupported H:4 packet type), so they are not driven directly by attacker-supplied radio bytes; a remote/adjacent peer can influence them only indirectly, e.g. by inducing controller TX failures under heavy link load. The consequence when reached is BLE-stack denial of service (crash / pool corruption) with possible further memory corruption, bounded to devices using one of these Bouffalo Lab on-chip controllers.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** On the Zephyr ARM port, enabling the hardware FPU (CONFIG_FPU) forces the "Floating point ABI" choice, which defaults to CONFIG_FP_HARDABI. Both FP_HARDABI and FP_SOFTABI permit the compiler to emit hardware FP instructions in any function, even code that never uses floating-point types. However, the callee-saved FP registers (s16-s31 / d8-d15) are only saved and restored across a context switch when CONFIG_FPU_SHARING is enabled (arch/arm/core/cortex_m/swap_helper.S and arch/arm/core/cortex_a_r/swap_helper.S), and prior to this fix selecting an ABI did not enable FPU register sharing, which defaults off.<br /> <br /> In a build that enables the FPU with the default ABI but leaves CONFIG_FPU_SHARING disabled, the kernel preserves no callee-saved FP register state across thread switches. The documented precondition for this "unshared" mode — that only a single thread ever executes FP instructions — is silently violated because the compiler may generate FP instructions in every thread.<br /> <br /> Under CONFIG_USERSPACE, where threads are mutually isolated, this becomes an information-disclosure boundary crossing: a victim thread can leave secret-derived values in s16-s31, and a co-resident unprivileged thread can read those registers directly (FP register access is not privilege-gated), recovering data left behind by another thread. Without userspace the same defect causes cross-thread FP state corruption (a correctness fault). The leak is bounded to the 16 callee-saved single-precision registers and is opportunistic, so impact is low.<br /> <br /> The fix makes FP_HARDABI and FP_SOFTABI select CONFIG_FPU_SHARING and tags every thread with K_FP_REGS at creation, so callee-saved FP state is always preserved across context switches whenever the compiler may emit FP instructions.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Untrusted Pointer Dereference in ASUS GPU Tweak III, GPUTweakII, AI Suite3, and VGAdll: An IOCTL vulnerability allows a local attacker to write a specific value to an arbitrary memory address, potentially leading to privilege escalation.<br /> Refer to the &amp;#39; <br /> Security Update for ASUS GPU Tweak III, GPU Tweak II, AI Suite 3, and Armoury Crate Security Bulletin   &amp;#39; section on the ASUS Security Advisory for more information.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Chiline Cloud developed by Inventec Appliances has a Insecure Direct Object Reference vulnerability. Unauthenticated remote attackers can modify a specific parameter to read other users&amp;#39; sensitive data.