Vulnerabilidades

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Subscriber SQL Injection in Community by PeepSo

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Joomla Extension - balbooa.com - Pre-auth Payment Amount Tampering in Balbooa Forms

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Joomla Extension - balbooa.com - Pre-auth PHP Code Injection in Balbooa Forms

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Vulnerability in NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway.<br /> <br /> This issue affects ADC: from 14.1 through 73.32 and from 13.1 through 63.21; Gateway: from 14.1 through 73.32 and from 13.1 through 63.21.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Vulnerability in NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway.<br /> <br /> This issue affects ADC: from 14.1 through 73.32 and from 13.1 through 63.21; Gateway: from 14.1 through 73.32 and from 13.1 through 63.21.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** CSS injection vulnerability in M-Files Web before 26.8.16330.2 allows an authenticated vault administrator to inject arbitrary CSS, affecting the web user interface displayed to other vault users.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** HTML injection vulnerability in M-Files Web before 26.8.16330.2 allows an authenticated attacker to affect web user interface contents displayed to other users.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In Eclipse OpenJ9 versions up to 0.60, a crafted .class file with deeply nested annotations causes a segmentation fault.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** A flaw was found in mod_cluster&amp;#39;s AdvertiseListenerImpl (org.jboss.modcluster core module). A single crafted UDP multicast datagram with a valid HTTP status line and a "Server:" header but without the "Date:", "Digest:", and "Sequence:" headers triggers a NullPointerException in verifyDigest() that is not caught by the worker thread&amp;#39;s exception handler. This causes the advertise listener thread to terminate permanently. The failure is silent (isListening() continues to return true) and persists until the node is restarted. The crash occurs before the AdvertiseSecurityKey comparison, so deployments with a configured security key are still affected.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** AIL Framework contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in its crawler submission functionality. A low-privileged authenticated user with access to the crawler interface can submit an arbitrary URL for crawling without adequate validation of the destination host.<br /> <br /> <br /> The crawler can therefore be instructed to make direct HTTP(S) requests to addresses that should not be reachable by application users, including loopback addresses, RFC1918 private networks, link-local addresses, and cloud metadata services such as 169.254.169.254.<br /> <br /> <br /> Manual crawler tasks bypass the existing domain blacklist because they are assigned a non-zero priority, and ordinary IP literals are classified as web targets and fetched directly rather than through Tor or another proxy. Consequently, an attacker can use the AIL server as a network pivot to access services available from the server&amp;#39;s network context.<br /> <br /> <br /> Responses generated by these requests, including captured HTML, screenshots, and HAR data, can subsequently be accessed through the crawler interface. This makes the SSRF non-blind and may allow an attacker to disclose sensitive internal application data, service information, or cloud instance metadata and credentials.<br /> <br /> <br /> The patch introduces validation that resolves crawler destinations and rejects URLs resolving to non-global IP addresses, addressing localhost, private-network, and link-local targets.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** An out-of-bounds read vulnerability was found in swtpm&amp;#39;s SWTPM_NVRAM_CheckHeader() function. The entry guard checks the buffer length against sizeof(bh), where bh is a pointer, instead of sizeof(*bh), the actual struct size. This allows an undersized buffer to pass validation, causing a 2-byte heap overread on 64-bit systems (6 bytes on 32-bit) when accessing the totlen field. This may cause daemon termination on some platforms and leaks heap data to the log.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify.<br /> <br /> verify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed.<br /> <br /> A provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token.