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Vulnerabilidades

Con el objetivo de informar, advertir y ayudar a los profesionales sobre las últimas vulnerabilidades de seguridad en sistemas tecnológicos, ponemos a disposición de los usuarios interesados en esta información una base de datos con información en castellano sobre cada una de las últimas vulnerabilidades documentadas y conocidas.

Este repositorio con más de 75.000 registros esta basado en la información de NVD (National Vulnerability Database) – en función de un acuerdo de colaboración – por el cual desde INCIBE realizamos la traducción al castellano de la información incluida. En ocasiones este listado mostrará vulnerabilidades que aún no han sido traducidas debido a que se recogen en el transcurso del tiempo en el que el equipo de INCIBE realiza el proceso de traducción.

Se emplea el estándar de nomenclatura de vulnerabilidades CVE (Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures), con el fin de facilitar el intercambio de información entre diferentes bases de datos y herramientas. Cada una de las vulnerabilidades recogidas enlaza a diversas fuentes de información así como a parches disponibles o soluciones aportadas por los fabricantes y desarrolladores. Es posible realizar búsquedas avanzadas teniendo la opción de seleccionar diferentes criterios como el tipo de vulnerabilidad, fabricante, tipo de impacto entre otros, con el fin de acortar los resultados.

Mediante suscripción RSS o Boletines podemos estar informados diariamente de las últimas vulnerabilidades incorporadas al repositorio.

CVE-2026-71289
Fecha de publicación:
05/08/2026
Idioma:
Inglés
*** Pendiente de traducción *** The NASA-AMMOS Asynchronous Network Management System (ANMS) reference implementation's default docker-compose.yml publishes the amp-manager service's REST API directly to the host network interface (port 8089, e.g. "${ION_MGR_PORT:-8089}:8089/tcp") with cap_add: NET_ADMIN, NET_RAW, SYS_NICE, bypassing the CAM (Configuration and Access Manager) gateway that is otherwise the system's sole authentication boundary. The underlying REST server, implemented with CivetWeb in JHUAPL/dtnma-tools (src/refdm/nm_rest.c), is configured with enable_auth_domain_check set to "no" and registers every route, including the DTNMA agent command-dispatch endpoints (.../agents/{eid|idx}/send, which accept and forward EXECSET-encoded command sets to a registered DTNMA agent), with a null authentication callback. Any network-reachable client can therefore enumerate registered agents, submit arbitrary command sets to them, and clear stored reports, entirely without credentials. This affects NASA-AMMOS/anms and JHUAPL-DTNMA/dtnma-tools as published; both repositories present this as a reference/ground DTN network-management implementation and testbed, and the affected components communicate with DTNMA agents (which may represent simulated or real spacecraft/ground nodes depending on deployment) rather than being flight software running onboard a spacecraft.
Gravedad CVSS v3.1: CRÍTICA
Última modificación:
05/08/2026

CVE-2026-71291
Fecha de publicación:
05/08/2026
Idioma:
Inglés
*** Pendiente de traducción *** Bolt CMS renders content field values through Twig's full application-level Environment with no SandboxExtension registered anywhere in the codebase. In src/Entity/Field.php, getTwigValue() calls shouldBeRenderedAsTwig(), which gates rendering only on the field definition's allow_twig flag and a regex checking for `{{`, `{%`, or `{#`; when true, the raw field value is compiled and rendered via `self::getTwig()->createTemplate($value)->render(['record' => $this->getContent()])` with no sandboxing. Bolt's own bundled config/bolt/contenttypes.yaml sets `allow_twig: true` on the default "pages" contenttype's content field out of the box. Any user with edit access to that content type (a standard editor role, not just an administrator) can inject a Twig payload such as `{{ ['id']|map('passthru')|join }}` that executes arbitrary OS commands when the content is saved and rendered, achieving remote code execution as the web server user.
Gravedad CVSS v3.1: ALTA
Última modificación:
05/08/2026

CVE-2026-71292
Fecha de publicación:
05/08/2026
Idioma:
Inglés
*** Pendiente de traducción *** Subrion CMS's admin grid sorting helper, _gridGetSorting() in includes/classes/ia.base.controller.admin.php, whitelists the `dir` (ASC/DESC) request parameter via in_array(), but falls back to the raw, attacker-supplied `sort` GET parameter whenever the requested key is not present in the per-controller $_gridSorting whitelist array: `$column = isset($this->_gridSorting[$params['sort']]) ? ... : $params['sort'];`, which is then placed into `sprintf(' ORDER BY %s`%s` %s', $tableAlias, $column, $direction)` with only backtick-quoting and no escaping. Because a backtick in the payload breaks out of the identifier context, an authenticated admin session can inject arbitrary SQL (error-based via EXTRACTVALUE, or time-based via SLEEP()) to extract database contents including administrator password hashes. Most of Subrion's ~29 admin grid controllers either define no $_gridSorting whitelist at all (e.g. pages.php, transactions.php, languages.php) or an incomplete one covering only some of their sortable columns (e.g. members.php whitelists only 1 of 7 sortable fields), making the vast majority of admin grid endpoints exploitable.
Gravedad CVSS v3.1: ALTA
Última modificación:
05/08/2026

CVE-2026-71276
Fecha de publicación:
05/08/2026
Idioma:
Inglés
*** Pendiente de traducción *** Magistrala (formerly Mainflux)'s message-readers API reads a `format` value from the HTTP query string (readers/api/http/transport.go) with no validation and interpolates it directly into raw SQL queries via fmt.Sprintf() in both the PostgreSQL reader (readers/postgres/messages.go: `fmt.Sprintf("SELECT * FROM %s WHERE %s ...", format, cond)`) and the TimescaleDB reader (readers/timescale/messages.go, same pattern), enabling SQL injection by any authenticated user able to query channel messages.
Gravedad CVSS v3.1: ALTA
Última modificación:
05/08/2026

CVE-2026-71277
Fecha de publicación:
05/08/2026
Idioma:
Inglés
*** Pendiente de traducción *** rust-iot-platform's AuthToken request-guard implementation (api/src/main.rs) only checks whether the Authorization HTTP header is present, and never validates its value against any session, token store, or signature. Any request carrying an arbitrary non-empty Authorization header (e.g. `Authorization: fake`) satisfies the guard, granting access to every endpoint protected only by this request guard.
Gravedad CVSS v3.1: CRÍTICA
Última modificación:
05/08/2026

CVE-2026-71278
Fecha de publicación:
05/08/2026
Idioma:
Inglés
*** Pendiente de traducción *** rust-iot-platform allows creating a "calc rule" via POST /calc-rule/create (api/src/controller/calc_rule_router.rs) containing an arbitrary `script` field. This route does not take the AuthToken request guard used elsewhere in the application, making it reachable without authentication. The stored script is subsequently executed via quick_js::Context::eval() in api/src/biz/calc_run_biz.rs with no sandboxing, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to achieve arbitrary JavaScript execution in the server process by creating and triggering a malicious calc rule.
Gravedad CVSS v3.1: CRÍTICA
Última modificación:
05/08/2026

CVE-2026-71279
Fecha de publicación:
05/08/2026
Idioma:
Inglés
*** Pendiente de traducción *** Zigbee2MQTT's ExternalJSExtension.getFilePath() (lib/extension/externalJS.ts) joins a `name` parameter received via an MQTT message (topic zigbee2mqtt/bridge/request/extension/save) into the extensions base path using path.join(basePath, name) with no sanitization. Because path.join() resolves `../` sequences, a name such as `../../tmp/evil.js` escapes the intended extensions directory. The extension handler only validates that the name ends in .js/.mjs/.cjs, writes the file, and then dynamically imports it via Node.js import(), achieving remote code execution. Requires the `enable_external_js` config option (off by default, but commonly enabled in legacy installs) and MQTT broker access, which is frequently unauthenticated in real deployments. The identical unsanitized getFilePath() is also used by the extension-removal handler, enabling arbitrary file deletion.
Gravedad CVSS v3.1: ALTA
Última modificación:
05/08/2026

CVE-2026-71280
Fecha de publicación:
05/08/2026
Idioma:
Inglés
*** Pendiente de traducción *** go-shiori's DownloadBookmark() (internal/core/download.go) fetches a caller-supplied bookmark URL using a plain http.Client with no custom DialContext or destination-IP validation (no IsLoopback(), IsPrivate(), IsUnspecified(), or IsLinkLocalUnicast() checks). An authenticated user creating or updating a bookmark via POST /api/bookmark, PUT /api/v1/bookmarks/cache, or POST /api/bookmarks/ext can supply a loopback (127.0.0.1) or 0.0.0.0 (which Linux redirects to loopback) URL, causing the server to make outbound requests to internal-only services, cloud metadata endpoints, or other network-restricted resources.
Gravedad CVSS v3.1: ALTA
Última modificación:
05/08/2026

CVE-2026-71281
Fecha de publicación:
05/08/2026
Idioma:
Inglés
*** Pendiente de traducción *** Hugging Face peft's LoRA-GA and CorDA initialization modules (src/peft/tuners/lora/corda.py lines ~102 and ~163, and src/peft/tuners/lora/loraga.py line ~101) call torch.load() on config-specified cache/covariance files without weights_only=True, bypassing peft's own safe-loading wrapper used elsewhere in the codebase. Because torch.load() without weights_only=True performs full pickle deserialization, loading a malicious cache or covariance file (e.g. a shared/downloaded LoRA-GA or CorDA cache) results in arbitrary code execution.
Gravedad CVSS v3.1: ALTA
Última modificación:
05/08/2026

CVE-2026-71282
Fecha de publicación:
05/08/2026
Idioma:
Inglés
*** Pendiente de traducción *** ChirpStack's SQLite-backend device tag filtering (chirpstack/src/storage/device.rs, in both get_count() and list()) interpolates the user-supplied tag KEY directly into a raw SQL fragment via Rust's format!() macro (`dsl::sql::(&format!("device.tags->>'{}' =", k)).bind::(v)`), while only the tag VALUE is safely parameter-bound via Diesel's .bind(). An authenticated user with device-list access can inject SQL via a crafted tag key when the SQLite backend (chirpstack-sqlite package) is in use; the PostgreSQL backend is unaffected as it uses Diesel's native JSONB containment operator instead of raw SQL string formatting.
Gravedad CVSS v3.1: MEDIA
Última modificación:
05/08/2026

CVE-2026-71283
Fecha de publicación:
05/08/2026
Idioma:
Inglés
*** Pendiente de traducción *** Fledge's backup-restore upload handler, upload_backup() (python/fledge/services/core/api/backup_restore.py), calls tarfile.extractall(temp_path) on an admin-uploaded tar archive with no filter argument and no per-member path validation. A crafted tar archive containing member names with `../` path components extracts files outside the intended temporary directory, allowing arbitrary file writes anywhere on the filesystem reachable by the Fledge process. Requires the admin role (@has_permission("admin")).
Gravedad CVSS v3.1: MEDIA
Última modificación:
05/08/2026

CVE-2026-71268
Fecha de publicación:
05/08/2026
Idioma:
Inglés
*** Pendiente de traducción *** OpenPLC Runtime v3's compile_program() function (webserver/openplc.py) parses `(*FILE:path content*)` directives from uploaded Structured Text (.st) program files and writes the referenced content to `os.path.join('./core', file_path)` with no validation that file_path stays within the ./core directory. A crafted .st file containing a directive such as `(*FILE:../../../etc/cron.d/x * * * * root *)` writes attacker-controlled content to an arbitrary filesystem path, enabling remote code execution (e.g. via cron or SSH authorized_keys). A path-validation function, validate_file_path(), exists elsewhere in the codebase (webserver/credentials.py) but is never invoked from compile_program(), leaving the sink unprotected. OpenPLC additionally ships with hardcoded default credentials (openplc:openplc), lowering the practical bar for exploitation.
Gravedad CVSS v3.1: CRÍTICA
Última modificación:
05/08/2026
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