Vulnerabilidades

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> netfilter: flowtable: IPIP tunnel hardware offload is not yet support<br /> <br /> No driver supports for IPIP tunnels yet, give up early on setting up the<br /> hardware offload for this scenario.<br /> <br /> This patch adds a stub that can be enhanced to add more configuration<br /> that are currently not supported. As of now, the offload work is<br /> enqueued to the worker, then ignored if the hardware offload<br /> configuration is not supported.<br /> <br /> Check the NF_FLOW_HW flag to know if this entry was already tried once<br /> to be offloaded so this is not retried on refresh when unsupported. Move<br /> NF_FLOW_HW flag check to nf_flow_offload_add(). If this NF_FLOW_HW flag<br /> is unset the _del and _stats variants are never called.<br /> <br /> This can be updated later on to skip hardware offload work to be queued<br /> in case hardware offload does not support it.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> netfilter: ebtables: terminate table name before find_table_lock()<br /> <br /> update_counters() and compat_update_counters() forward a user-supplied<br /> 32-byte table name to find_table_lock() without NUL-terminating it. On a<br /> lookup miss, find_inlist_lock() calls try_then_request_module(..., "%s%s",<br /> "ebtable_", name), and vsnprintf() reads past the name field and the<br /> stack object until it hits a zero byte.<br /> <br /> BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in string (lib/vsprintf.c:648 lib/vsprintf.c:730)<br /> Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880119dfb20 by task exploit/147<br /> Call Trace:<br /> ...<br /> string (lib/vsprintf.c:648 lib/vsprintf.c:730)<br /> vsnprintf (lib/vsprintf.c:2945)<br /> __request_module (kernel/module/kmod.c:150)<br /> do_update_counters.isra.0 (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:371 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:380)<br /> update_counters (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:1440)<br /> do_ebt_set_ctl (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2573)<br /> nf_setsockopt (net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101)<br /> ip_setsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1424)<br /> raw_setsockopt (net/ipv4/raw.c:847)<br /> __sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2393)<br /> ...<br /> <br /> compat_do_replace() shares the same unterminated name via<br /> compat_copy_ebt_replace_from_user(); terminate it there too so all<br /> find_table_lock() callers behave alike. The other callers already<br /> terminate the name after the copy.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> netfilter: ebtables: module names must be null-terminated<br /> <br /> We need to explicitly check the length, else we may pass non-null<br /> terminated string to request_module().

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ksmbd: fix UAF of struct file_lock in SMB2_LOCK deferred-lock cancellation<br /> <br /> When a blocking byte-range lock request is deferred in the<br /> FILE_LOCK_DEFERRED path, ksmbd registers the asynchronous work into<br /> the connection&amp;#39;s async_requests list via setup_async_work(). The cancel<br /> callback smb2_remove_blocked_lock() holds a reference to the flock.<br /> <br /> If the lock waiter is subsequently woken up but the work state is no<br /> longer KSMBD_WORK_ACTIVE (e.g., due to a concurrent cancellation), the<br /> cleanup path calls locks_free_lock(flock) without dequeuing the work from<br /> the async_requests list. Concurrently, smb2_cancel() walks the list<br /> under conn-&gt;request_lock and invokes the cancel callback, which then<br /> dereferences the already freed &amp;#39;flock&amp;#39;. This leads to a slab-use-after-free<br /> inside __wake_up_common.<br /> <br /> Fix this by restructuring the cleanup logic after the worker returns<br /> from ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_wait(). Move list_del(&amp;smb_lock-&gt;llist) and<br /> release_async_work(work) to the top of the cleanup block. This guarantees<br /> that the async work is completely dequeued and serialized under<br /> conn-&gt;request_lock before locks_free_lock(flock) is called, rendering<br /> the flock unreachable for any concurrent smb2_cancel().

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ksmbd: serialize QUERY_DIRECTORY requests per file<br /> <br /> smb2_query_dir() stores a pointer to its stack-allocated private data in<br /> the ksmbd_file readdir_data. Concurrent QUERY_DIRECTORY requests using the<br /> same file handle can overwrite this pointer while an iterate_dir() callback<br /> is still using it, resulting in a stack use-after-free.<br /> <br /> Add a per-file mutex and hold it while accessing the shared directory<br /> enumeration state. The lock covers scan restart, dot entry state,<br /> readdir_data setup and iteration, and response construction. This prevents<br /> another request from replacing readdir_data.private before the current<br /> request has finished using it and also serializes the shared file position.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ksmbd: add a permission check for FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA<br /> <br /> FSCTL_SET_ZERO_DATA in smb2_ioctl() destroys file data via<br /> ksmbd_vfs_zero_data() -&gt; vfs_fallocate(PUNCH_HOLE/ZERO_RANGE) after<br /> checking only the share-level KSMBD_TREE_CONN_FLAG_WRITABLE, with no<br /> per-handle access check. A handle opened with only FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES<br /> still yields an FMODE_WRITE filp (FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES is part of<br /> FILE_WRITE_DESIRE_ACCESS_LE, so smb2_create_open_flags() opens it<br /> O_WRONLY), so the vfs_fallocate FMODE_WRITE check does not stop it; only<br /> the missing fp-&gt;daccess gate would. Reproduced on mainline 7.1-rc7 with<br /> KASAN by an authenticated SMB client: a FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES-only handle<br /> zeroed 4096 bytes of file data it had no FILE_WRITE_DATA right to<br /> (6/6; a FILE_READ_DATA-only handle was correctly denied).<br /> <br /> This is the unfixed sibling of commit cc57232cae23 ("ksmbd: fix FSCTL<br /> permission bypass by adding a permission check for FSCTL_SET_SPARSE").<br /> Because SET_ZERO_DATA writes data (not an attribute), require<br /> FILE_WRITE_DATA.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ksmbd: add permission checks for FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_TO_FILE<br /> <br /> The FSCTL_DUPLICATE_EXTENTS_TO_FILE arm of smb2_ioctl() overwrites the<br /> destination file&amp;#39;s data via vfs_clone_file_range() with neither the<br /> share-level KSMBD_TREE_CONN_FLAG_WRITABLE check nor a per-handle<br /> fp-&gt;daccess check that the other write-bearing arms carry. A client can<br /> overwrite destination data on a read-only share, or from a handle opened<br /> with only FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES (which still yields an FMODE_WRITE filp).<br /> FILE_WRITE_ATTRIBUTES-only destination handle overwrote the file&amp;#39;s data via<br /> the clone. Add both checks, matching the FSCTL_SET_SPARSE permission fix;<br /> require FILE_WRITE_DATA since this writes data.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ksmbd: prevent path traversal bypass by restricting caseless retry<br /> <br /> ksmbd_vfs_path_lookup() enforces LOOKUP_BENEATH to restrict path<br /> resolution within the share root. When a crafted path attempts to<br /> escape the share boundary using parent-directory components (&amp;#39;..&amp;#39;),<br /> vfs_path_parent_lookup() detects this and immediately fails,<br /> returning -EXDEV.<br /> <br /> However, a bug exists in __ksmbd_vfs_kern_path() under caseless mode.<br /> The function fails to intercept the -EXDEV error and erroneously<br /> falls through to the caseless retry logic, which is intended only<br /> for genuinely missing files. During this retry process, the path<br /> is reconstructed, leading to an unintended LOOKUP_BENEATH bypass<br /> that allows write-capable users to create zero-length files or<br /> directories outside the exported share.<br /> <br /> Fix this by ensuring that the execution only proceeds to the caseless<br /> lookup retry when the error is specifically -ENOENT. Any other errors,<br /> such as -EXDEV from a path traversal attempt, must be returned immediately.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> smb: client: resolve SWN tcon from live registrations<br /> <br /> cifs_swn_notify() looks up a witness registration by id under<br /> cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex, drops the mutex, and then uses the registration&amp;#39;s<br /> cached tcon pointer. That pointer is not a lifetime reference, and it is<br /> not a stable representative once cifs_get_swn_reg() lets multiple tcons<br /> for the same net/share name share one registration id.<br /> <br /> A same-share second mount can keep the cifs_swn_reg alive after the first<br /> tcon unregisters and is freed. The registration then still points at the<br /> freed first tcon, so taking tc_lock or incrementing tc_count through<br /> swnreg-&gt;tcon only moves the use-after-free earlier. Taking tc_lock while<br /> holding cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex also violates the documented CIFS lock<br /> order.<br /> <br /> Fix this by making the registration store only the stable witness<br /> identity: id, net name, share name, and notify flags. When a notify<br /> arrives, copy that identity under cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex, drop the mutex,<br /> then find and pin a live witness tcon that currently matches the net/share<br /> pair under the normal cifs_tcp_ses_lock -&gt; tc_lock order. The notification<br /> path uses that pinned tcon directly and drops the reference when done.<br /> <br /> Registration and unregister messages now use the live tcon passed by the<br /> caller instead of a cached tcon in the registration. The final unregister<br /> send is folded into cifs_swn_unregister() while the registration is still<br /> protected by cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex. This removes the previous<br /> find/drop/reacquire raw-pointer window. The release path only removes the<br /> idr entry and frees the stable identity strings.<br /> <br /> This preserves the intended one-registration/many-tcon behavior: a<br /> registration id represents a net/share pair, and notify handling acts on a<br /> live representative selected at use time. It also preserves CLIENT_MOVE<br /> ordering for the representative tcon because the old-IP unregister is sent<br /> before cifs_swn_register() sends the new-IP register.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> coresight: ultrasoc-smb: Fix OOB write in smb_sync_perf_buffer()<br /> <br /> When the SMB sink is used as a perf AUX sink, smb_update_buffer() calls<br /> smb_sync_perf_buffer() to copy hardware trace data into the perf AUX ring<br /> buffer pages. It derives pg_idx = head &gt;&gt; PAGE_SHIFT from @head, which is<br /> handle-&gt;head, and indexes dst_pages[pg_idx]. The pg_idx %= nr_pages<br /> normalization is only applied after the first loop iteration.<br /> <br /> This leaves the initial page index underived from the buffer size, which<br /> can result in an out-of-bounds write past dst_pages[] when head exceeds<br /> the AUX buffer size.<br /> <br /> Normalize head modulo the AUX buffer size before deriving the page index<br /> and offset, mirroring tmc_etr_sync_perf_buffer().

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate option length before reading conf opt value<br /> <br /> l2cap_get_conf_opt() derives the option length from the<br /> attacker-controlled opt-&gt;len field and immediately dereferences<br /> opt-&gt;val (as u8, get_unaligned_le16() or get_unaligned_le32(), or a<br /> raw pointer for the default case) before any caller has confirmed<br /> that opt-&gt;len bytes are present in the buffer. The callers<br /> (l2cap_parse_conf_req(), l2cap_parse_conf_rsp() and<br /> l2cap_conf_rfc_get()) only detect a malformed option afterwards, once<br /> the running length has gone negative, by which point the<br /> out-of-bounds read has already executed.<br /> <br /> An existing post-hoc length check keeps the garbage value from being<br /> consumed, so this is not a data leak in the current control flow. It<br /> is still a validate-after-use ordering bug: up to 4 bytes are read<br /> past the end of the buffer before it is known to contain them, and it<br /> is fragile to future changes in the callers.<br /> <br /> Fix it at the source. Pass the end of the buffer into<br /> l2cap_get_conf_opt() and refuse to touch opt-&gt;val unless the full<br /> option (header + value) fits. Each caller computes an end pointer<br /> once before the loop and checks the return value directly instead of<br /> inferring the error from a negative length.

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> smb: client: fix query directory replay double-free<br /> <br /> A response-bearing attempt can return a replayable error and free its<br /> response buffer. If SMB2_query_directory_init() fails before the next send,<br /> cleanup retains the previous buffer type and frees that response again.<br /> <br /> Reset response bookkeeping before each attempt to prevent the stale free.