CVE-2026-23411

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> apparmor: fix race between freeing data and fs accessing it<br /> <br /> AppArmor was putting the reference to i_private data on its end after<br /> removing the original entry from the file system. However the inode<br /> can aand does live beyond that point and it is possible that some of<br /> the fs call back functions will be invoked after the reference has<br /> been put, which results in a race between freeing the data and<br /> accessing it through the fs.<br /> <br /> While the rawdata/loaddata is the most likely candidate to fail the<br /> race, as it has the fewest references. If properly crafted it might be<br /> possible to trigger a race for the other types stored in i_private.<br /> <br /> Fix this by moving the put of i_private referenced data to the correct<br /> place which is during inode eviction.