CVE-2026-43121

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> io_uring/zcrx: fix user_ref race between scrub and refill paths<br /> <br /> The io_zcrx_put_niov_uref() function uses a non-atomic<br /> check-then-decrement pattern (atomic_read followed by separate<br /> atomic_dec) to manipulate user_refs. This is serialized against other<br /> callers by rq_lock, but io_zcrx_scrub() modifies the same counter with<br /> atomic_xchg() WITHOUT holding rq_lock.<br /> <br /> On SMP systems, the following race exists:<br /> <br /> CPU0 (refill, holds rq_lock) CPU1 (scrub, no rq_lock)<br /> put_niov_uref:<br /> atomic_read(uref) - 1<br /> // window opens<br /> atomic_xchg(uref, 0) - 1<br /> return_niov_freelist(niov) [PUSH #1]<br /> // window closes<br /> atomic_dec(uref) - wraps to -1<br /> returns true<br /> return_niov(niov)<br /> return_niov_freelist(niov) [PUSH #2: DOUBLE-FREE]<br /> <br /> The same niov is pushed to the freelist twice, causing free_count to<br /> exceed nr_iovs. Subsequent freelist pushes then perform an out-of-bounds<br /> write (a u32 value) past the kvmalloc&amp;#39;d freelist array into the adjacent<br /> slab object.<br /> <br /> Fix this by replacing the non-atomic read-then-dec in<br /> io_zcrx_put_niov_uref() with an atomic_try_cmpxchg loop that atomically<br /> tests and decrements user_refs. This makes the operation safe against<br /> concurrent atomic_xchg from scrub without requiring scrub to acquire<br /> rq_lock.<br /> <br /> [pavel: removed a warning and a comment]