CVE-2026-47065

*** Pendiente de traducción *** ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy<br /> <br /> <br /> Assessment: Fully addressed.<br /> <br /> <br /> When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker <br /> for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()<br /> is<br /> dispatched. JDK then calls the default <br /> ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which <br /> performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH <br /> interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted<br /> classes list .<br /> <br /> <br /> ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in <br /> readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes<br /> <br /> <br /> Assessment: Fully addressed.<br /> <br /> <br /> For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s <br /> (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an <br /> attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the <br /> developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies <br /> com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes of SomeClass — and many <br /> real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers<br /> <br /> <br /> Both issues have been fixed.