CVE-2026-53224

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> sctp: validate embedded INIT chunk and address list lengths in cookie<br /> <br /> sctp_unpack_cookie() only checked that the embedded INIT chunk length<br /> did not exceed the remaining cookie payload, but did not ensure that the<br /> INIT chunk is large enough to contain a complete INIT header.<br /> <br /> A malformed COOKIE_ECHO can therefore carry a truncated INIT chunk whose<br /> length field is smaller than sizeof(struct sctp_init_chunk). Later,<br /> sctp_process_init() accesses INIT parameters unconditionally, which may<br /> lead to out-of-bounds reads.<br /> <br /> In addition, raw_addr_list_len is not fully validated against the<br /> remaining cookie payload. When cookie authentication is disabled, an<br /> attacker can supply an oversized raw_addr_list_len and cause<br /> sctp_raw_to_bind_addrs() to read beyond the end of the cookie. The<br /> address parser also lacks sufficient bounds checks for parameter headers<br /> and lengths, allowing malformed address parameters to trigger<br /> out-of-bounds reads.<br /> <br /> Fix this by:<br /> <br /> - requiring the embedded INIT chunk length to be at least sizeof(struct<br /> sctp_init_chunk);<br /> - validating that the INIT chunk and raw address list together fit<br /> within the cookie payload;<br /> - verifying sufficient data exists for each address parameter header and<br /> payload before parsing it.<br /> <br /> Note that sctp_verify_init() must be called after sctp_unpack_cookie()<br /> and before sctp_process_init() when cookie authentication is disabled.<br /> This will be addressed in a separate patch.