CVE-2026-63939

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area<br /> <br /> When setting the length of the GHCB scratch area, and the area is in the<br /> GHCB shared buffer, set the effective length of the scratch area to the max<br /> possible size given the start of the guest-provided pointer, and the end of<br /> the shared buffer.<br /> <br /> The code was "fine" when first introduced, as KVM doesn&amp;#39;t consult the<br /> length of the buffer when emulating MMIO, because the passed in @len always<br /> specifies the *max* size required. But for PSC requests, the incoming @len<br /> is just the minimum length (to process the header), and KVM needs to know<br /> the full size of the scratch area to avoid buffer overflows (spoiler alert).<br /> <br /> Opportunistically rename @len =&gt; @min_len to better reflect its role.