CVE-2026-64046

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net: tls: prevent chain-after-chain in plain text SG<br /> <br /> Sashiko points out that if end = 0 (start != 0) the current<br /> code will create a chain link to content type right after<br /> the wrap link:<br /> <br /> This would create a chain where the wrap link points directly<br /> to another chain link. The scatterlist API sg_next iterator<br /> does not recursively resolve consecutive chain links.<br /> <br /> meaning this is illegal input to crypto.<br /> <br /> The wrapping link is unnecessary if end = 0. end is the entry after<br /> the last one used so end = 0 means there&amp;#39;s nothing pushed after<br /> the wrap:<br /> <br /> end start i<br /> v v v<br /> [ ]...[ ][ d ][ d ][ d ][ d ][rsv for wrap]<br /> <br /> Skip the wrapping in this case.<br /> <br /> TLS 1.3 can use the "wrapping slot" for it&amp;#39;s chaining if end = 0.<br /> This avoids the chain-after-chain.<br /> <br /> Move the wrap chaining before marking END and chaining off content<br /> type, that feels like more logical ordering to me, but should not<br /> matter from functional perspective.