CVE-2026-68118

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> tcp: challenge ACK for non-exact RST in SYN-RECEIVED<br /> <br /> The SYN-RECEIVED request-socket path in tcp_check_req() accepts an<br /> in-window RST without requiring SEG.SEQ to exactly match RCV.NXT. A<br /> non-exact RST therefore removes the request instead of eliciting a<br /> challenge ACK.<br /> <br /> RFC 9293 section 3.10.7.4 applies the RFC 5961 reset check in<br /> SYN-RECEIVED: an exact RST resets the connection, while a non-exact<br /> in-window RST must trigger a challenge ACK and be dropped.<br /> <br /> Apply that check before the ACK-field validation, following the RFC<br /> sequence-number, RST, then ACK processing order. Factor the per-netns<br /> challenge ACK quota out of tcp_send_challenge_ack() so request sockets<br /> can share it. Use the request socket&amp;#39;s send_ack() callback and its own<br /> out-of-window ACK timestamp to send and rate-limit the response.