CVE-2026-68125

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> mac802154: llsec: reject frames shorter than the authentication tag<br /> <br /> llsec_do_decrypt_auth() computes the associated-data length for the<br /> AEAD request as<br /> <br /> assoclen += datalen - authlen;<br /> <br /> where datalen is the number of bytes after the MAC header and authlen<br /> (4, 8 or 16) is the length of the authentication tag. Nothing verifies<br /> that the frame actually carries at least authlen payload bytes. A<br /> secured frame whose payload is shorter than the tag makes<br /> datalen - authlen negative; assoclen is then passed to<br /> aead_request_set_ad() as an unsigned value close to 4 GiB, so<br /> crypto_aead_decrypt() walks far off the end of the scatterlist that<br /> only spans the real frame.<br /> <br /> The frame is fully attacker-controlled and reaches this path from any<br /> IEEE 802.15.4 peer in radio range. Reject frames whose payload is<br /> shorter than the authentication tag before the subtraction.<br /> <br /> Dynamically reproduced on a KASAN kernel as a general-protection-fault<br /> in the AEAD scatterwalk, and the fix confirmed.