CVE-2026-68294

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> net: qrtr: restrict socket creation to the initial network namespace<br /> <br /> QRTR keeps its entire port and node state in module-global variables<br /> that are not partitioned per network namespace: qrtr_local_nid is a<br /> single global node id (always 1) and qrtr_ports is a single global<br /> xarray. qrtr_port_lookup() and qrtr_local_enqueue() operate on that<br /> global state with no network-namespace check, and qrtr_create() places<br /> no restriction on the namespace a socket is created in.<br /> <br /> As a result an unprivileged process that creates an AF_QIPCRTR socket<br /> in a separate network namespace, e.g. via<br /> unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNET), can send QRTR datagrams -<br /> including control-plane messages such as QRTR_TYPE_NEW_SERVER - to QRTR<br /> sockets owned by another namespace, and vice versa. The receiving<br /> socket sees such a message as coming from node id 1, indistinguishable<br /> from a legitimate local client, breaking the isolation that network<br /> namespaces are expected to provide.<br /> <br /> QRTR is a transport to global hardware endpoints (the modem and other<br /> remote processors) and has no per-namespace semantics; its in-kernel<br /> name service already creates its socket in init_net only. Confine the<br /> socket family to the initial network namespace, as other<br /> non-namespace-aware socket families do (see llc_ui_create() and the<br /> ieee802154 socket code).