CVE-2026-74472

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ublk: reset kernel-owned dev_info fields in ublk_ctrl_add_dev()<br /> <br /> ublk_ctrl_add_dev() memcpy()s the userspace ublksrv_ctrl_dev_info into<br /> ub-&gt;dev_info and then fixes up the fields the driver owns, but misses<br /> -&gt;state and -&gt;ublksrv_pid.<br /> <br /> A device added with -&gt;state = UBLK_S_DEV_LIVE passes the<br /> "-&gt;state != UBLK_S_DEV_DEAD" test that ublk_stop_dev_unlocked() uses as its<br /> proxy for "a disk is attached", while -&gt;ub_disk is still NULL, so DEL_DEV<br /> right after ADD_DEV oopses in del_gendisk(). UBLK_S_DEV_QUIESCED plus<br /> UBLK_F_USER_RECOVERY dies one step earlier, in ublk_force_abort_dev(). A<br /> poisoned -&gt;state also gets START_USER_RECOVERY and the char device<br /> read/write path onto a device that was never started, and wedges START_DEV<br /> at -EEXIST. A poisoned -&gt;ublksrv_pid just makes GET_DEV_INFO report an<br /> unrelated task as the ublk server.<br /> <br /> Reset both after the memcpy(), as ublk_detach_disk() does. Userspace only<br /> ever reads these back, so correcting them silently breaks nothing.<br /> <br /> ADD_DEV has copied -&gt;state in unsanitized since ublk was merged, but back<br /> then it was harmless: the gendisk was allocated during ADD_DEV, and both<br /> teardown and the START_DEV -EEXIST check keyed off disk_live() rather than<br /> -&gt;state. The oops became reachable once the disk allocation moved to<br /> START_DEV and those checks switched to -&gt;state.