CVE-2026-74671

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> ima: fix out-of-bounds read in xattr_verify()<br /> <br /> The digest-length check in xattr_verify() mixes int and size_t:<br /> <br /> if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value-&gt;type) - hash_start &gt;=<br /> iint-&gt;ima_hash-&gt;length)<br /> <br /> sizeof() yields size_t, so the usual arithmetic conversions promote<br /> the whole left-hand side to unsigned 64-bit before the subtraction<br /> runs. For a truncated xattr this underflows instead of going negative:<br /> a 1-byte IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG xattr (xattr_len == 1, hash_start == 1)<br /> turns "1 - 1 - 1" into SIZE_MAX, which is trivially &gt;= ima_hash-&gt;length.<br /> The check then passes and the following memcmp() reads<br /> iint-&gt;ima_hash-&gt;length bytes starting past the end of the buffer<br /> vfs_getxattr_alloc() allocated for it.<br /> <br /> Nothing upstream clamps xattr_len back into a safe range first:<br /> ima_get_hash_algo() only special-cases xattr_len