CVE-2026-99235

*** Pendiente de traducción *** In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:<br /> <br /> tracing: Save the event file instead of the compatible histogram<br /> <br /> create_field_var_hist() creates a histogram on the matched event to<br /> supply a field variable, and records it on the target so it can be torn<br /> down later:<br /> <br /> hist_data = find_compatible_hist(target_hist_data, file);<br /> ...<br /> /* Save the compatible histogram information */<br /> var_hist-&gt;hist_data = hist_data;<br /> <br /> hist_data is not the histogram it creates. It is one that was already<br /> there, whose keys the new one copies. The saved pointer has a single<br /> user, unregister_field_var_hists(), which runs when the target is<br /> removed:<br /> <br /> file = hist_data-&gt;field_var_hists[i]-&gt;hist_data-&gt;event_file;<br /> <br /> find_compatible_hist() matches on keys alone, so it can pick one with no<br /> variables of its own. check_var_refs() then returns false and the user<br /> can remove it while the target still points at it:<br /> <br /> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in event_hist_trigger_free+0x2b2/0x320<br /> Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880093b90e0 by task init/1<br /> <br /> Freed by task 1:<br /> kfree+0x154/0x420<br /> event_hist_trigger_free+0x1d5/0x320<br /> event_hist_trigger_parse+0x35f3/0x69e0<br /> trigger_process_regex+0x1a6/0x250<br /> <br /> Save the event file instead. It is all the dereference ever wanted, and<br /> it does not go away when the user removes a trigger.